Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility by Branson, Douglas M.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium: Financial 
Institutions, Municipal Finance, and Community 
Development 
Article 1 
4-1976 
Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for 
Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility 
Douglas M. Branson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas M. Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 Vanderbilt Law Review 539 (1976) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 29 APRIL 1976 NUMBER 3
Progress in the Art of Social
Accounting and Other Arguments
for Disclosure on Corporate
Social Responsibility*
Douglas M. Branson**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTING ............ . 546
II. AN INVENTORY OF TYPES OF SOCIAL AUDITS ........... 551
A. The Process Audit ............................ 551
B. The Complete Audit .......................... 560
C. The Complete Audit - Another Approach ...... 562
D. The Super Social Audit ........................ 566
III. PRESENT PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUR-
THER PROGRESS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTING ............... 574
IV. PROGRESS IN THE ART OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTING - A FIRST
ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE ......................... 580
V. INCONGRUITIES IN THE PRESENT DISCLOSURE SYSTEM -
ANOTHER ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE ................ 582
A. The Purposes of Disclosure - In General ........ 582
B. Utility in the Investment Process - An Argument
for Disclosure on Social Responsibility .......... 585
(1) Introduction ............................... 585
(2) Evidence of Investor Interest in Social Responsi-
bility Disclosure ........................... 587
(3) Individual Investor Attitudes ............... 592
C. Parity as a Goal of Disclosure - Presentation of a
Well-Rounded Picture of the Firm .............. 604
* The author wishes to thank Professor Ernest L. Folk, III, of the University of Virginia
School of Law for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A., University of Notre
Dame, 1965; J.D., Northwestern University, 1970; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1974.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
(1) Expanding Financial Accounting Requirements
.. .......... ......... .. ..... .............. . 604
(2) Expanding Financial Disclosure Requirements 606
(3) Expanded Accessibility to and Dissemination of
Financial Information ...................... 609
D. Another Parity As a Goal of Disclosure - Equality
of Access to Information for Investors or Categories
of Investors ..................... ............. 617
E. A Third Parity as a Goal of Disclosure - Equivalent
Amounts of Information Available About Different
Corporations and Classes of Corporations ........ 621
F. A Traditional Purpose of Disclosure - Prevention of
Fraud and Forced Revelation of Risk ............ 624
VI. THE PRESENT POSITION AND ATITUDE OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ........................ 627
A . Introduction .................................. 627
B. Formal Action by the SEC ..................... 629
C. The Revolution on the Theory of the Corporation 639
VII. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FROM NONINVESTOR POINTS OF
V IEW ............................................ 648
A. Introduction .................................. 648
B. Benefits Social Accounting and Disclosure Might
Bestow .................................. 649
(1) Uniformity, Comparability, and Resulting Ben-
efits ...................................... 649
(2) More Efficient Allocation of Corporate Re-
sources Devoted to Social Responsibility ..... 651
(3) Relief of Corporate Social Performances from
M isguided Attacks ......................... 653
(4) Relief from Some Shareholder Proxy Proposals
and the Waste of Corporate and Governmental
Resources They Entail ..................... 655
(5) Relief from Public Relations Drivel Now Substi-
tuting for Controlled Disclosures ............ 657
(6) Social Accounting and Disclosure as the Most
Efficient Use of Governmental Resources ..... 658
(a) Federal Chartering ..................... 659
(b) Federal Corporate Uniformity Statutes ... 662
(c) Installation of Public Interest Directors ... 664
(d) Liberalized Shareholder Proxy Proposal
R ule .................................. 666
[Vol. 29:539
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING
(e) One-Person-One-Vote Restructuring ...... 667
(f) Nationalization ......................... 668
(7) Accounting and Disclosure as the Most Politi-
cally Feasible of Reforms ................... 668
(8) Disclosure as a Means of Forcing Social Ac-
counting's Development .................... 669
(9) Disclosure Will Make Further Reform Less Ab-
rupt and Better Considered ................. 670
C. Costs Social Accounting and Disclosure Might
Im pose ....................................... 670
(1) The Information Social Accounting Could Pro-
vide Would Be of a Soft, Speculative Variety . 670
(2) Social Responsibility Is a Moving Target, and
Costs Will Be Incurred in Hitting a New Target
Each Year ................................ 672
(3) Compiling Data on Corporate Social Perform-
ance W ill Be Costly ........................ 673
(4) Image Costs to Corporations Will Arise When
Disclosure Forces Revelation of Negative Items
or Lack of Progress on Certain Social Fronts .. 674
(5) An Excursion into the Socioeconomic Arena
Will Cause Loss of the SEC's Non-Controversial
Status, and, Therefore, Its Effectiveness ..... 676
VIII. A MODEST PROPOSAL - REQUIRED DISCLOSURE OF PRO-
CESS AUDIT RESULTS .. .............................. 678
IX. CONCLUSION ........................................ 682
Would you tell me please which way I ought to go from
here? That depends a good deal on where you want to go.
-The Cheshire Cat to Alice in Wonderland.
In the area of corporate social responsibility, where to
go and how to get there are major questions facing corpora-
tions, their lawyers, investors, and governmental agencies
alike.' Questions of "where to go" facing corporate execu-
1. See, e.g., R. BAUER & D. FENN, THE CORPORATE SOCIAL AUDrr 3 (1972), reviewing
"rhetoric from businessmen and public officials alike" calling on "corporate management
to solve the problems of Urban America once and for all" and the confusion that has
resulted:
Ralph Nader, consumerism, ecology, Africa, misleading advertising, Campaign GM,
student and church criticism all tumbled over one another seeking attention to the point
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tives and others include how much corporate social respon-
sibility is enough 2 and what forms social responsibility
should take. Other questions concern which of the socially
responsible measures corporations could take portend the
greatest good for the greatest number, or on the more prag-
matic scale, which measures will win the greatest amount
of public or governmental acceptance. What roles govern-
ment, citizen groups, or investors should play in inducing
or in monitoring corporate social responsibility are
questions of "how to get there."' 3 Much debated and often
where the businessman of the seventies is caught up in a confusing turbulence of de-
mands and charges and concerns, all marching under the umbrella of "social responsibil-
ity."
On the quandary facing institutional investors over how to inject corporate responsibility
into the investment selection process see B. LONGSTRErH & H. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 41-70 (1973). For a description of similar
problems facing not-for-profit institutional investors, J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMAN,
THE ETHICAL INVESTOR (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE ETICAL INVESTOR]. See also auth-
orities cited note 4 infra.
2. This article presumes that corporations do have responsibilities over and above pro-
viding goods and services to meet demand and beyond maximizing profits for the benefit of
stockholders. Most scholars who have addressed the question now agree that corporations do
have such a responsibility. See, e.g., notes 176-88 infra and accompanying text. There are,
however, a few who believe that any corporation attempting to fulfill social responsibilities
is, indeed, an Alice in Wonderland. The most notable of these is Professor Milton Friedman,
who states:
Most of the talk has been utter hogwash . . . .[Tihe question is, do corporate execu-
tives, provided they stay within the law, have responsibilities in their business activities
other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible? And my answer
to that is, no, they do not.
McClaughry, Milton Friedman Responds, Bus. & Soc'y REv. 5, 6 (Spring 1972). See also M.
FRIEDMAN, AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 147 (1972) (remarking that corporate social responsibility
is "pure and unadulterated socialism"); Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32 (corporate responsibility "could
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society" and "is a fundamentally
subversive doctrine"). The other notable devotee of profit maximization as the corporation's
sole goal is Professor Henry G. Manne. See, e.g., Manne, Financial Intermediaries and Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 17 N.Y.L.F. 725 (1971); Manne, Good for General Motors, BARRONS, May
18, 1970, at 1; Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility, 26 Bus. LAW. 533 (1970).
Indications, though, are that Professor Manne is softening a bit. See Manne, The Limits and
Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic Model, 59 VA. L. REv. 708 (1973),
discussed in notes 182-88 infra and accompanying text. This article avoids that debate,
however, and assumes that corporations do have social responsibility, confining itself to a
discussion of how much social responsibility should be exercised and in what directions it lies
and the use of accounting and disclosure to answer those questions.
3. These inquiries are not new. For instance, to whom corporations are responsible-to
the shareholders alone or to labor, consumers, and society as well-was the subject of the
famous Berle-Dodd debates. See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L.
REv. 1049 (1931); Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REv. 1365 (1932); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
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heavy-handed or economically wasteful devices have been
proposed as means of achieving desired levels of corporate
social performance. These proposed devices include federal
chartering of corporations, federal minimum corporate law
standards, use of shareholder public interest proxy cam-
paigns, installation of public interest directors on corporate
boards of directors, and directors' election by specified con-
stituencies drawn from labor, consumers, or suppliers.'
This article's supposition is that perhaps none of these
devices offers as much promise in getting corporations to an
optimum level of social performance as does corporate so-
cial accounting. Indeed, combined with some disclosure of
accounting results, corporate social accounting will aid in
defining what an optimum level of social performance
might be. The corporate social audit, together with public
reporting, can be the Cheshire Cat of today's corporate
world. As such, it is more benevolent-sitting on the rail
telling corporations where to go and how to get there with
less acrimony, delay, or inefficiency-than federal charter-
ing of corporations, public interest proxy campaigns, or any
(1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). In 1919, Mackenzie King stated that the corpora-
tion must seek to serve the objectives of its employees and of the community. See G. GOYDER,
THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 20 (1951). As early as the 1950's, Howard R. Bowen
recommended that businessmen undergo an examination by independent experts every 5
years in order to evaluate their performance from a societal point of view. H. BOWEN, SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BusINEssMEN 155-56 (1953).
4. See, e.g., Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO.
L.J. 71 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
Ralph Nader is convinced that federal chartering is the answer to controlling major corpora-
tions as irresponsible power centers in modem society. For that reason he has created a Nader
subsidiary, the Corporate Accountability Research Group, to gather evidence, marshall argu-
ments, and advocate federal chartering. See Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973). Professor William Cary
is the latest on the scene with a new proposal-federal minimum standards. See Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Share-
holder proxy proposals and campaigns are reviewed in LONOSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note
1, at 3-19, and reviewed and advocated in Schwartz, Proxy Power and Social Goals-How
Campaign GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 765 (1971); Schwartz, The Public-Interest
Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971); Schwartz, Toward
New Corporate Goals: Co-existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971). The public directors
device and its pitfalls are analyzed in Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a
Private Corporation-The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. REV. 350 (1965).
Concise reflection on directors for varying constituencies can be found in Symposium,
Corporate Machinery for Hearing and Heeding New Voices, 27 Bus. LAW. 195, 197-208 (1971)
(remarks of Professor Alfred Conard). Notes 272-99 infra and accompanying text discuss all
of these proposed reforms and juxtapose them to social accounting and disclosure.
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other device reformers propose.
To demonstrate this, the article reviews the progress
that has taken place in the field of social accounting. In
that review, social accounting's virtues and its superiority
in accomplishing the aims of corporate social performance
should become evident. The discussion also lists the ques-
tions and imponderables that remain as limitations on so-
cial auditing techniques. Those limitations notwithstand-
ing, the article recommends that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission mandate corporate disclosure on cer-
tain basic social responsibility issues. Although other writ-
ers have recommended disclosure on corporate social re-
sponsibility,5 they have done so based upon various new
views of the corporation as a public, socioeconomic entity,
with responsibilities to consumers, labor, the community,
and the society as a whole.' They have abandoned the pres-
ent corporate law model of a private, primarily economic
entity owing its main responsibility to its owners, the share-
holders. The difficulty is that the bridge to such a new
model seems too long to transit in a single step.
This article's premise is that the time has come when
regulation can require disclosure on corporate social respon-
sibility based upon the present corporate law model. Dis-
closure has become justifiable not through some newly
emerging view of corporations as major power centers in our
society or in response to shrill calls to utilize disclosure to
tame the runaway beast or to cure social ills. Rather, it is
justifiable based upon traditional rationales for disclosure: 7
5. The principal works are Blumberg, The Public's "Right to Know": Disclosure in the
Major American Corporation, 28 Bus. LAW. 1025 (1973) and Schoenbaum, The Relationship
Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 565 (1972).
6. See text accompanying notes 322-29 infra. Nor have they discussed the accounting
that necessarily must precede disclosure.
7. Such an exposition seems timely. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has evidenced an intransigence toward such disclosure, most recently in hearings a federal
court felt constrained to order so as to determine the "extent of 'ethical investor' interest" in
information on corporate social performance. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., v. SEC,
389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 274-321 infra. Probably
due to the shrill rhetoric surrounding issues of corporate social responsibility generally, and
a lack of clear thinking about disclosure's many purposes, the Commission has concluded
hearings without requiring significant disclosure. Moreover, the Commission seems to retain
the view that it can require disclosure, if at all, only as "the promotion of social goals
unrelated to the objectives of the federal securities laws," Exchange Act Release No. 11,733,
at 1 (Oct. 14, 1975), and not based upon the rationales upon which the Commission has
traditionally premised disclosure.
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to enable investors to make sound investment decisions; to
even the flow of information about different companies to
disparate groups of investors; and to deter or to force revela-
tion of questionable acts or practices that can make an
individual's investment drastically lose value. The call to
action is sounded in response to the growing number of
judicial and legislative pronouncements that entail signifi-
cant liabilities for the polluter or the discriminating corpo-
ration. Those liabilities meld together with the public's and
the investors' growing expectancy that corporations should
be socially responsible and that such a corporate posture
may indicate good management or, indeed, lead to long-run
corporate prosperity. Thus, a need for before-the-fact dis-
closure to enable investors to ascertain if a company's envi-
ronmental programs are sound is just as strong as a need
for before-the-fact disclosure to determine if directors could
have serious conflicts of interest or if a company's product-
development program seems sufficient for the future.
In the meanwhile, the Alice in Wonderland analogy
will work on a theoretical level. Disclosure will aid theory
in telling "where to go" and "how to get there." Some social
auditing and disclosure can teach how and why corpora-
tions impinge on society. In that way, accounting and dis-
closure can help to define a new model of the body corpo-
rate before the old model is cast aside. Lurching into the
unknown before a new paradigm has evolved will become
unnecessary. Thus, disclosure acts as a needed half-way
measure, or bridge, to corporate law reform.
The article's conclusion is that in its more modest
forms social accounting and disclosure should be comm-
enced, both as a means of further, forced development of
social accounting techniques, and as a means of further,
forced contemplation about what the modem corporation
is and to whom it is responsible.8 Social accounting and
8. Although this article may seem primarily a public law piece, the content has many
here-and-now private law ramifications. Any lawyer who has as a client a large publicly held
corporation should begin learning the rudiments, strengths, and the shortcomings of social
accounting. If for nothing more, the wise counselor will do so as part of the good management
practice of knowing where the corporation stands on all fronts and as a device to provide
management with data for defense should the corporation be attacked as socially irresponsi-
ble, through a public interest proxy campaign or otherwise.
Moreover, corporate law reform discussion has intensified as of late. Federal chartering
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disclosure can serve in the meantime to force some corpo-
rate effort in reducing the social costs corporations impose
and improving the positive good they do, and thus act as a
device wisely and seasonably to heed even some of the more
shrill cries for corporate accountability.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTING
The social accounting process denotes many things. In terms of
either content or intent, a company might call the process "a 'Social
Action Evaluation' or 'Human Investment Analysis' or 'Social Per-
formance Measures,' or even 'Figuring How to Do Well and Good,'
or even. .. 'Benevolence for the Profit-Seeking Rationalist.' , Nei-
ther does a "unified concept of what a social audit is emerge from
the literature," nor in one view, "is there even any crude indication
of common trends" in social auditing.'0 The roots of the process,
however, can be traced. The calls of corporate activists and critics
for corporate social responsibility prompted concern among corpo-
rate executives. Within corporations the new consciousness thus
created caused accountants and other corporate managers to realize
that in the
[p]resent system of business reporting, we do not measure-or include
in any statement of its stewardship prepared by management-the damage
done to a stream when the poisonous pollutants are dumped into it, or to the
landscape when the land is scarred. . . by machine efficient strip mining. Nor
do we give proper reporting credit for the "good" that management does."
That realization was coupled with knowledge that "[t]he reporting
advocates have introduced a chartering proposal in the Congress. Some reform seems near.
See, e.g., notes 394 & 427 infra. And although none of the reform proposals discuss disclosure
at length, every current reform proposal contains social responsibility disclosure as a central
ingredient. See text accompanying notes 423-24 infra. Thus, the wise counselor should advise
the client to begin some internal social accounting and perhaps limited disclosure. In that
way, when reform does come, whether disclosure itself is the reform or is merely part of a
wider scaled reform, attorney and client will be able to comply with less stress and at lower
cost.
9. C. Abt, An Introduction to Social Audit Methods (undated memorandum, Abt Asso-
ciates, Inc.). Abt Associates, Inc., a Massachusetts consulting firm, is a leader both in devel-
oping social audit techniques and in applying them to companies' operations. See notes 77-
88 infra and accompanying text.
10. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 25-26. In their review the authors conclude that:
At this point the social audit is far from a standardized product. Its character is as much
a function of the industry, the particular circumstances of the firm in question, and the
interests of top management.
Id. at 29.
11. Measuring Social Programs in Business, Address by David F. Linowes, American
Accounting Assoc. Southwest Region Annual Meeting, Baton Rouge, La., Apr. 28, 1972.
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of corporate 'good deeds,' . . . has been largely confined to
institutional advertising and annual reports showing the company
in a favorable light." It amounts to "self-aggrandizement," or pure
public relations.' 2 Corporate managers realized that the inaccura-
cies, vagueness, and puffery in traditional corporate social responsi-
bility statements could leave them vulnerable to a vengeful attack
by corporate activists.'
3
Faced each day with yet another set of new and differing de-
mands from corporate activists, enlightened corporate executives
also began to realize that, ofttimes quite legitimately
12. Sethi, Getting a Handle on the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 31, 33 (Winter 1972-
73). The softness of much of present annual reports' and other documents' discussions about
corporate giving is discussed generally in Note, Corporate Altruism: A Rational Approach,
59 GEO. L.J. 117 (1970). Neither is such information required of any corporation nor subjected
to close scrutiny by the SEC or others. Id. at 143-44. See also Marlin & Marlin, What is a
Responsible Annual Report? Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 118 (Spring 1973). The annual report itself
has no specified format and little required content. See Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 588-
89. The courts have turned down requests that the annual report be deemed "filed" material
within the meaning of the securities laws. Hence, the annual report generally is not subject
to any detailed SEC regulation other than the broad-based antifraud provision, Rule 10b-5.
See Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del. 1971). But see recent SEC efforts to dictate
more of annual reports' content, note 221, and text accompanying notes 433-35 infra. Rule
lOb-5, of course, would require both that the annual report make a misleading statement
about a material fact and that a plaintiff purchase or sell securities on the basis of such a
statement. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1968).
13. Writing in 1962, Professor William Cary stated that the wise corporate manager and
his or her counselor will attempt to anticipate possible future regulation. They will minimize
vulnerability from any quarter. One area in which Professor Cary felt corporations were
vulnerable was the then burgeoning number of soft euphemistic statements corporations were
making about social responsibility:
[Clorporate managements themselves seem to suggest that the modern corporation has
a duty to disclose everything to almost everybody. Quite frequently we may read the
following in a company annual report:
[N]o commercial organization, particularly one of [our] size, can exist with-
out creating social influence and, thereby, acquiring responsibilities beyond
those of a purely business nature. These responsibilities will certainly grow in
the future. ....
In addition, [a corporation] .. .has civic responsibilities to the various com-
munities where its affiliates operate, financial responsibilities to the educational
institutions from which it draws many of its key employees, and-under many
categories-responsibilities to government.
If the company really believes, and says, that it has a responsibility to these numerous
groups, must it not at least account to these groups by full disclosure?
Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. Rav. 408, 420 (1962). Accord, Knauss,
A Reappraisal of the Rule of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. Rv. 607, 648-51 (1964). Both Professor
Cary and Professor, now Dean, Knauss seem to have wanted some form of social accounting;
they also seemed to have called for formal disclosure, including disclosure of hard data, in
the corporate social responsibility field. See notes 322-25 infra and accompanying text.
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A society's expectations change continuously. . . .Yesterday's goals be-
come today's values, and future actions may call for different cost considera-
tions and yield a different distribution of benefits ....
[Tihese considerations may call for a restructuring of existing social
institutions to make them more responsive to changing social needs . . . . A
necessary first step in this direction will then be to find out exactly what
business is doing in the areas that might legitimately fall under the rubric of
new social expectations, and what it should be doing .... ,1
Thus arose one characteristic of social accounting that distinguishes
it from financial accounting. The social audit developed as a tool
"to help break down the broad term 'social responsibility of busi-
ness' into identifiable components."1 5 The social audit included not
only a formal examination or verification of accounts, as the term
audit connotes, but also an extensive determination of the ac-
counts the company was to recognize and audit. The social audit
was a means of keeping track of what a sometimes quixotic public
wanted or expected the corporation to do. Thereafter, the social
audit became more like a traditional audit, a means of monitoring
and demonstrating what the corporation was doing in the social
responsibility area.
This first dimension of the social audit-which social accounts
the company chooses to recognize and audit-can vary widely. The
audit might consider only some or all of those matters in which, by
consensus, corporations should play an active role-product safety,
plant safety, environmental matters, corporate charitable contribu-
tions, minority hiring and promotion, energy conservation and de-
velopment. Alternatively, the social audit might range over more
controversial or esoteric matters such as doing business in apart-
heid nations, contracting to provide weapons to the defense es-
tablishment, admitting and then doing away with subliminal or
allegedly misleading portions of advertising and marketing strate-
gies, and much, much more."8 In short, the social audit attempts
14. Sethi, supra note 12, at 32-33. Bauer and Fenn have observed that social responsi-
bility, once the "plaything of the business community" and once a "soul-satisfying" hobby
for the businessman,
[hias become instead a carrier of great anxiety. Under such circumstances, the business
executive is more to be pitied than censured. He never knows when or from what quarter
the attack will come, he has few tools and little experience to determine the viability of
this or that particular charge, and he has no way of defending himself because no one,
least of all the onrushing legions, has even any really useful measurements of perform-
ance or definition of social responsibility to tell him what he ought to be doing.
BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 11.
15. Sethi, supra note 12, at 33.
16. The subjects ruh the gamut. Dr. Clark Abt in C. Abt, Management Decisions Made
Better with Social Audits: Social Audit Aids to Corporate Decision Making 2 (unpublished
manuscript, Abt Associates, Inc., 1973), lists 20 areas with social ramifications. These range
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to define the moving target called social responsibility. It then
tries to point to the corporation's commitments and its beneficial
opportunities on that endless spectrum.' 7
Once the corporation determines the breadth of the corpora-
tion's social responsibility or the breadth of its undertaking in that
direction, the social audit has a second dimension-depth. Depth
of the audit depends upon several considerations. One is the purpose
for which the company intends the audit. In increasing order of
complexity, the social audit can be used: "to satisfy the conscience
of corporate officers; to anticipate and avoid community (including
employee, stockholder, and government) pressure; to solve social
problems."'" Further, the social audit can attempt not only to solve
social problems, but to do so with the most efficient allocation of
corporate resources and, perhaps, simultaneously to enhance the
firm's long-range profit potential.'9 The social audit can be a bread
from product safety to supplier selection and sources of financing. Bauer and Fenn list no
less than 20 items including charitable giving to artistic and cultural endeavors and the
makeup of the firm's board of directors. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 73-74. See also text
accompanying notes 107, 317-20 infra.
17. More colloquially, this portion of the social audit lets an executive determine "what
the field is and where the yardline markers are drawn." BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 14.
In Dr. Clark Abt's view, the question of where corporate social responsibility lies is no differ-
ent from what is to teachers at the Harvard Business School the central question facing any
business:
What business are we in? That is, what combination of markets, products, and factors
of production is most desirable for the firm? This question is fundamental for investment
decisions for diversification, acquisition (buy) or R & D (make), plant location, person-
nel policy, and . . associated . . decisions.
Abt, supra note 16, at 6.
18. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 47.
19. There is a growing conviction on the part of executives, money managers, institu-
tional investors, and others that corporate social responsibility enhances long-run profitabil-
ity. Evidence of that conviction is reviewed in conjunction with evidence of investors' desires
to obtain disclosure in notes 123-88 infra and accompanying text. These attitudes range from
the view that corporate social responsibility is needed if only for government and the public
to allow the corporation as we know it to survive, see the views of Henry Manne, text
accompanying notes 182-87 infra, to the view that an aware public will purchase more of the
products of enterprises that have demonstrated corporate responsibility. See, e.g., BAUER &
FENN, supra note 1, at 61-63; Abt, supra note 16, at 6. The evidence most often cited is J.
BRAGDON & J. MARLIN, IS POLLUTION PROFITABLE? THE CASE OF THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY
(1971), which concludes that of 17 companies in the industry there is a direct correlation
between good records on pollution control and excellent per share earnings growth. In most
areas of corporate social responsibility or in other industries, however, there has been no
demonstration of a positive correlation, let alone causality, between social responsibility and
better profits. Such a correlation may be intuitively plausible on the premise that the man-
agement which stays ahead on the social front will also be on top of things in its regular
business, or that an increasingly aware public will even pay a few pennies more for the
responsible manufacturer's product. No empirical proof of relationship between profitability
and social responsibility, however, exists as a basis for such assertions. Cf. the Princeton
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crumb the company throws to the public. It can be a device with
which to satisfy astute institutional investors interested in socially
responsible companies. Like financial accounting, it can primarily
be a serious public reporting tool for the use of investors generally.
Finally, social accounting can surpass financial accounting to be-
come a management or systems analysis tool for deciding how most
efficiently to achieve social responsibility.
The third dimension of the social audit that distinguishes social
accounting from traditional accounting and determines the audit's
depth or complexity relates to the precision demanded by corporate
managers, stockholders, or public interest groups in the measure-
ment of a company's efforts and achievements in the social responsi-
bility area. Typically, the question involves the degree of quantifica-
tion desired in the social audit's measurement of goals and perform-
ance. Unlike the financial accounting field, social auditing confronts
expenditures of resources or, more particularly, indicia of results
that are not readily translatable into comparable, understandable
dollar terms. The impact of company's program on inter-city reha-
bilitation is more difficult to ascertain than are sales or profits fig-
ures.
20
Again, on this count social audit forms vary. One writer classi-
fies these audits as non-monetized, monetized, and super-
monetized.2' Non-monetized can be broken down into nonquanti-
fled, quantified, or quantified and partly monetized. On the one
hand, a report can be a description of what the company is doing
on various social responsibility fronts, with quantification in terms
of number of minority workers hired, reduction in levels of effluents,
and the like. Which measure the company uses depends upon the
accuracy and availability of the data. At the other extreme, the
social audit can seek to emulate or surpass financial accounting.
Such an audit can quantify every item in dollar terms or go further
and seek to determine opportunity costs22 for assets the firm uses in
University finding that the return on endowment investments with operations in South Af-
rica, a supposed sign of social irresponsibility to some, had an average of 3% higher return
than other portfolio investments. Malkiel & Quandt, Moral Issues in Investment Policy, 49
HARV. Bus. REv. 37, 43 & 46 (Mar.-Apr. 1971).
20. Cf. the false sense of certitude some believe complete monetization has brought to
financial accounting, notes 430-34 infra and accompanying text, and the increasing use of
narratives, rather than numbers and dollars, both in financial statement footnotes and in
SEC-required disclosure, notes 200-06 infra and accompanying text.
21. Merrill, Social Accounting for Decision-Making: A Survey of Approaches to Date,
(unpublished paper presented at The Social Measurement Workshop, Boston, Mass., Nov.
18-20, 1973).
22. The opportunity cost, of course, is not just the out-of-pocket expenditure financial
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social programs. Some social audits then determine the net yearly
dollar addition to society's welfare that the corporation's activity
generates and develop a running tabulation of the firm's social as-
sets and liabilities. Such an advanced audit contemplates a social
responsibility profit and loss statement and balance sheet showing
stocks of social assets with flows to and from those stocks.
At the outset, any social accounting process must determine the
social audit's three dimensions: what areas the audit will cover; for
whom the company intends the audit-management, shareholders,
investors, or government; and how precise the audit is to be.23 In
making this determination, corporations and their managers do
nothing more than attempt to answer the questions Gardiner
Means, Adolf Berle, and E. Merrick Dodd raised over forty years
ago. Upon whom and in what way does the multifarious activity of
the modern corporate entity impinge, and to whom, how, and why
are the corporation and corporate managers accountable?24 By using
the social audit to define the areas in which management perceives
the corporation to have social responsibility, managers indicate to
whom the corporation feels it is responsible. With a determination
of the purpose of the audit, the firm says something about to whom
it feels a need to account. The precision and care with which man-
agement carries out those tasks reflect a similar sentiment. The
social accounting process may thus force corporate managers them-
selves to consider, and perhaps reach, the heart of the matter-the
largely unanswered question of exactly for whom modem corporate
managers are trustees.
II. AN INVENTORY OF TYPES OF SOCIAL AUDITS
A. The Process Audit
The process audit is the simplest and oldest form of social ac-
counting. It contemplates a limited range of subjects or accounts for
accounting uses but the dollar benefit foregone in not using the assets expended in their
best alternative use. Hence, the $100 the company invests in a social program represents a
$125 opportunity cost if the company could have made a $25 profit by investing the $100 in
its manufacturing operation. See notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
23. Similarly, Sethi contends that to make a social audit "operational," three determi-
nations have to be made:
(1) Definition. What is socially responsible behavior?
(2) Measurement. How can it be measured?
(3) Accountability. To whom should the corporation be responsible?
Sethi, supra note 10, at 33.
24. See, e.g., the works cited in note 3 supra. Of course, a seminal classic is G. MEANS
& A. BERLE, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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audit, rather than attempting to measure the total societal impact
of the corporation's activities. The process audit is not overly am-
bitious with respect to quantification of the amount or value of re-
sources the company commits to a program or the results the social
program achieves. Rather,
[A] process audit would ascertain the following: the reason for undertak-
ing a particular program, the goals of the program, the rationale for the action,
a description of what is actually being done, and intermediate measures of
performance if they are readily available.2
The process audit may limit itself further. The audit may attempt
only to describe and measure the effects of affirmative action pro-
grams and not deal with or emphasize the company's shortcomings.
Such a positive-action process audit emphasizes what the company
is doing; it does not dwell upon what the corporation has not done
or is not doing."6
The use of the process audit is widespread. For several years
Eastern Fuel and Gas Associates, Inc., a leader in the social ac-
counting field,27 has devoted four or five annual report pages to the
company's social responsibility. The pages include hard data such
as year-to-year figures on minority hiring, training, and promotion
programs. The annual reports of Bank of America each contain a
process audit of a number of social accounts such as solid waste
recycling, contributions and grants, equal employment opportunity,
student and minority business loan programs, "rebuilding Califor-
nia Cities" program, and the work of the Bank's "Social Policy
25. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 84.
26. For that reason, process audits may be criticized as being little or no improvement
over the puffed, vague, noble-sounding social responsibility statements contained in many
annual reports. See notes 12-13 supra, and text accompanying notes 392-96 infra. The
positive-action process audit, however, is 1 or 2 steps removed from that type of statement.
The process audit does contemplate recitation of hard facts-number of manhours expended,
level of funding, number hired, and the like. The process audit and the positive action process
audit do have supporters, for example, the SEC's chief accountant. See Burton, Commentary
on Lets Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc', REV. 42-43 (Winter 1972-73):
In light of what we are trying to communicate, it seems we should steer clear of the
traditional accounting approach of matching bad things (costs) with good things (reve-
nues) in order to develop a net dollar figure out as a basis for objectively evaluating the
periodic performance of corporate management. Dollar-matching does not seem appro-
priate when benefits are primarily external to the firm . . . .In fact, that which is not
done should not be subtracted from what is done, since it does not reduce the benefit of
what has been achieved.
27. That was largely the work of the late Eli Goldston, the company's president, who
also delivered the 1971 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lectures at Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity on the subject of social accounting. See E. GOLDSTON, THE QUANTIFICATION OF CON-
CERN-SOME AsPEcTs OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTING (1972).
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Committee."2 Dayton Hudson Corporation has in its annual reports
a process audit bearing the title "Toward Fulfilling Our Social
Responsibility." Quaker Oats similarly includes in its annual report
"929a "Social Progress Plan for Fiscal Year ....
Other annual reports contain process audits pertaining only to
one or two issues of particular concern to the company or the indus-
try. Atlantic Richfield Company includes a description of the com-
pany's program to remove billboards, including a listing of resources
devoted to that end, and data on the company's program to do
business with minority owned banks. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corpo-
ration sets forth data on its pollution abatement program. The an-
nual reports of General Motors Corporation have contained narrow
process audits of sorts, with data on expenditures for and results
achieved in bulwarking the company's opposition to development
and installation of certain automotive pollution control and safety
devices.'"
Still other companies have published broader process audits
but through mediums other than the annual report. 3' Ralston Pur-
ina Corporation has produced a special edition of the Ralston Pur-
ina Magazine dealing with the company's social responsibility. Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Company does the same with its magazine,
Metropolitan.32 Chase Manhattan Bank publishes its Action
Report.3 3 The First Pennsylvania Bank publishes a "Social Score-
card," describing the rationale for the goals of and the operation of
the bank's social programs. The "Scorecard" sets out year-to-year
28. See, e.g., Bank America Corp., 1974 Ann. Rep. 44-45 (1975).
29. Reviewed in Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1035. Other process audits are also de-
scribed, id. at 1036-37. See also LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 24-29.
30. See generally Bauer & Fenn, What is a Corporate Social Audit?, 51 HARV. Bus. REV.
37 (Jan.-Feb. 1973); Spreading the Word about Good Works, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1973, § 3,
at 16, col. 2.
31. One possible reason for doing so may be that a firm wishes to avoid dissemination
of information to certain shareholders, viz., those who may be irritated when confronted by
corporate expenditures for social programs. If management is to solicit proxies in any large
publicly held firm, it must send the annual report to all shareholders prior to or simultane-
ously with the proxy materials. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1971). All shareholders therefore
would receive information about corporate social expenditures and activities if the company
includes the social audit results in the annual report. Companies may choose to use a different
medium of publication to avoid the usual wide dissemination of the annual report. Whether
any companies act on the basis of such a rationale, however, is conjectural.
32. METROPOLITAN, Aug.-Sept. 1969; RALSTON PURINA MAGAZINE, Nov. 1972. A survey of
the known efforts to date was provided to the author in a letter from John N. Bailey, Execu-
tive Director, International Ass'n of Business Communicators, Dec. 11, 1973.
33. Reviewed, along with similar efforts, by Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Con-
test: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, at 466 & n.235 (1971).
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comparative figures on minority employment and loans and contri-
butions to minority group businesses and organizations.Y Under
pressure of some shareholder proxy proposals requesting disclosure,
General Motors published, apart from its annual report, "Record of
Progress" in 1970 and "Progress in Areas of Public Concern" in
1971.11
Besides companies themselves, public interest organizations
and corporate activist groups have undertaken another series of
process audits. These organizations publish audits, or at least
external assessments of several companies' programs in several
areas of corporate social responsibility. Other, similar corporation
watchdog groups publish audits of many companies or of an entire
industry on one issue, such as environmental pollution. The Council
on Economic Priorities, a nonprofit independent organization, has
been instrumental in the latter effort by publishing data about pol-
lution control efforts in the pulp and paper and electric utility in-
dustries. The Council also has inventoried industry in general on
defense contracts and on antipersonnel weapons development and
production." The Corporate Information Center of the National
Council of Churches compiles and makes available process audits
of corporations' activities in five areas: environment; consumer
health, welfare, and safety; foreign investment; military procure-
ment; and minorities and women.37 Ralph Nader's Project on Corpo-
34. First Pennsylvania Bank, Social Scorecard (1973). Limited process audits of this
type also have been popular in the environmental field. See, e.g., Marlin, Accounting for
Pollution, 135 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 41 (1973); Parker, Accounting and Ecology: A Perspective,
133 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 41 (1971).
35. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.J.
57, 62 (1971). In 1973, General Motors agried to supply shareholders with a booklet describing
its operations in South Africa. Wall Street J., Jan. 17, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
36. COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, THE BUSINESS OF WAR: 523 CORPORATE CONTRAC-
TORS FOR THE WAR IN INDOCHINA (1971); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, CRACKING DOWN
(1975) (air and water pollution at oil refineries); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, EFFICIENCY
IN DEATH (1972) (antipersonnel weapons manufacturers); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES,
PAPER PROFITS: POLLUTION IN THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY (1971); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC
PRIORITIES, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY OVERVIEW (1972); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, THE
PRICE OF POWER (1972) (utilities). In addition, the Council publishes a bimonthly newsletter,
entitled the Economic Priorities Report that contains research on the social action or nonac-
tion of various companies. See BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 40; LONGSTRETH &
ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 27. For a profile on Alice Tepper Marlin, the Council's progeni-
tor, see Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 28 (Summer 1973). The Council also has published reports on
minority hiring and promotion practices of large banks and on pollution in the steel industry.
Id.
37. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 39. For another description of the National Council
of Churches auditing and clearinghouse organization and for a listing of a number of similar
organizations see A Who's Who of Corporate Responsibility Action Groups, Bus. & Soc'Y REv.
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rate Responsibility has attempted in-depth process audits of E.I.
duPont Nemours & Company and of the First National City Bank.38
Other outside groups do process audits of companies exclu-
sively for the groups' clientele and do not make them publicly avail-
able. The Institute of Life Insurance has a Clearinghouse on Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility to make information available to insur-
ance companies for use in investment selection.39 The Investment
Company Institute, the mutual funds trade group, has a similar
clearinghouse for its membership's use.4" Other process audits are
conducted by the so-called "do-good mutual funds," also known as
social funds.4' The Dreyfus Third Century Fund examines and rates
81 (Winter 1972-73). The National Council of Churches, through its Corporate Information
Center, also publishes a monthly newsletter entitled the Corporate Examiner. The newsletter
contains information about and process audits of various corporations.
38. D. LEINSDORF & D. ETRA, RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FIRST NATIONAL
CITY BANK-CITIBANK (1973); J. PHELAN & R. POZEN, RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
DUPONT IN DELAWARE-THE COMPANY STATE (1973). See also Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1037.
Professor Blumberg noted that First National City Bank (now Citibank) refused to let the
Nader group conduct a second study after the group had termed its first audit "inconclusive."
The bank's grounds were that the bank had devoted 10,000 manhours in helping Nader's staff
conduct studies. Id. On the other hand, in its "Corporate Social Performance Roundup,"
Business & Society Review singled out First National City Bank as a "Super Performer,"
partly as a result of information the Nader audit had produced. Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 93, 94
(Summer 1972). One suspects, therefore, that the Nader efforts may have failed because
Nader auditors have concentrated on the development of derogatory information and not on
evaluation of the company's existing programs or of its relative performance. The absence of
later similar audits by Nader subsidiaries perhaps confirms that conclusion. For one, Citi-
bank would agree. In a 50 page news release to book editors and reviewers, Citibank refutes
the Nader group charges, accuses the group of "reckless misuse of facts and unsupported
allegations to reach predetermined conclusions," and labels the Nader report a "presumably
scholarly study" based "on the assumption that most, if not all, business relationships are
essentially conspiratorial." Public Affairs Dep't, First National City Bank, statement of
Walter B. Wriston, Chairman, at 1 (Jan. 16, 1974).
39. Described in a letter from Stanley G. Kaison, Director, to Editor, Wall Street J.,
Feb. 3, 1975, at 11, col. 1-3.
40. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1039. Such organizations pose a problem. Without
securities law disclosure of corporate social responsibility, such organizations' existence fuels
the problem of preferential access to social responsibility information. Affluent or influential
investors interested in such information can obtain it more easily than can ordinary inves-
tors-from companies themselves, from government agencies, and from such trade group's
clearinghouses. See, e.g., note 42 infra. Providing equality of access, therefore, is one argu-
ment for required disclosure. See notes 233-46 infra and accompanying text.
41. See Shapiro, Social Funds: Trying to Do Well by Doing Good, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR 64 (Feb. 1972); Zerkin, The Social Investors, Bus. & Soc'v REV. 121 (Summer 1973).
Shapiro reviews the stated aims of 5 social funds. None of the 5 has performed well. See,
e.g., Gapay, Losing Cause-Do-Good Mutual Funds Find Customers Rare, Profits Elusive
Indeed, Wall Street J., Aug. 9, 1972, at 1, col. 6. An exception is the Dreyfus Third Century
Fund. Besides attributing its success to the size, support, and reputation of the parent
Dreyfus mutual fund complex, the fund's managers cite another factor. All of the other social
funds have begun by eschewing investment in anything but the clean company-the company
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companies on four bases-equality of employment opportunity,
ecology, product safety-purity, and occupational health and
safety.4 2
Process audits do have advantages that render them viable. For
example, the process audit forces a corporation to establish priori-
ties among possible areas for corporate involvement and, in any
given area, among candidate projects. In choosing four or five pro-
cesses to monitor and to consider for public reporting, the corpora-
tion must decide where in the broad spectrum of possibilities the
corporation believes its social responsibility lies. "For example,
lending policies would be relevant for banks; product safety for toy
manufacturers; reliability and safety for applicance manufacturers;
exploration . . . practices for oil companies."43 Yet beyond areas
without a blemish on its social record, or further, one that is affirmatively engaged in socially
responsible activity as its principal business, such as a manufacturer of pollution control
equipment. The clean company has proved to be elusive and, when found, not very profitable.
On the other hand, Dreyfus has approached the matter of choosing socially responsible
investments on a relative basis, giving up trying to develop the "model of a perfect firm."
Dreyfus will take an industry under consideration, and will conclude that, on a relative basis,
4, 5, or 6 of, say, 12 companies in the industry are socially responsible. From those firms,
Dreyfus chooses an investment on traditional investment grounds-earnings, sales, etc. See
Shapiro, supra, at 69-70. This relative decisional approach the Dreyfus organization uses, one
suspects, has become more prevalent as the fruitlessness of the search for clean companies
has become evident. That observation provides several bases from which to argue for social
accounting and disclosure.
With the change in emphasis from the search for the clean company to a relative ap-
proach, a company can report the results of a social audit and need not fear that any negative
item will condemn the company in the eyes of socially minded investors. Secondly, relative
comparisons may be more difficult without the data social accounting could provide. Al-
though few in number, the clean companies may be easy to identify. As a pollution control
equipment manufacturer, an Alpine Geophysical Co. is visible. Without published data avail-
able, however, investors may find it more difficult to identify the relatively more responsible
companies in the chemical industry. Without some social accounting and disclosure, the
chances increase that a company with a good social performance track record will be passed
over by the growing number of investors who, other things being equal, will invest in the more
socially responsible companies. The relative approach to choosing socially responsible invest-
ments thus gives companies an incentive, or would at least lower opposition, to accounting
and disclosure. See text accompanying notes 440-41 infra.
42. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 35-36; Shapiro, supra note 41, at 69-70. As opposed
to the other social funds, most of which are quite small, Dreyfus Third Century Fund has
been able to obtain data from companies for use in the fund's process audits. Dreyfus attrib-
utes this to the size and power of the parent Dreyfus fund complex. BAUER & FENN, supra
note 1, at 36. The other social funds have had a more difficult time obtaining data from
companies. Id. at 37. This is one example of the preferential access, supra note 40, to which
absence of required disclosure leads. Additional evidence of similar preference is reviewed in
notes 238-45 infra and accompanying text.
43. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 84. A mere process audit can make the firm's choice
of projects and the matching of its resources with social responsibility more efficient. The
authors conclude that the evidence suggests that heretofore "companies 'fall into' these
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obviously applicable to a given company or industry, and beyond
processes which have near universal application, such as those deal-
ing with minority hiring and promotion matters:
[T]he range of issues involved in present conceptions of corporate social
responsibility is highly diverse. Even if we bypass the more poli-
tico/philosophical issues such as investment in South Africa, producing muni-
tions . . . and so on, we are confronted by . . .black capitalism; . . .com-
munity development; physical rehabilitation of cities; support of various levels
of education; crime; mass transportation; the impact of plant location on
population distribution; consumerism; advertising and marketing practices;
and so on."
Obviously, some corporate decisions on concentration are neces-
sary. 5 Also, new social responsibility issues will arise that the corpo-
ration will have to face and about which the corporation will have
to make a decision. 6 Thus, the process audit makes some manage-
ment decisions necessary.
programs rather than select them from the hundreds of alternatives presented to them."
Confirmation of that observation is found in the popular notion that charitable giving, for
example, "either reflects the charitable preferences of the sitting president's wife" or "the
personal concern of past chief executives frozen into tradition." Id. at 61. In fact, a major
criticism of corporate social programs is that companies fall into projects, are ill-equipped to
carry them out, and are generally inefficient in doing good. Forced accounting, with the
establishment of priorities and increased efficiency accounting would entail, is one benefit
disclosure could bring to the corporate social responsibility area, as notes 359-64 infra and
accompanying text attempt to demonstrate.
44. Id. at 85. Of course, along with other constraints, the need to make a profit, or
indeed, to maximize profits will limit a firm's involvement. Given those constraints, however,
a company without a process audit or some other method of establishing priorities can splin-
ter its efforts, achieving no significant result in any single area. On the ability to maximize
profits and simultaneously engage in socially responsible, affirmative action, see the discus-
sion notes 176-88 infra and accompanying text contain.
45. One method, reviewed by Sethi is the "Reaction to Perceived Reality Approach"
to the social audit:
A firm may argue that there are really no fixed criteria for determining what is socially
responsible behavior and how much of it would be acceptable to the general public or
to special interest groups . . . .Consequently, social responsibility is no more than
whatever public expectations are, and a firm would do well to satisfy those expectations
.... It is not the "real" social needs, however well defined, that are important; it is
the "perceived" needs.
Sethi, supra note 12, at 34. According to Sethi, some well-known firms are following "per-
ceived reality" approaches in structuring their social action programs. Id.
One variation of the "perceived reality" approach is not to match programs to what the
public perceives the social problems to be but to determine which company the public or
special interest groups perceive to a leader on a given issue. The company doing the social
audit then fashions its programs after those of the industry leader. Sethi describes one re-
tailer's employment of a consulting firm. The firm "interviews 18,000 individuals and asks
them to rate five large retail chains such as Montgomery Ward and Sears, Roebuck on various
consumer services." The retailer intends to pattern its own consumer services after those of
the chain which the public believes to be the best. Sethi, supra note 12, at 34.
46. As corporate social responsibility has received more widespread acceptance and
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Another virtue of the process audit is that it does satisfy most
public or investor demands for corporate accountability, yet it is not
overly broad in scope. At least in the area of positive action pro-
grams, the primary concern of many individuals is not the success
or failure of a company's effort on social responsibility fronts, but
whether a corporation is making an effort at all and whether it is
earnest in that effort. 7 A process audit can demonstrate this, and
in fact, from the public's viewpoint the process audit may be the
preferable method." Because the process audit need not cover all
areas of potential social responsibility, including the more
controversial or esoteric ones, the audit may enhance public or
stockholder receptivity simply because limited breadth would lead
to limited length for the reader. Moreover, an audit that purports
to discuss all the social responsibility aspects of a large corporation's
otherwise matured in recent years, the areas of concern seem to have stabilized a bit and new
issues seem to arise with less frequency. See, e.g., notes 317-20 infra and accompanying text.
47. Bauer & Fenn, supra note 30, at 41. See also BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 71-72
(footnote omitted).
[I]n many areas, the public will be content with a statement of what is being done, as
contrasted to what is being accomplished. . . . Here is where process audits come in.
Finally, in some areas it is easy to produce objective and apparently complete measures
of performance (if not useable comparative data)-such as minority and female employ-
ment practices, and pollution abatement.
48. Some commentators would argue that the social audit reaches its goal if the public
is satisfied.
After all, Ralph Nader's main objective, laid out explicitly in Unsafe at Any Speed, is
to make corporations responsive. One can hardly attack them for "doing things just to
stay out of trouble," if responsiveness is the ultimate objective, because that is precisely
the characteristic they are displaying: responding to community demands and pressures
... . Experience shows that there is no necessarily perfect fit between the most well-
intentioned of corporate actions and the expectations of other interested and affected
parties. This is particularly true in an era in which the expectations of corporate respon-
sibility are in such a constant state of change.
BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 50. Of course, ultimately Marie Antoinette lost her head for
"giving them cake." Ralph Nader, too, is speaking to responsiveness to social needs, not just
social pressures. Nevertheless, such an approach, like the perceived reality approach, supra
note 45, has advantages as well as disadvantages, as Sethi points out:
It helps a corporation keep its goals in tune with public expectations. Evolving shifts in
public expectations can also be spotted so that necessary changes in a firm's long-range
objectives can be made. The problem . . . is that a firm may maximize its short run
gains by advertising and public relations campaigns without actually improving its
performance. ...
A totally external orientation in goal orientation does not take into account a firm's own
strengths and weaknesses in attacking certain problems and may therefore result in a
distorted allocation of resources.
Sethi, supra note 12, at 34-35.
In establishing goals and priorities, then, what the corporation must achieve is a delicate
balance-some perceived reality consideration along with some consideration of the most
effective utilization of its resources and of the most egregious de facto social problems.
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myriad activities may impart a sense of false accuracy to the
reader-even if the audit has a high degree of certitude.
In addition, from the standpoint of the general complexity of
modern accounting,49 the public may find the process audit prefera-
ble. If the social audit attempts to monetize every item across the
broad spectrum of corporate activity, and if it attempts to tie each
item to overall corporate profitability, readers may find the process
by which the company does so difficult to understand. Inaccuracies
may creep in as quantification moves farther away from raw data.
The report of the social audit may thicken and gray. The formidable
appearance and conceptual difficulties in understanding the audit
may scare potential readers away." Arguably, this is the case with
many of today's financial statements, prospectuses, and other dis-
closure documents." In its developmental stage, particularly in tak-
ing the process audit format, social accounting has the opportunity
to avoid the complexity that characterizes much of financial report-
ing.
This accounting complexity may forestall corporate attempts
at social accounting in the first place if the corporation attempts to
go beyond a process audit. The corporate executive will proceed
with trepidation and unease at each new level of self-examination
if he or she proceeds at all. If the social audit is initially outlined as
the complete monetization of every item across the sweep of the
corporation's activities, its sheer formidability may further repel
management, and executives may succumb to the temptation to
refrain altogether from monitoring social performance. The process
audit has shown some accountants in the field that "the biggest
mistake . . .at this juncture is to try to design techniques which
will fully satisfy all dimensions. 52 The same may be true for the
corporate executive; inordinate accounting complexity may be the
added increment that convinces the executive altogether to resist
corporate self-examination.
49. See notes 192-95 & 430-34 infra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 72-93 infra and accompanying text for an outline of some "super" audits'
dimensions and conceptual complexity.
51. See, e.g., Schneider, Acquisition Under the Federal Securities Acts-A Program for
Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1333 (1968), on the formidability of traditional, required
disclosure: "It is doubtful whether anyone ever read the prospectus other than the parties
preparing it, the SEC staff (which developed an extensive comment letter), and the printers,
who charged $15,000 for their efforts."
52. Linowes, supra note 11, at 4.
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B. The Complete Audit
The task of trying to design social audit techniques that will
satisfy all dimensions is complex; yet the complete audit attempts
to do so. The complete audit attempts to measure the social impact
of the entire spectrum of a corporation's activities, not merely to
measure several processes or accounts. Measurements include those
dealing with the detrimental effects or social costs inherent in the
corporation's day-to-day operations, as well as measurements deal-
ing with the corporation's affirmative action programs in traditional
"do-good" areas. Besides assessing the level of effort in those areas,
the complete audit also attempts to measure the effect corporate
efforts achieve. Furthermore, the complete audit attempts to quan-
tify the level of social effort and performance and to convert that
quantification into monetized terms.
An example of the complete audit is the concept of the "socio-
economic operating statement" developed by David F. Linowes, a
partner in a New York accounting firm. Mr. Linowes proposes that
corporations prepare a socioeconomic operating 'tatement each
time they prepare an annual balance sheet and profit and loss state-
ment. 3 The socioeconomic statement would cover the entire range
of corporate activity. Detriments resulting from environmental pol-
lution corporate operations cause, failure to hire minority group
members, and shortcomings in any social sense, would be offset
against benefits the company bestows on society through social pro-
grams. When benefits are conferred on society as a result of corpo-
rate action that comes about through compliance with governmen-
53. Linowes, Let's Get on With the Social Audit: A Specific Proposal, Bus. & Soc'Y REV.
39 (Winter 1972-73).
The profit and loss statement and balance sheet alone are no longer adequate measures
of performance-a means must be found which will reflect all facets of management's
efforts. Some argue that before we seek to implement social program reporting, we
should fully define what we mean by social action or nonaction. I disagree. Because
social programs are difficult to define does not mean we should not deal with them.
Justice Potter Stewart said, "I can't define obscenity, but I know it when I see it." In
the same way, we need not wait until we can clearly define social action or nonaction;
we know it when we see it.
Id.
According to Mr. Linowes' thesis, the means of defining what social action is in the "socio-
economic operating statement." Cf. Moskowitz, Choosing Socially Responsible Stocks, Bus.
& Soc'Y REV. 71-72 (Spring 1972):
[Wihile a company may be strong in one area such as pollution control, it may be
laggard in another, such as minority hiring. After four years of closely monitoring busi-
nesses' social involvement, however, I have observed a number of company names crop-
ping up time after time with regard to positive responses to social problems.
Apparently, Moskowitz knows corporate social responsibility when he sees it.
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tal regulations or collective bargaining agreements, however, the
social audit would exclude such action from the benefits list.-, Every
item would be monetized. For example, the company would include
a "[pirorated portion of salaries and related expenses for personnel
who spend time in socially beneficial actions" as a benefit. 5
Presumably, the socioeconomic operating statement would pro-
duce a bottom line dollar figure denominating the entire corporate
operation as either a benefit or detriment to society." Although one
54. That suggestion has been criticized as eliminating an important indicator of social
responsibility:
[Elven where the law is apparently clear on matters of employment and pollution, the
issue is not whether or not they are in compliance . . . but the rate of speed and
earnestness of the effort with which they are striving to achieve compliance. This is likely
to be true of most laws and regulations ....
Bauer, Commentary on Let's Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'Y Rv. 43 (Winter
1972-73). To ask that corporations demonstrate how they are not in compliance with the law
may be unrealistic: the request is for a firm to incriminate itself. On the other hand, a firm
could demonstrate with a social audit that it has complied ahead of schedule or even before
regulation has come into being.
55. Linowes, supra note 53, at 40. In the Linowes scheme,
"[b]enefits" or "improvements" are measured as the financial cost to the company of
taking a social action and not as the impact of that action. The theory . . . is that
something is worth what you pay for it, one of the most basic valuation approaches used
in financial accounting.
Merrill, supra note 21 (unpaginated manuscript). Mr. Linowes, however, does not indicate
how a company should compute detriments in monetary terms. The problem arises because
with detriments to society a company would not have even the first approximation out-of-
pocket costs gives in the area of affirmative programs and other "benefits." Mr. Linowes does
not discuss a method to place a valuation on a failure to hire minorities or on the social cost
pollution imposes. Whatever the method the company finally uses, however, he argues that
the subjective nature of valuing detriments to society is probably no more subjective than
ordinary accounting's determination of "research and development costs, work in progress
inventories, bad debt allowances, depreciation charges, and price earnings ratios." Linowes,
supra note 53, at 41.
On the benefit side of the ledger, Mr. Linowes does admit to the shortcoming perceived
by Merrill, namely that with the use of cost as a valuation method the socioeconomic operat-
ing statement does "fail to measure the quality of outputs." Nevertheless, he contends that
"we must begin somewhere." Use of cost, as financial accounting does, as a starting point is
a sufficient beginning. Id. at 42.
The problem runs throughout social accounting: even in its nascent form both critics and
proponents seem to hold social accounting to standards higher than financial accounting has
ever had or purports to have. See, e.g., text following note 103 infra. In this area, though, the
problem is compounded because in financial accounting the "quality of outputs" can be
deduced from the bottom line profit figure in the instant year and as opposed to prior years'
profit figures. But it is nevertheless a deduction. Financial accounting does not purport to
measure the quality of output obtained for each dollar a company spends, as many would
have social accounting do.
56. Mr. Linowes does not say so explicitly, but neither does he contemplate separating
areas of corporate responsibility and reporting on each separately, as the process audit con-
templates. Complete monetization and the inclusion of all findings in one socioeconomic
statement, therefore, necessarily would lead to some sort of a bottom line figure.
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final figure indicating that a company is either an asset or a liability
to society in a particular year might seem harsh to corporate execu-
tives, its value over time is emphasized. The trend and magnitude
of a company's year-to-year efforts and progress would become evi-
dent from a comparison of several successive years' socioeconomic
operating statements."
C. The Complete Audit-Another Approach
Another form of the complete audit is the "maximum capabil-
ity utilization and best effort" approach.1 The maximum utiliza-
tion audit goes somewhat beyond the socioeconomic operating state-
ment into the traditional management preserves of systems plan-
ning and systems analysis. Thus, the maximum capability utiliza-
tion approach aims at producing not only data on the level of corpo-
rate effort and the results that effort obtains, but also data with
which management will best be able to correct deficiencies in the
company's social milieu. It aims to select "[t]hose projects that
will make the best use of the firm's capabilities in undertaking
socially desirable programs and practices at the least cost. It is
internally oriented, deliberately planned for the long term . . . .",
The approach contemplates cost-benefit analyses of all the alterna-
tives for social action a corporation faces at a given time. This
contrasts with the traditional accounting approach with its year-to-
year comparative feature, as exemplified in the social accounting
area by the socioeconomic operating statement. Thus, the maxi-
mum utilization approach
typically . starts by inventorying what is being done in the corporation's
various departments . . . The next step relates these findings to certain
performance criteria and identifies areas of strength . . . . This is followed by
developing new goals and setting up programs to achieve those goals.'
In fashioning those programs, the task is "to compare existing prog-
ress against other alternatives (making changes where efficiency
and adaptability can be improved) and the effectiveness of a firm's
57. Linowes, supra note 53, at 41. In part, such a trend would obviate the inadequacy
in not having any specific criteria by which to measure the company's deficiencies or detri-
ments, save the company's own goals. See note 55 supra. The trend shown by various years'
socioeconomic operating statements would not make the initial statement of a deficiency any
less arbitrary, but would give a relative gauge to improvement if the initial method of assess-
ing the deficiency was followed consistently in subsequent years.
58. Reviewed in Sethi, supra note 12, at 34-38.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id.
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programs against those of other firms.""1
The approach envisions monetization "somewhat akin to finan-
cial statements which purportedly show the company's state of fin-
ancial health and performance. ' 2 In its ultimate form, the maxi-
mum utilization social audit hopes to cause and demonstrate a
"judiciously" selected range of projects for which the firm's "physi-
cal and manpower resources make it particularly suitable." The
audit will "report a corporation's performance not merely in terms
of output" but "in terms of effectiveness and benefits to society
(e.g., whether an alternative use of those resources would have pro-
vided larger social gains)." 3 Thus, the maximum capability utiliza-
tion social audit goes beyond the process audit, the socioeconomic
operating statement, and, indeed, any traditional form of account-
ing or accounting format. It would attempt to show not only corpo-
rate efforts and the magnitude of those efforts but also the corpora-
tion's reasons for selecting certain courses of action and levels of
effort from the various alternatives open to it.4
A number of corporations are attempting to develop a complete
social audit. Among them are Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of
America, ARA Services, Inc., and Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates,
Inc." Whether the audits under development are of the socioecon-
omic variety, the maximum utilization variety, or some other genre,
however, is not evident from the publicity surrounding the develop-
ment. None of the audits has yet been made public. Several com-
mittees of professional accounting associations also are undertaking
61. Id. at 37.
62. Id. at 34. Sethi is unclear as to the amount of monetization the "maximum utiliza-
tion" approach would incorporate. On the one hand, he lists areas of social involvement
susceptible to "early quantification and measurement," including aid to the arts, employee
related programs on health, safety, and self-development, minority group relationships, com-
munity related activities, and consumerism. Id. at 38. Since the results programs in some of
those categories achieve obviously would be difficult to quantify, the statement strongly
infers that Sethi believes complete monetization desirable. On the other hand, Sethi warns
against the McNamara fallacy, the tendency for "technically oriented people to rush toward
the quantification of concepts even though the variable may be imprecisely defined and the
necessary data unavailable." Id. at 37. Without quantification, however, Sethi opines that
reporting of social audits may become "devoid of objectivity and loaded with puffery ...
poorly disguised window dressing." He seemingly concludes that until quantification and
acceptable reporting standards are developed, social audits will have low credibility and that,
therefore, quantification should proceed. Id. at 34.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Another similar type of audit, aimed at accomplishing some of the same internal
corporate goals, is the so-called performance audit, reviewed in BAUER & FENN, supra note 1,
at 54-58.
65. LONGSTRE'rH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 24; see Blumberg, supra note 5, at
1036-37.
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to develop the social audit.6 These committees are working toward
uniformity as well as development; it is not yet evident whether
their efforts have focused upon any one variety of the complete
audit.
Whatever the form of the audit, in pursuing their endeavors the
various committees and companies will encounter conceptual diffi-
culties common to all forms of the complete audit. One principal
objection corporate activists raise is that, realistically, corporations
will not "identify and report social nonactions." The general reply
to that objection is twofold:
(1) For decades, businesses have been accounting for and giving visibility
to adverse fiscal conditions when they report on contingent liabilities. (2)
Many . . . organizations such as those connected with Ralph Nader, the
United Church of Christ, the Dreyfus Third Century Fund, and the Council
on Economic Priorities are already identifying the antisocial actions or nonac-
tions of specific companies. 7
In this regard the notion that "corporations have an interest in
making their own audits before they are audited by others" is quite
persuasive. "[T]he very fact they audit themselves is a real plus
in terms of a firm's relations with social pressure groups; such corpo-
rate self-effort, if done honestly, is a prime objective" of corporate
activist groups. 8
66. See text accompanying notes 99-101 infra.
67. Linowes, supra note 40, at 41. Compare this to the current controversy over the
inaccuracy of corporations' statements concerning contingent legal liabilities. Traditionally,
lawyers have given auditors so-called clean letters, stating that in pending or threatened
litigation the lawyers believe the company to have "meritorious defenses" or "a good chance
of prevailing on the merits." They have often done so despite the statements' misleading
nature because they believe that divulging the true state of affairs may tip the lawyers' hands
or derail a potential settlement prior to the litigation. Further, accountants until recently
have accepted such soothing and optimistic statements of contingent liabilities at face value.
See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report of the Committee on
Corporate Law and Accounting on Scope of Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Request for
Information (Rev. Exposure Draft, Oct. 20, 1974), in 30 Bus. LAW. 513, 988 (1975); Stabler,
What Should Lawyers Tell the Accountants about Legal Problems, Wall Street J., Feb. 27,
1974, at 1, col. 6. Thus it is not perfectly clear that corporations "for decades" have been
accurately reporting all contingent liabilities, or for that matter, adverse fiscal conditions of
other sorts. On the new-found suspicion of financial accounting in other areas, see notes 430-
34 infra and accompanying text.
68. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 45. An immediate all-out corporate attack on
deficiencies the audit reveals is probably not the prime objective of most serious activists.
Also, the change in emphasis from the search for the clean or perfect company to the view
that corporate social responsibility is relative, supra note 41, will give corporate executives
some assurance that they will not be condemned if a public social audit report reveals
negative factors or nonfeasance. Another result of a relative approach is that the potential
corporate public relations cost is reduced, thereby making disclosure on corporate social
responsibility politically more feasible than other proposed and politically objectionable cor-
porate law reforms. See text accompanying notes 440-41 infra.
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The other principal objection to complete audits, one found
with near universality, is that complete, forced monetization of a
social audit shades reporting even further away from the true state
of affairs than does attempted quantification in terms of raw data,
such as manhours expended, persons hired, improved test scores,
and the like. In the literature, the argument that no such monetized
social audit can be precise, is met with the observation that "income
statements and balance sheets are far less than precise."6 These
social audit monetization problems are mostly problems of valua-
tion. Everyday financial accounting encounters similar problems, as
in the ageing of receivables, depreciation computations, or inven-
tory valuations. The problems always have been a source of contro-
versy in some accounting situations and probably always will be; yet
no one argues that traditional accounting should not attempt to deal
with such problems.
Another observation one can make is that accounting is not a
static art. It has evolved new methods for dealing with perennial
valuation problems, tests to check obliquely the accuracy of older,
more established methods, and accounting systems that have
evolved from a simple to a more complex system as a company has
grown. Social accounting does not have these advantages; it is a new
method devoid of evolutionary experience. Moreover, the social
audit is an attempt to insert a totally new accounting system into a
mature, large corporation, rather than to finetune an accounting
system that has evolved with the company. Nevertheless, to some
degree, social accounting can borrow methods and checks from fin-
ancial accounting; to what extent is not yet certain. Moreover, so-
cial accounting has at its disposal tools and a reservoir of expertise
that traditional accounting has not always had available as it has
evolved-computers, systems analysis techniques, mathematical
69. Lews, Commentary on Let's Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'y REv. 45
(Winter 1972-73). Linowes, supra note 53, at 39-40 also expands on the criticism at length:
Many socially helpful programs can be quantified for measurement even now. We have
enough standards available in social areas to begin.
I must add that the softness of much of the economic and fiscal data used today...
leads one to suspect that given all their present limitations, social measurements may
be just as reliable. The dollars involved in social costs incurred by businesses are clearly
determinable. The fact that a statement of these costs may not be complete has its
counterpart in the fact that traditional financial statements have never fully reflected
significant aspects of business affairs-the value of trained manpower, the extent of
provision for executive succession, the potential profitability of new inventions and
product development, the contingent liabilities that include potential adverse legal ac-
tions for faulty products.
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skills, and the like. On balance, then, one might expect social ac-
counting to evolve more rapidly than has financial accounting.
Whether the monetization of social audits should be acceler-
ated is not the important consideration at this time. That social
accounting will evolve with the principal variable being time,70 is
the important realization. Unlike the relatively established process
audit, the complete social audit is still very much in the develop-
mental stage, making evaluation of the present objections to this
approach difficult. While the complete audit may not be "far down
the road," as some suggest, 7t the complete audit is still at the stage
where objections and realizations about the complexities involved
are adding to the shaping and improvement of the final product.
D. The Super Social Audit
As has been seen, the complete social audit tries to show the
entire social impact of all a corporation's activities. The complete
audit then reviews a company's present social programs both in the
way of affirmative action and in neutralization of social costs the
company's operations impose on the community. In that review the
audit attempts to demonstrate the level of effort expended on those
programs, the effects those programs achieve in ameliorating social
impacts and problems, and possibly, the quality of those effects. In
its most refined form, the complete audit also attempts to juxtapose
the costs and benefits of a firm's own programs against the costs and
benefits of alternative social responsibility programs open to the
firm.
The super audit attempts to do all of the foregoing and more.
For example, the super social audit attempts to derive opportunity
costs for corporate resources the company utilizes either in initiating
social action programs or in negating the deleterious effects the
company's regular operations produce. The opportunity cost, of
course, is the benefit foregone in using an asset in such a social
venture instead of devoting the asset to its best alternative use.72 In
the case of social programs the best alternative use will usually be
the firm's principal profit making activity. Thus, if a firm devotes
money, management skills, overhead, and other resources to pollu-
70. See also the comment on uniformity, as well as evolution through time, as a solution
to these problems, and the need for required disclosure as a means of forcing more rapid
development in social accounting techniques, text following note 107 infra.
71. Bauer & Fenn, supra note 30, at 38.
72. R. LIPSEY & 0. STFANR, ECONOMICS 177 (3d ed. 1972). See also note 22 supra.
[Vol. 29:539
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING
tion abatement, the super audit computes not only the out-of-
pocket cost of those resources but also attempts to compute the
additional profits the corporation would have made had it devoted
those same resources to the production of widgets.73 The most re-
fined complete audit attempts to compare the cost of social respon-
sibility programs only with those of other social responsibility possi-
bilities and not with alternative commercial uses.
Closely aligned with the super audit's attempt to derive op-
portunity cost is its more ambitious attempt to evaluate the benefits
a corporation's social activities produce. Instead of merely evaluat-
ing the relative merit of various social alternatives, as the complete
audit does, the super audit attempts to evaluate the contribution
to long-run corporate profitability that each possible social action
might produce. This is a difficult, if not impossible task.74 The super
audit then compares the contribution to long-range profitability
with the potential profitability of resources used in their best alter-
73. The next best alternative use might be selected, for example, if the company is
producing widgets at 100% of capacity. Normal accounting practice, of course, does not
involve an attempt to measure opportunity costs for resources expended in production, mar-
keting, and the like. See, e.g., LIPsEY & STEINER, supra note 72, at 180-84 for a comparison of
the accountant's methods of valuation, principally historical cost, with the economist's op-
portunity cost method. Rather, in present day business, opportunity costs and cost-benefit
analyses of various choices open to the firm are management's professional bailiwick, not the
accountant's. Opportunity costs have not often been reduced to the nicety of accounting
format; they remain the province of systems analysis and other management subjects.
By attempting to integrate opportunity cost concepts into an accounting framework, the
super social audit is attempting to do what traditional accounting and most managements
have never before attempted in any area. Sethi intimates that the attempt is an outgrowth
of dissatisfaction with traditional accounting as well as with accounting's failure to treat
social factors. He sees:
[tirends concerning the public view of business . unfolding, giving strength to the
call for new kinds of measurement. One was the disenchantment with the use of the GNP
as the measuring rod of national health.
Sethi, supra note 12, at 32.
74. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 64 (footnote omitted) concludes that the "[t]ask
of conducting a social audit for 'optimizing' a corporation's profit would be formidable and
is not likely to be undertaken in the near future by a well-advised firm." Among the complexi-
ties are the quantification of various additions to long run profit which socially responsible
actions might produce through making the firm a more attractive investment, through at-
tracting more consumers to a company's goods and services, and through "making the local
community and the society at large a better place to do business." Id. at 63. For example,
with regard to consumers
[a] survey of consumers might reveal what proportion were patronizing the firm's goods
or services because of its image for social responsibility. If, however, the firm's social
programs added to the price of its goods and services, an estimate would also have to be
made of the proportion of potential customers who werp lost . . . . Such information
. . . would be rather expensive to come by. . ..
Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
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native commercial use; in other words, the audit compares the long-
range profitability of social programs with the opportunity cost of
assets the company uses in such programs. The resulting dollar
figure is either an addition or a subtraction to profit in the firm's
regular financial statements. 5
Before tying the firm's social activities into its regular financial
statements, however, another goal of the super audit is the develop-
ment for the social sphere of analogues to traditional accounting
statements .7 The social balance sheet shows stocks of social assets,
matched against social liabilities, debt to society, and society's eq-
uity. In each accounting period the social income statement would
show flows to these stocks-the additions and subtractions to the
social asset and social liability accounts the balance sheet contains.
Flows might include corporate tuition reimbursements as additions
to the human-employee resources account or governmental services
the company consumes over and above those paid for by corporate
taxes as additions to a social balance sheet liability account.
The best existing example of these items and of a super social
audit is the social audit of Abt Associates, Inc., a Massachusetts
consulting firm. 7  Positing that a consulting firm's most important
resource is its staff, Abt computes a number of benefits and costs
to the staff by means of a social income statement. Thus, against
health and life insurance, vacations, holidays, tuition reimburse-
ments, food services, child care, parking, and spaciousness and
quality of work space provided by the firm, the Abt Associates'
income statement offsets layoffs and involuntary terminations,
overtime worked but not paid, and inequality of opportunity. In
other areas, the statement debits to asset accounts contributions to
knowledge through company publications and environmental im-
provements, such as reduction in solid waste. It characterizes as
credits to liability accounts local governmental services the com-
pany receives, net taxes paid, and the cost of pollution caused by
75. See, e.g., id. at 21-22.
76. Cf. the socioeconomic operating statement in text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
77. Abt Associates, Inc., 1972 Ann. Rep. & Social Audit X-XXV (1973); Abt Associates,
Inc., 1973 Ann. Rep. & Social Audit 22-34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1972 or 1973 Abt Social
Audit]. Besides preparing a super audit of its own operations, Abt Associates stands willing
to conduct such an audit, or any lesser form of social audit, for clients who retain the firm to
do so. Letter from Peter Merrill, Vice President for Operations, Abt Associates, Inc., to
author, Dec. 13, 1973. Mr. Merrill notes that since there "[is] no one set of established and
generally accepted procedures," the form of the social audit Abt Associates will prepare
"[viaries according to the communications goals of the company involved." A sample list
of Abt's auditing for clients is found in Abt Associates 1973 Ann. Rep. 11.
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its employees' commuting and by Abt's own consumption of electric
power. 8
On its social balance sheet, Abt lists as assets its staff resources
less training obsolescence, organizational assets, including the capi-
tal cost of reconstructing the organization, and its accumulated
research in social responsibility areas such as child care and social
accounting. On the right-hand or liability side of the balance sheet,
Abt lists the company's financing requirements (as an opportunity
cost to society), its staff and resources engaged in company activi-
ties not considered socially productive, and pollution the company
generates." To balance Abt lists the excess of social assets over
social liabilities as society's equity, which is broken down to show
whether the Abt staff, its stockholders, or company operations pro-
duce the equity.
Abt Associates would incorporate the results of its social audit
into the firm's financial balance sheet by first eliminating from total
social assets those items the financial balance sheet duplicates.
Such items as land and retained earnings, which also are considered
social assets because they are available for social programs, are
eliminated from the social asset total because they also appear on
the financial balance sheet. That elimination, of course, leaves so-
cial assets such as staff, social research programs in progress, and
social projects the financial balance sheet does not reflect. From the
remaining social assets Abt then subtracts social liabilities. The
resulting figure then appears on the left-hand side of the financial
balance sheet as net social assets; on the right hand side, the figure
appears as net social surplus, above equity but below debt and other
liabilities."0
The Abt super audit procedure no doubt is a valuable tool for
78. 1972 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at XV, and notes accompanying the social
income statement. See also BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 32, notes 84-86 infra and accompa-
nying text. The 1973 Abt social audit is even a bit more ambitious, as it no longer presents
completely separate social accounting statements. Although in substance the same as the
data in the 1972 social statements, Abt completely integrates the social responsibility data
with financial accounting statements in a "Social and Financial Income Statement" and a
"Social and Financial Balance Sheet." 1973 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at 24-32.
79. 1972 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at XIII-IV; 1973 Abt Social Audit, supra note
77, at 24-25.
80. 1972 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at XXI-XXII. In the 1973 Annual Report Abt
does not go through the elimination of duplicated items. The "Social and Financial Balance
Sheets" ab initio lists all assets together, and italics denominate those items Abt considers
social rather than financial assets. 1973 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at 24-27. See also
supra note 78.
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management introspection, systems analysis, and planning.8' Yet,
when one reads the Abt social accounting statements a feeling of
discomfort arises, in part, perhaps, due to the complete monetiza-
tion of every item in the audit. Although detailed footnotes describe
the monetization, they do not describe the alternative measures for
quantification that the audit could have used.82 Traditional ac-
counting statements do not always describe alternative valuation
methods either, but at least in reading traditional accounting state-
ments an individual familiar with accounting already will be ac-
quainted with some alternative valuation methods. Additionally, in
some instances, traditional accounting statement footnotes will de-
scribe why the company has chosen a particular valuation method
over other methods. A social audit cannot presume that a reader is
familiar with alternative valuation measures. The dilemma's other
horn is that since social accounting is such a nascent process, ex-
planation of why the company has not used alternative measure-
ments would take reams of paper. Social accounting has not the
complete panoply of tag words and shorthand that regular account-
ing has at its disposal to explain items in a statement. Regular
accounting's nomenclature assumes a familiarity on the part of the
81. Dr. Clark Abt claims the following "immediate benefits" from the use of the Abt
social audit form: "earnings increase, budgeting efficiency, early warning of opportunity and
risk, positive public and governmental relations, and marketing improvements." BAUER &
FENN, supra note 1, at 19. At this stage, however, management introspection and planning
are the primary purposes of attempts at the super social audit. Yet since the super audit is
also intended for external use and, indeed, Abt has published its own super audit in its annual
report, the super audit also must be evaluated from the reader's standpoint. Even from the
standpoint of the super audit's use as a management tool, however, BAUER & FENN, supra
note 1, at 32 intimate that such an audit might be possible only in "[a] small company
manned by top officials of a like mind both on social audits and on the issues with which the
audit was concerned . . . ." Used merely as a management tool in a larger firm, executives'
disagreement over the breadth and depth of the audit the firm is to undertake and sensitivity
to or anguish over such deep introspection might inhibit a super audit process.
82. The 1973 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at 24, n.1 describes the valuation of staff
as a social asset. "Valuation . . . is based on year-end payroll, discounted to present value,
the discount rate being a function of mean staff tenure (averaged over previous years) and
salary profiles over time." Apparently, then, Abt values staff at cost. Alternatively, one could
value staff based upon financial productivity, or in context, social productivity. Another
measure could be staff time devoted to social projects not otherwise reflected in social assets.
At least to the naive reader, cost valuation of staff as a social asset seems to presume that
employment of persons is a priori a social good, regardless of employers' duties, or that Abt
employees all are thoroughly good and efficient persons. See also the Abt social audit foot-
notes accompanying note 84 infra, costing abatement of pollution Abt causes at $.02 per
kilowatt of electricity Abt consumes, $.01 per mile of automobile travel Abt employees gener-
ate, and $35 per ton of paper Abt uses. Abt gives no explanation of the basis for those
particular valuations or for alternatives Abt might have used.
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reader that social accounting cannot assume.83
Even when the measurement of valuation is explained, the
reader remains skeptical of the valuation or of any conceivable mea-
surement method. For example, with regard to Abt's social liability
for pollution, the notes to Abt's social income statement read:
NOTE 13-The company consumed 1,723,593 KWH of electric power in 1973
. . . . The cost of abatement of air pollution created by the production of this
power is estimated at $.02 per KWH.
NOTE 14-The company generated 1,727,440 commuting trip miles in 1973
. . . . The cost of abatement of air pollution caused by automobile commuting
is estimated at $.01 per mile.
NOTE 15-A substantial portion of the company's activities are expressed
. . . through the printed word. The company used 170 tons of paper in 1973
... . The cost of abatement of water pollution created by the manufacture
of this paper is estimated at $35 per ton."
Perhaps those statements are accurate. Perhaps, too, pollution is a
social cost everyone should bear. Given the propriety of those items'
inclusion in the social audit, however, one remains skeptical that
Abt Associates or any firm can put a monetary value on the prorated
portion of pollution damage the production of paper the firm uses
causes in a faraway, unknown stream. 5
A feeling seems to arise of the impropriety of accounting in the
first place for externalities, such as automobile commuting by em-
83. The problem is an evolutionary one. As more social accounting statements appear
with some degree of uniformity, see text following note 107 infra, and with several professional
accounting groups' movement toward those goals, text accompanying notes 99-102 infra, some
readers will become familiar with the methods of valuation and the non-traditional account-
ing concepts used in social audits.
Yet it may be insufficient. For many individuals, accounting is taught and not learned.
Other than business persons, the accountant, and the financial analyst who work with ac-
counting statements on a daily basis, most individuals probably learn what they know of
accounting, its short hand, terminology, and methods through formal training. Certainly
most lawyers do, either as undergraduates or in a summary accounting course in law school.
Social accounting, therefore, and its methods of valuation may not become really meaningful
until social accounting evolves, becomes somewhat uniform, and is taught in accounting
courses, probably in the elementary course most individuals encounter. That would seem to
be far, far in the future. But see the recommendations for teaching rudiments of social
accounting, to accountants at least, in McCullers & Van Daniker, Socio-economics and
Accounting Education, 47 AcCOUNTING REV. 604 (1972).
84. 1973 Abt Social Audit, supra note 77, at 27.
85. One wonders whether the Abt social audit carried out the exercise of tracing the
paper Abt consumes to the specific plants of specific paper companies which pollute, do not
pollute, or pollute at some given level. For the audit to be accurate, a similar task would
involve an inventory of the pollution quotient for each employee automobile used in commut-
ing to and from work at Abt or an inventory of at least the make and model of each automobile
so used and the distance traveled. If tracing has been carried out, then one has to wonder
whether the task of carrying out the exercise or of trying to account for such items in the first
place is worthwhile, except perhaps as an expression of management's concern.
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ployees, for which the company is only one of thousands of causes.86
This feeling arises partly because of the attribution and valuation
problems, but more because of the reasoning that the paper com-
pany or the manufacturer of employees' automobiles can best ac-
count for pollution they cause most directly, either because of their
proximity to the source or their ability to determine what the opti-
mum level of pollution is."
Absent a valuation problem, the propriety of other items' inclu-
sion in the super social audit also is apparent. Including items such
as land and retained earnings as social assets merely because they
are available for social programs seems suspicious. An inference
arises that the item's full inclusion on the social balance sheet is
merely to fatten the social assets total because Abt eliminates the
items before inserting the social assets total into the financial bal-
ance sheet. Instead, the company should list as social assets only
that portion of those fixed 6r other assets the firm uses or reserves
for social programs. Moreover, if the company intends to integrate
social and financial accounting statements, it should leave standing
on the balance sheet's financial portion only the remaining histori-
cal cost or market valuation of those assets partly used for social
programs."5
86. An exception might be where the audited firm consumes most or all of the polluter's
output and would be in a position to account and to persuade or exert pressure on the polluter.
Another possible nexus might be if the good whose manufacture gives rise to environmental
damage is the principal raw material used by the audited firm, even if the audited firm
consumes only a small portion of the polluter's output. But to have social audits account for
pollution caused in the production of all the myriad raw materials, parts, and other goods
the audited firm consumes seems of little use, save as an internally oriented conscience-
raising and conservation device.
87. Economists and ecologists agree that optimal levels of pollution, not zero pollution,
are the proper goals. There are goods which the society will still desire even when the society
has been made fully aware of the social cost those goods' production poses. With other goods,
consumers will tolerate a price rise to accommodate some pollution abatement efforts by the
manufacturer. Beyond some level of cost, however, the public utility in having the goods at
a given price will be greater than the utility in having the pollution manufacture causes
eradicated further. See LIPSEY & STEINER, supra note 72, at 227-28. The Abt social audit seems
to presume that all pollution must be eradicated. If such presumptions are dispelled, social
audits such as Abt's will have even greater difficulty in determining a firm's proper share qua
consumer of the cost of reducing its suppliers' and others' pollution, because the audit will
first have to determine what the optimal level of pollution is. With a few exceptions, then,
the social audit would probably do best to leave accounting for environmental matters to the
manufacturer and others closer to the source, such as the company which consumes most or
all of the polluter's output, supra note 86.
88. Perhaps more wisely, the entire item should remain a financial asset if its primary
purpose is use in the regular business of the company. Only if the fixed assets use is primarily
social, such as recreational facilities for employees or day care centers, should the item be a
social asset. Occasional or part time use of other company facilities for social programs could
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The Abt statements raise many other questions of accounting
nicety. The discreteness of apportionments between accounts and
of valuation that the statements suggest does not seem warranted
in such a new field. Furthermore, the Abt type audit calls on corpo-
rate executives to make an examination of conscience the likes of
which few, if any, individuals ever make in their personal lives. For
the corporation to admit to itself and maybe to the outside world
that its operations pollute will be painful; to expect a corporation
to compute as a liability the governmental services it consumes over
and above those its taxes pay for, or its financing as an opportunity
cost to society, is to carry accounting accuracy and accountability
to extremes.
There are others, though, who would overlay the super social
audit with further complexity. For instance, some would have a
social environmental audit precede the social audit. The environ-
mental audit provides statistics and other information on the whole
range of social problems the corporation could face within its com-
munity and its industry. Statistics on unemployment, income dis-
tribution, health care, public safety, housing, education, environ-
ment, transporation, and culture describe the environment in which
the corporation operates. 89 The super social audit then describes the
rationale for the choices the firm makes and the priorities it assigns
in its quest to remedy social problems the environmental audit has
highlighted."
Another complexity some would stir into the pot is the inclusion
of comparative data about other companies in a corporation's own
social audit. 1 The firm would glean the data from public reports,
be reflected in the social income statement as accretion to a social asset and as a cost of
conferring a social benefit.
89. See First National Bank of Minneapolis, Social Environmental Audit Rep. (1972).
90. The principal criticism that can be offered seems to be that while such a process is
worthwhile, the workload involved in formally preparing such an audit for public disclosure
would be great. The better course might be to prepare an informal environmental audit for
management's use. The company's social audit could then show relevant portions of the
environmental audit through the social audit's discussion of the priorities the company has
assigned to the social problems it intends to treat. Alternatively, all of the firms in a particu-
lar community could operate from a social environmental audit a government agency, a
central planning authority, or an industry trade group develops and furnishes.
91. See e.g., BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 72, suggesting that, along with data about
one's own firm, a social audit should include 4 types of comparative norms:
[Plerformance by other companies in the industry, by similar firms in the same geo-
graphical location, local legal requirements, and some norm of what is possible in a given
location (e.g., minority employment as a function of the proportion . . . of minority
group members in the area).
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including those of government agencies, public interest groups,92
and other companies' social audits. Companies might include com-
parable firms in the same industry and companies of a similar size
in the same geographical region. This seems spurious. Public reports
and public interest groups' data would be available to readers
through other sources. An interested individual will be able to make
his or her own summarization of other companies' performances,
compare results, and reach conclusions. Such a comparison, along
with the comparison of the company's data for the present year with
that of prior years is the normal practice with financial matters and
in investment selection.13 The provision by a company of summari-
zations about other companies' social performance could lead to
liability for disparagement or some other sort of action, especially
if a company follows the temptation to make its own performance
seem, on a relative basis, salubrious. The social audit would do well
to leave the whole task of comparison to the social audit's readers,
to investment advisors, and to public interest groups. In time, too,
the comparison process will become more facile as the use of social
audits evolves and spreads and as auditing practices become more
uniform.
In fact, as with the complete audit, whatever the difficulties
with the super social audit or with the layers of complexity some
would pile upon it, judgment must be reserved. Advanced social
accounting is in a state of evolutional flux. Until developers of social
accounting methods achieve some uniformity and some wider famil-
iarity with social accounting, and companies complete some num-
ber of more sophisticated social audits, criticism can be nothing
more than constructive.
II. PRESENT PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
PROGRESS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTING
The debate over quantification and monetization will continue.
A few commentators still argue that there should be no monetiza-
tion at all. These authorities reason that in social accounting:
92. E.g., through the sources listed in notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. Pre-
sumably, were the SEC to require some social accounting and disclosure, those public interest
organizations would continue to extrapolate and summarize information corporations' social
audit disclosure documents contain.
93. See Kripke, Bicentennial Paper: A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure
Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 305 (1975). Professor Kripke, however, intimates that perhaps the
present process is backwards and, for that reason, SEC-required disclosure might enhance
instead of forbid comparative data in companies' financial disclosures.
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The theoretical justification for an expenditure approach is questionable.
For economic goods, the price mechanism assures the relevance of dollars as a
measure of utility, for the person bidding is the one to receive the utility. With
social goods. . . the price mechanism is not as effective. Items of very low cost
might be required to avoid significant unfavorable social impact. A manage-
ment can fail to incur many small social expenditures and emerge with a high
. ..rating, regardless of the negative social impact of the firm."
The danger that social accounting could become bogged down in a
morass of monetization problems in attempting to account for min-
iscule corporate social impacts is very real. Ambiguities about the
social impact of some items or programs will remain. "For example,
a 'vice-president. . serving on a government Product Safety Com-
mission' could be speeding progress or inhibiting progress." Under
most present forms of social accounting, the company employing
such a vice-president could list his or her salary as a social asset.
The company "would score either way."''
The range of issues that the social audit and corporate social
responsibility should cover will be a continuing source of contro-
versy. The lists of possible issues are long. New areas for corporate
social responsibility come into vogue, but many of the older issues
remain on the list."6 Whether a firm should list as a liability activi-
ties in apartheid countries, or whether the firm should list those
activities as an asset, on the premise that a company is ameliorating
conditions by its operations there, will be a continuing debate
within and without the firm. Defense contracting and supply raises
similar issues. Even legally permissible political activity is a source
of fierce debate. One list of social audit items includes a recommen-
dation that a firm assess how much democracy or disenfranchi-
sement the firm has meted out to its shareholders,97 a recommenda-
94. Mobley, Commentary on Let's Get on with the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 48
(Winter 1972-73). Accord, Bauer, supra note 54, at 44:
Often a company can make its most important social contribution by adopting policies
for which there is no identifiable cost, but which may be socially positive, such as
enlightened marketing and advertising practice.
95. Bauer, supra note 54, at 44.
96. See, e.g., one corporate official's lament:
Now its women, before it was air pollution and before that the urban crisis. Some honest
efforts are made, and then it's swept under the rug until the next crisis.
Bralove, Despite Much Hoopla, Few Women Capture Companies' Top Jobs, Wall Street J.,
Apr. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
97. BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 73-74. When the problem of issues that social
accounting should treat is analyzed, though, the air clears. Most "social responsibility" issues
fall into one of three categories. First, there is a range of issues on which most everyone agrees
private companies do have a responsibility and, further, a consensus exists as to the direction,
if not the magnitude, to which responsibility points. Minority hiring and pollution abatement
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tion sure to touch deeply corporate officers' sensibilities. Another
recommendation that further obfuscates is a suggestion that a firm
account for its past sins as well as for its present malfeasance or
nonfeasance. The suggestion asks that a firm's audit hazard a guess
about the social position a community would have been in had the
firm not inflicted social costs ab initio.15 The process' complexity
alone seems staggering, even when viewed apart from the masochis-
tic posture the recommendation calls for corporate management to
assume.
These and other debates, however, should not dishearten those
who await a meaningful social audit. Progress in achieving a
method, terminology, and degree of uniformity for the social audit
is well underway. The National Association of Accountants has an
active Committee on Accounting for Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity. The Committee has outlined the issues it intends to face in its
"Statement of Objectives and Procedures"99 and currently is follow-
ing up on that Statement. The American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants has begun a similar program with its Committee on
Social Measurement. The Committee already has issued several
reports.' 0 A number of seminars, workshops, and symposia have
are such issues. Secondly, there is the group of issues as to which everyone agrees corpora-
tions have a responsibility but no consensus exists concerning its direction. For example,
most believe that private American companies are obligated not to foster apartheid. Whether
not to operate in South Africa or to continue operations there in an enlightened manner,
however, is a question over which many disagree. Finally, there is a category of issues over
which many disagree whether corporations have any responsibility in the first place, viz., to
refrain from defense contracting. Many would argue that a strong national defense is a social
good. As social responsibility has matured, a consensus has come into being about what lies
in the first category of issues. See, e.g., notes 107 & 317-20 infra and accompanying text.
This category of issues would be a good point from which to base social accounting and re-
quired disclosure of accounting results. See note 451 infra and accompanying text.
98. Of course, for the enlightened company, the recommendation can have a reverse
effect. The company can trace the community benefits of years of the company's social
programs. See, e.g., BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 59, n.12:
By virtue of broad social forces a community may be going "up" or "down." The
contribution of any social program to a community should be measured in terms of where
the community is relative to where it would have been in the absence of the program. If
statistical series are available for the community. . . an extrapolation can be made from
the time the program begins to estimate where it would have been in the absence of the
program.
99. The statement is reproduced in the National Ass'n of Accountants' periodical
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, Feb. 1974, at 39-41.
100. The committee is the so-called Toan Committee, headed by Arthur B. Toan of
Price Waterhouse & Co. Its reports include: AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUN-
TANTS, SOCIAL MEASUREMENT-POINTS OF VIEW OF SOCIOLOGISTS, BUSINESSMEN, POLITICAL SCIEN-
TISTS, ECONOMISTS, CPA'S (1973) and Committee on Measurement of Social Programs,
Report, 47 Accounting Rev. 337 (Supp. 1972).
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been held to gather information and to disseminate lessons learned
in the art of social accounting.'"' Several business consulting firms
are now in the field evolving social audit methods for client corpora-
tions' use.' 2 Hence, an attempt to resolve the issues is being made
and some semblance of uniformity in and widespread use of the
social audit could be in sight. 103 In the drive for uniformity, however,
several different steps could be taken and several distinctions could
be made. They would enable both the social audit's potential user
and the casual observer to evaluate the progress that social account-
ing is making and better to determine just how far down the road
the maturation of the social audit lies.
Emphatically, consideration and refinement of the social audit
in the sense of traditional accounting and with a view toward even-
101. The Public Affairs Council, an organization of some 200 major corporations whose
purpose is to stimulate increased corporate involvement in society's mainstream, has held 2
such workshops since 1971. LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 25. A second was
held in 1972. Sethi, supra note 12, at 33. The National Ass'n of Manufacturers has had a
similar conference. Id. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan also
has been studying the issues. Likert, The Influence of Social Research on Corporate
Responsibility, in COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A NEW RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE
SOCIAL POLICY (1970) (Supp. No. 31). See also Merrill, supra note 16, on the Boston Workshop
and other movements; Abt Associates, Inc., 1973 Ann. Rep. 11 (1974), for a description of
symposia in which Abt has participated.
102. These include Abt Associates, Inc., supra note 77; Arthur D. Little Co., a large,
well-known consulting firm; Sethi, supra note 12, at 33; and BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at
28. The Hudson Institute has been formulating checklists for 6 major corporate clients to
evaluate their performance in the area of corporate social responsibility. LONGSTRETH &
ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 24.
103. Cf. Briloff, Comment on Let's Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'Y REV.
46 (Winter 1972-73):
[I] am not inclined to wait until . . . my profession, i.e., certified public accountancy,
develops the configurations required . . . . My misgivings are noted in the belief that
[a social audit] program would be implemented, if at all, much too little and much too
late.
As to the "too late." Experience informs me that before our professional bodies go
through the agonies of determining what costs are to be allocated, . . . how is the
standard of materiality to be applied, what should be the auditor's responsibility . ..
there will have elapsed a whole generation of nondisclosures and even deceptive disclo-
sure. To discern how deliberate "all deliberate speed" can be, we need but reflect on
the time lags in the development of standards of disclosure by diversified entities . ..
to say nothing of the purchase-pooling trauma, and we discern how deliberate "all
deliberate speed" can be.
On the trauma and equivocation in the 10 years it took public accounting to resolve the
purchase-pooling question, see Briloff, Accounting Practices and the Merger Movement, 45
NOTRE DAME LAW. 604, 610-14 (1971). Professor Briloff, a persistent critic of public account-
ing, is the author of a book quite critical of all phases of modern accounting. A. BRILOFF,
UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972). But see the other recent trauma caused by and the lack
of certitude found in the financial accounting and disclosure modern public accounting
produces in notes 430-36 infra and accompanying text.
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tual disclosure must be separated from the social audit as an inter-
nal management tool. The latter is accompanied by difficult con-
cepts such as cost-benefit analyses of management's social alterna-
tives, opportunity cost computations, social environmental audits,
and measuremnts of the quality of effects social programs produce.
Those concepts are beyond the public's and most investors' abilities
to comprehend. By combining all possible measurements of corpo-
rate social performance for all possible uses under the head "social
audit," social accounting's developers certainly are doing much
more than traditional accounting has ever done or purported to do.
The task of adopting traditional accounting concepts to the com-
pany's efforts in the social responsibility area is a prodigious enough
task. When social auditing also considers what social responsibility
actions corporations could have taken or should have taken, the
accounting task becomes herculean. Traditional accounting has left
cost-benefit analyses and discussion of quality as opposed to quant-
ity to management's subjective comments, which usually accom-
pany accounting statements in annual reports and elsewhere. Dur-
ing its development, social accounting should be content to do the
same.
Failure to separate the areas of accounting for disclosure and
managerial accounting-systems analysis has inhibited social ac-
counting's progress by binding up the entire field with conceptual
difficulties. That failure also has hidden the accomplishments social
accounting has made thus far. The pseudo-complexity and false
accuracy imported into social auditing may have prolonged the
avoidance of social accounts by many corporations; because of the
purported weightiness, companies have thought the entire field to
be less advanced than it really is. With some unity of format and
some quantification having been introduced, social accountants
could now encourage companies to include process audits and some
forms of the complete audit in annual reports.
Some corporations have weathered for too long the misguided
attacks of corporate activists,' 4 while other companies have done
little in the social responsibility area because they have had no need
to account. With a modest, regularized social accounting format,
some corporations would be able to reveal the good they believe they
104. When coupled with some disclosure, this seems to be a benefit social accounting
might bestow. At present, corporate activists sometimes direct attacks toward a relatively
social responsible corporation while the activities of the worst polluter or of the silent, less
responsible corporation go unchallenged. See the examples discussed notes 371-79 infra and
accompanying text in the cost benefit analysis of disclosure on corporate social responsibility.
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do as well as admit to shortcomings of which they are aware. Regu-
larity of format would enhance comparison of social audits, induce
readability, and in part avert misguided attacks. On the other hand,
social accounting would force other companies to begin thinking
about and formulating social programs. A relatively simple form of
process audit could accomplish those aims. At present, however, the
process audit and the thought of public reporting are mixed in the
morass of loftier thought and rhetoric about efficient allocation of
resources, opportunity costs, and demonstrable relationships to
profitability.
Henceforth, social accounting in the nature of traditional ac-
counting, for public reporting purposes, should be a separate area
for study. Accounting organizations should split apart the concep-
tual framework into treatment of social accounting and treatment
of managerial systems analysis. The various social accounting com-
mittees should spawn separate subcommittees for the two areas.
Textual treatment in reports and in the literature should be distinct
and clearly labeled. Last of all, the terms social audit and social
accounting should be used in contradistinction to the internal social
audit and management systems analysis. With those steps, some of
the confusion and blurriness that has so pervaded social account-
ing's development will disappear.
That the social accounting which such a separation produces
may not be discrete enough or take into account every effect corpo-
rate activity has on its environment is no objection. The interested
public, interested investors, and, indeed, many of the more severe
critics of corporate methods do not call for an omnipotent, detailed
audit. Instead, they have begun to realize that in pursuing social
responsibility companies are subject to restraints, that in some form
profit maximization is a necessary constraint if the production of
desired goods and services is to continue.' 5 Room for corporate ac-
tivity in the social responsibility area has limits. Those limits also
include the time and effort corporations can give to assessing'and
reporting on social considerations. In other words, time and profit
constraints limit the social audit's breadth and complexity just as
105. These and similar observations have been made elsewhere in this article: with
reference to the process audit's virtues, notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text, with
reference to investors' relative approach to choosing socially responsible investments displac-
ing the search for the clean company, note 41 supra, and with reference to the public's desire
to know the earnestness with which companies are pursuing social responsibility and not
necessarily for a discrete measurement of all corporate efforts, note 55 supra. The observation
is also implicit in much of the criticism of the super audit's complexity in notes 81-88 supra
and accompanying text.
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those constraints limit the activities upon which a social audit re-
ports. Many investors and corporate critics have come to under-
stand this.
In the last analysis, most individuals interested in corporate
social responsibility merely want assurances that corporate execu-
tives have adopted a concerned attitude; they do not desire a de-
tailed accounting. They want assurances that executives have en-
gaged in some earnest introspection about the corporation's role in
modern society and about company policies, that they have as-
signed some priorities, that they are attempting to foresee and then
avoid the liabilities social irresponsibility may cause, and, finally,
that they have begun doing something. Forms of the social audit
for demonstrating these things now exist. If these social accounting
forms can now only be freed from consideration of more lofty and
complex stuff, as this article recommends, and if some social ac-
counting results are required to be disclosed, the art of social ac-
counting would make a quantum jump down the road of progress.
IV. PROGRESS IN THE ART OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTING-A FIRST
ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE
Despite whatever faults and inaccuracies remain in the simpler
social accounting forms that now exist, the Securities and Exchange
Commission should begin requiring those forms for public account-
ing purposes, bearing in mind that "we can sometimes outwit uncer-
tainty by a wilful assault on it. Incremental insights into urgent
matters can often be gained by forcing imperfect designs upon stub-
born problems."' ' Social accounting has reached the turning point
where the ability and incentive to improve its substance and metho-
dology can only be achieved through some application. Social ac-
counting is now developing largely in the abstract or in those con-
crete situations where the problems social accounting meets are
easy ones. Accounting organizations and consulting firms are en-
gaged in research on social audit methods, but research can proceed
only so far. At some point, widespread use of the techniques devel-
oped is necessary to iron out the ambiguities and inaccuracies that
106. Gray, Commentary on Let's Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'y REV. 47,*
48 (Winter 1972-73). These stubborn problems are not those of social accounting alone. The
whole area of evolving a new legal model of the modern, publicly held corporation and of
corporate law reform generally, with proposals for federal chartering of corporations, ex-
panded use of shareholder proxy proposals, and so on, are faced by the SEC. Social account-
ing and disclosure could also give the SEC "incremental insights" on those "urgent matters."
See, e.g., notes 176-88 & 460-63 infra and accompanying text.
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remain. The widespread application of audit techniques also is
needed to discover those imperfections in accounting methods one
can discover only through oft-repeated use. Seemingly, that point
is near. SEC-required disclosure would transfer social accounting's
development from a realm largely filled by theory to the realm of
practice.
SEC-required disclosure also could introduce some needed uni-
formity and comparability. Social accounting has proceeded to the
point where its forms are beginning to proliferate more at a geome-
tric than an arithmetic rate. For social accounting to move more
forward than sideways, some rough-hewn uniformity must be intro-
duced to the social accounting field. Choosing some of the best from
the various social accounting techniques now available, the SEC
can aid in consolidating the progress social accounting has made
thus far. A base in which uniformity exists will enhance comparison
of techniques varying beyond that base. Discussion and develop-
ment can then isolate on frontiers; every discussion of social audit-
ing techniques will not have to begin at ground zero, as is now the
case. SEC-required disclosure could impose a core of uniformity to
speed social accounting's development. Moreover, a consensus can
be contrived as to which areas or what minimal breadth a social
audit should take. Minority hiring and promotion, environmental
matters, product safety, employee welfare and plant safety, energy
conservation and development, and corporate giving now appear on
every list of subjects the social audit should treat.10 Social account-
ing and disclosure could move forward in this minimal core of areas
if that core were given the legitimacy of an SEC mandate.
The principal impediment to social accounting now seems to be
the complexities its progenitors have injected into it. That problem
seems soluble by a realization that the complexities are more the
ken of traditional management thought processes than is public
accounting in financial matters or needed accounting in the corpo-
rate social responsibility area. Once that catharsis is passed, the two
social accounting areas can proceed along separate but parallel
107. See BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 72; Linowes, supra note 53, at 40-41; Schoen-
baum, supra note 5, at 587; Sethi, supra note 12, at 38. See also the areas of interest to the
various corporate activist and auditing groups discussed in notes 36-42 supra and accompany-
ing text; areas about which institutional investors want disclosure, text accompanying note
145 infra. Although each of these and other authorities may differ concerning the inclusion
of certain areas in the social audit, each has as the core of its proposal auditing and reporting
on all of the topics the text lists. Quite unconsciously, a working consensus seems to have
evolved through the writing and comment of diverse individuals. That consensus provides a
basic field of topics with which almost any attempted social audit must deal.
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tracks. Both would develop with greater speed if the SEC were to
require public accounting. Through use and application in prepar-
ing required disclosures accountants and corporate managers will
learn social accounting by doing, and they will have bases for com-
parison and improvement.
The other side of the coin-progress as it is presently being
accomplished-consists of consideration of all social accounting
forms under one head with thought of use delayed until social ac-
counting reaches quintessent form. As the guardian of the principal
disclosure schemes, the SEC seems to want such a quintessent so-
cial accounting form, including demonstrable linkage of social re-
sponsibility with profitability along the lines super social audits
comtemplate, before the Commission requires significant disclosure
on corporate social responsibility.18 Hence, social accounting will
evolve to an anomalous position. With all the hope social accounting
offers for telling corporate managers "where to go" and "how to get
there" in this troublesome area of social responsibility, the public,
interested investors, and corporate managers will remain confused.
Then, suddenly, the SEC, some other governmental agency, or the
accountants will present them with "too much, too late." In modest
forms social accounting and disclosure should begin now.
V. INCONGRUITIES IN THE PRESENT DISCLOSURE SYSTEM-ANOTHER
ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE
A. The Purposes of Disclosure-in. General
"The keystone of . . . Federal securities legislation is disclo-
sure."'"9 Many writers cite Professor Louis Loss: "[T]here is a re-
current theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again disclo-
sure, and still more disclosure."'' 10 Commentators have used Profes-
sor Loss' words to buttress countless arguments for extending ac-
counting and disclosure into the nooks and interstices the original
regulatory scheme left vacant or for using accounting and disclosure
as the solution to each new problem that arises in the securities
area.'
1
'
108. The point is best illustrated by the recent case Natural Resources Def. Council,
Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) that was discussed in the text accompanying
notes 274-321 infra.
109. Knauss, supra note 13, at 607.
110. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (1961).
111. See, e.g., Knauss, supra note 13, at 607-08 (citing Loss in argument for extending
disclosure requirements to over-the-counter securities); Sommer, The Annual Report: A
Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1093 (citing Loss in argument for extending and
upgrading disclosure requirements for annual reports).
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Commentators have identified several purposes these disclo-
sure requirements and the accounting rules and regulations that
necessarily precede disclosure seek to serve. Most often mentioned
is the function of accounting and disclosure in informing investors,
thus enabling investors to make rational investment decisions." 2
The investor chooses to buy, sell, or hold investment securities on
the basis of full disclosure of material facts about the security and
about the company that has issued the security.1 3
The other oft-cited purpose of accounting and disclosure is the
prevention of fraud, manipulation, and questionable acts and busi-
ness practices. The theory here is that "many things are not done
by corporate managements which would be done if they could be
done without disclosure.""' 4 Thus, accounting and disclosure "re-
strain because of sensitivity to public reaction" or "the possibility
of legal action." Disclosure operates in a "deterrent manner.""' 5 The
reason disclosure attempts to deter questionable acts and practices
is to prevent the visitation upon investors of catastrophic invest-
ment losses that management's speculative or questionable actions
might cause. Without disclosure of management's proposed course
of action, investors have no way of evaluating the risk of loss or the
potential reward that management's action poses. The corollary is
that if disclosure does not restrain, and management decides to
proceed with the speculative or questionable scheme, but discloses
what is involved, investors can evaluate the risk of loss.
112. The emphasis on disclosure . . . [rielates to the proper function of Federal
government in investment decisions. Apart from the prevention of fraud and manipula-
tion, the draftsman of the '33 and '34 Acts viewed that responsibility as being primarily
one of seeing to it that investors and speculators had access to enough information to
enable them to arrive at their own rational decisions.
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND
'34 SECURITIES ACTS 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as the WHEAT REPORT]. See also Cary, supra
note 13, at 410; Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 575.
113. Disclosure, however, does not contemplate subjective evaluations of the security's
investment merits, either by the security's issuer or by the SEC. The federal disclosure
philosophy leaves the ultimate question, evaluation of the security's investment merits, to
the investor, with or without the aid of a broker or investment adviser. See, e.g., WHEAT
REPORT, supra note 112, at 43-44.
114. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (1970). Professor Ratner opines
that disclosure is "the most effective control over management that has been developed
during the last thirty-five years-disclosure of financial information, of transactions by insi-
ders, of other types of information through which shareholders and others can measure man-
agement's performance against general standards of competence and integrity."
115. Cary, supra note 13, at 411. The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 112, at 10 posits "the
belief that appropriate publicity tends to deter questionable practices and to elevate stan-
dards of business conduct."
1976]
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One also can detect a number of other goals for disclosure.
These goals exist either independently of or subsidiarily to the more
oft-cited purposes of disclosure. For instance, supplementing both
of those traditional disclosure goals is the aim to present a rough
parity of information across the spectrum of a company's affairs.
Through its disclosures, a company cannot emphasize its strengths,
for instance an order backlog, and ignore its weaknesses, for in-
stance a possible dearth of plant capacity to capitalize on that back-
log. Another of disclosure's goals is to insure that an equal amount
of information be available about different companies. That is, dis-
closure aims to produce availability of information of roughly the
same scope about all companies having a certain size or status.",
Pre-Securities Act history has shown that many companies were
willing to make the financial disclosures the securities acts eventu-
ally made mandatory. Before the legislation, hoWever, some firms
refrained from making the disclosures because they feared that
other firms, competitors in the same industry or in the general mar-
ket for capital, would not disclose, leaving the disclosing firm
standing in isolation, a good target for criticism. The firm that had
not discosed would do so only if its performance exceeded that of
the firm first disclosing." 7
Another parity proponents of disclosure mean it to achieve is
some rough-hewn equality of access to information for various
classes of investors. The theme of much of development of Rule 10b-
5 has been assurances to investors that, in theory at least, all partic-
ipants start the investment process on roughly the same informa-
tional footing. Assurances of equality of access foster investors' trust
in the capital markets."' In part, the same equality of access theme
inspires affirmative disclosure requirements for documents compa-
nies file with the SEC.'1 9
116. In part, that status is defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12(b),
12(g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), 78j(g) (1970). Section 12(b) companies are those that have a class
of securities listed on a national stock exchange. Section 12(g) companies are those that have
$1,000,000 or more in assets and a class of equity securities held by 500 or more persons. Under
§§ 13a-c of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (a-c) (1970), such companies must file annual and other
periodic reports containing detailed financial and other information with the SEC.
117. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132, 133 passim (1973).
118. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) that began an
analysis of Rule 10b-5 with the premise that "the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information. ... See also In re Cady Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
119. See, e.g., Benston, supra note 117, at 133-36.
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Without disclosure on corporate social responsibility the pres-
ent disclosure system produces incongruities that result in the sys-
tem's failing to meet even the goals it sets for itself. This section's
purpose is to identify those incongruities, document them, and use
them as arguments for Securities and Exchange Commission man-
dated social accounting and disclosure. The section's other purpose
is to demonstrate that social accounting and disclosure have become
necessary because they would serve all the traditional purposes for
which securities regulation has in the past required disclosure in
financial and other areas. Neither the SEC nor advocates of social
responsibility accounting and disclosure need premise accounting
and disclosure on some new view of corporations as the principal
power centers in our society or as quasi-public institutions. Some
disclosure on corporate social responsibility is now needed to enable
investors to evaluate securities' merits, to prevent surprise or catas-
trophe that social irresponsibility might produce, and to provide
a parity of information about all of a company's activities, a parity
of information about different companies, and a parity of access to
that information for all interested investors.
B. Utility in the Investment Process-An Argument for Disclosure
on Social Responsibility
(1) Introduction
In the mid and late 1960's bull market, investors did not seem
to have much interest in choosing "socially responsible" invest-
ments or, once they had invested, in encouraging socially responsi-
ble management. It can be surmised that investors, preoccupied
with making money in a seemingly ever-rising market, were not
much concerned with social responsibility. In the late 1960's, the
investor decision rule that prevailed was the so-called "Wall Street
Rule." Its tenor was suggested by the following observation:
The overwhelming majority of the shareholding public probably prefers
reading ball scores to proxy statements . . . . If they do become dissatisfied
with the performance of management, the best thing to do is sell. During the
past 20 years, there have always been many profitable corporations into which
they could switch their bets at the cost of two commissions. This generally
happy situation. . . has had at least one predictable result. Despite the con-
cern expressed by some scholarly observers . . . there has been no word of
protest from shareholders in general.'1
120. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 253 (1969) (footnote omitted).
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Since investors could easily "switch their bets at the cost of two
commissions," they did not and needed not scrutinize social respon-
sibility factors in choosing investments in the first place.
In particular, commentators noted that the Wall Street Rule
was descriptive of institutional investors' behavior. Institutions
such as pension funds, bank trust departments, mutual funds, and
insurance companies had large amounts of money to invest and, in
the competition for the funds of those on whose behalf they would
be investing, a felt duty to maximize profits. In institutions' invest-
ment management, the Wall Street Rule theorized that "to invest
in a company was to invest in management and if one does not like
what management is doing, one sells the stock." It was a "love it or
leave it" approach.' 2' In investment selection, the Wall Street Rule
dictated that institutions choose investments solely on the basis of
corporations' ability to maintain constant earnings per share
growth.
For a variety of possible reasons, in the few years since the late
1960's a metamorphosis in investor attitudes has occurred. The Wall
Street Rule has been steadily on the wane. The fallout from the Viet
Nam War, the equal rights movements, the death of Martin Luther
King, Earth Day in 1970 and the ensuing ecology movements, and
the bear markets of 1969-70 and 1973-75, all occurring in a short
time frame, have converged and led to ever increasing investor in-
terest in corporate social responsibility and disclosure. A more cycli-
cal stock market has fostered the realization that investment selec-
tion must be much more discrete to result in profit on investments.
Choosing socially responsible investments may be one more hedge
an investor can make in attempting to choose profitable stocks.
Whatever the reasons, '22 many investors, and especially institu-
tional investors, claim that corporate social responsibility is a factor
both in their selection of investments and in the voting of shares
they own. In addition these investors almost universally complain
about the lack of information upon which to base a social responsi-
bility appraisal of some companies and the unevenness of informa-
tion about other companies' social performance.
121. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 495 (footnote omitted). This phenomenon, the Wall
Street Rule, was well known and much discussed. See, e.g., LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM,
supra note 1, at 4-5; THE ETHICAL INVESTOR, supra note 1, at 46-64; Ratner, supra note 114,
at 25-27.
122. These and some of the other more tractable hypotheses about increased investor
interest in corporate social responsibility are discussed in notes 146-88 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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(2) Evidence of Investor Interest in Social
Responsibility Disclosure
The first indications of the Wall Street Rule's possible future
demise came through shareholder public interest proxy proposals.
Campaign General Motors involved social responsibility proxy pro-
posals in two successive proxy seasons, 1970 and 1971. In 1970 a
proposal for a shareholder's committee on General Motors' corpo-
rate social responsibility, which would prepare and make disclo-
sures to General Motors' shareholders on the company's social per-
formance, drew a significant "2.73 percent of the votes cast repre-
senting 7.19 percent of the shareholders voting. 11 3 The New York
City Pension Funds, the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, the
Teachers Insurance Annuity Association, and the College Retire-
ment Equity Fund voted for the proposal."4 Other institutions voted
with General Motors management against the proposal. In doing so,
however, many did express sympathy with the proposal, noting that
"their votes could be different the next time."' I
In the 1972 proxy season, thirty-four shareholders submitted
disclosure proposals that appeared in the proxy statements of
twenty-two companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
Disclosure proposals ... involved 15 of the 22 corporations in question,
including ... Bristol Meyers, Chrysler, Eli Lilly, Ford Motor, GM, Goodyear
Tire and Rubber, Gulf Oil, Honeywell, International Telephone and Tele-
graph, Jewel Companies, Merck ... Standard Oil of California, and Warner
Lambert.
Support for the disclosure proposals ranged from a high of 5.50% at Stan-
dard Oil ... to a low of 0.5% at Eli Lilly. It should be noted that the use of
percentages underestimates support. For example, holders of approximately
$950,000,000 market value of General Motors stock voted in favor of a proposal
for disclosure .... 1
123. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 430. In 1971 a proposal for disclosure directly from the
company, instead of through a shareholders' committee, received 2.36 % of the votes cast,
representing 4.43 "i of the shareholders. The disclosure proposal received roughly double the
votes which other 1971 General Motors public interest proxy proposals received. Schwartz,
supra note 35, at 64 & n.30.
124. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 494 passim.
125. Mintz, Campaign GM Likely to Stir New Conflict on Campus, Wash. Post, May
24, 1970, § A, at 3, col. 2. Still other institutions indicated, some directly to General Motors'
officers, that they would have voted for the proposal had it been better drafted. Schwartz,
supra note 33, at 505-07.
126. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1029-30 (footnotes omitted). Numerous proposals for
disclosure made to other major corporations are listed in Henning, Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: Shell Game for the Seventies?, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 151, 162-63 (R. Nader,
M. Green eds. 1973). See also Schwartz, supra note 33, at 422-23.
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In the 1973 proxy season, shareholder proposals appeared in the
proxy statements of 224 listed and unlisted companies governed by
the SEC's proxy rules.' As a symposium on the role of the SEC
notes, "It is noteworthy that most of the proposals have simply
sought disclosure on the facets of corporate activity thought to im-
pact on societal problems.' '2 8
Direct evidence of institutional investor use of social responsi-
bility criteria exists in the investment selection as well as in the
proxy area. A 1973 Ford Foundation study attempted to canvas 196
major institutional investors on their investment attitudes.' 9 Of the
115 institutions responding, 57.4 percent stated that they took cor-
porate social responsibility considerations into account in decisions
on both the selection and retention of investments.'30 Moreover,
thirty-nine institutions or 33.9 per cent, surprisingly mostly banks
and mutual funds rather than university endowments or founda-
tions, stated a belief that some correlation existed "between socially
responsible business enterprise and those that will produce a satis-
factory return."' 3 ' Such beliefs added a traditional economic as well
as moral incentive to choosing socially responsible stocks.
Of insurance companies, twenty-one responded to the study's
inquiries. The responses revealed that among profit making institu-
tions, insurance companies were "notable both for the degree of
interest they expressed in the social aspects of investment policy
and the extent of present involvement they claimed."'' 2 Apparently,
all twenty-one insurance companies claimed an interest of one sort
or another in corporate social responsibility and investment selec-
tion.' Nine of seventeen large mutual funds claimed that "they
127. SEC, 39th Ann. Rep. 37 (1974). In addition to NYSE listed companies such figures
include companies listed on other stock exchanges, principally the American, and over-the-
counter companies having so-called 12(g) status, as described in note 116 supra. Comparable
figures for prior years were 489 proposals and 204 companies in 1971, 37th Ann. Rep. 53-54
(1972), and 411 proposals and 193 companies in 1972, 38th Ann. Rep. 30-31 (1973).
128. Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The Role of the SEC, in Symposium,
Corporations Under Attack: Response to New Challenges, 28 Bus. LAW. 215, 218-19 (special
ed. 1973) (comments of Bevis Longstreth) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity: The Role of the SEC].
129. LONGSTRETH & RoSENBLOOM, supra note 1.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id. at 43.
132. Id. at 58. Some insurance companies voice a desire to seek socially responsible
investments based not only upon a belief that such investments gain the best long run success
but as a matter of principle as well. Thus, many insurers feel that liquor and tobacco stocks
pose health hazards "inconsistent with the basic interests of a life insurance company." Id.
at 39.
133. Id. at 58 passim. Of course, bound by state law requirements, many insurance
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take social factors into account on the ground that these factors bear
importantly on the economic success of an investment.' 1 34 Fifteen
of eighteen commercial banks took a similar stand.135 Hence, the
Ford Foundation Study indicated that a sizeable percentage of a
representative sample of institutional investors do attempt to take
corporate social responsibility into account in investment selec-
tion.'36
companies must limit their common stock investments, have less investment liquidity than
do other types of institutional investors, and therefore do not come completely under the
aegis of a Wall Street Rule. See Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private Placements For the
Few, 59 VA. L. REv. 886, 892 (1973). Due to that lack of liquidity, insurers cannot always take
a "love it or leave it" approach; rather, since they are more likely to have to "live with it,"
insurance companies may take more care in examining all of an investment's facets, including
scial responsibility factors, before buying. This may explain why the life insurer's trade
group has established a social responsibility information clearinghouse for its members' use.
See text accompanying note 39 supra.
134. LONCSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 67. That finding may also be the
result of urging by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the mutual funds' trade group.
The ICI has established a clearinghouse so that its members can obtain information on
investments' relative social merit. Note 40 supra and accompanying text. It also has pub-
lished a report to its members concluding that "a general qualitative appraisal of manage-
ment's corporate responsibility . . . could have significant long-term investment implica-
tions." I.C.I. COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS STANDARDS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND MUTUAL
FUNDS 2 (1971). The report urges investment companies to consider portfolio companies' and
possible investments' environmental product safety, advertising, and minority hiring and
promotion as "an additional input into the investment decision making process." Id.
135. LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 62. Many responding banks harmo-
nized their investment policy with their fiduciary duties as trustee. They stated that they
indeed must "be conscious of social factors because there exists some coincidence between
those corporations that are 'socially responsible' and those that will be sound investments."
Id.
136. A surprising study result was that profit-making institutions (banks, mutual
funds, and insurers) seem to view their roles as compelling the selection of socially responsible
investments. On the other hand, those institutions which one might intuitively feel would
take an activist role, universities and charitable foundations, downplay social criteria's use
in investment selection.
Eighteen of 22 universities responding did have a policy of taking social responsibility
into consideration in endowment management. Id. at 48. Only 2 universities, however, ex-
pressed the view that socially responsible corporate managements produce better long-run
portfolio yields. Id. at 51. Furthermore, most felt that they would maximize utility to them-
selves and to society by maximizing portfolio yield rather than by accepting lesser yields in
more socially responsible investments in order to induce overall corporate responsibility. As
one university official stated, the feeling seems to be that a university can best implement
the public good
[tlhrough the excellence of its education program, ... the search for . knowledge
and the education of young men and women. Thus, to carry out its function [a univer-
sity] needs the maximum income available.
Id. at 49. An alternative rationale for low-key university involvement is the academic freedom
rationale, typified by the University of Chicago Kalven Committee report:
There is no mechanism by which [the university] can reach a collective position with-
out inhibiting the full freedom of dissent on which it thrives. . . . This creates a heavy
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More recent studies indicate that the Wall Street Rule is of
little import today. A 1974 congressional survey"'7 of sixteen of the
nation's largest banks and insurance companies and ten investment
advisors to mutual funds shows that only one still professes alle-
giance to the Wall Street Rule.' Six of the banks and insurers
expressly disclaim reliance on anything resembling a Wall Street
Rule, and five others not only reject such a principle but report that
they scrutinize social responsibility even more closely or that they
are more likely to vote against portfolio company management on
that issue than any other. They also note that they attempt to
utilize social performance in investment selection.13 Chase Manhat-
tan Bank's response is especially lucid:
presumption against the university . . . modifying its corporate activities ....
University of Chicago, The Report of the Committee on the University's Role in Political and
Social Action 2 (1967).
Twenty-seven of the 44 foundations questioned responded, although only a meager 9
responded in a "substantial way." LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 55. Noting
that there "does not appear to be a widespread sense of urgency among foundations," the
study's authors speculated that "One reason may be that foundations. . . are not subject to
the constant pressures of a close, large, and vocal constituency." Id. From the foundation's
own point of view, the reasoning seemed similar to that behind a university's hesitancy in
cranking social responsibility into investment decisions:
[Ojur investment activities must be for the sole purpose of realizing a maximum return
to charity. . . through our charitable activities we may be able to strengthen our social
and political institutions.
Id. at 56 (quoting a foundation's treasurer). Nevertheless, 5 of the 9 responding foundations
voiced a belief that social responsibility affects a corporation's long-run economic success. Id.
The other not-for-profit institutional investor category, churches, take the most activist
investor role of all, profit or non-profit. Alone among the categories of institutions the study
surveyed, they expressed a willingness not only to select an investment in the more socially
responsible company, other things being equal, but also to accept a lesser monetary return
on portfolio investments, if need be, in exchange for "social returns." Id. at 46. Many
churches were also "prepared to become involved in the affairs of large . . . enterprises in
which they invest." Id. at 47.
137. Hearings on Corporate Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Budgeting, Manage-
ment. and Expenditures and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 245-377 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on Disclosure]. The hearings' subject is disclosure by institu-
tional investors of their portfolios' makeups, not disclosure by companies on social responsi-
bility. A byproduct, however, of a survey to determine how institutions in general vote the
shares they hold is a relatively complete picture of how some large banks and insurance
companies embrace corporate social responsibility.
138. [W]e only invest . . . in organizations in the management of which we have
the highest confidence. Accordingly, voting against management does not normally
arise.
Id. at 361 (letter from W. Perry Neff, Executive Vice President, Chemical Bank of New York
to Senator Lee Metcalf, dated Oct. 29, 1973).
139. Id. at 282 passim (tabulation by the author).
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As managers of other people's money, our primary responsibility is to
achieve the best investment results . . . . This primary obligation, however,
does not relieve us of our concomitant responsibility to demonstrate a due
regard for the manifest priorities of society as a whole. It is becoming increas-
ingly evident that the. . . success of any business depends upon a thoughtful
concern for the society it serves. When a company does not respond affirma-
tively to . . . public aspirations, whether from intentional disregard or eco-
nomic necessity, clearly its prospects for healthy long-term growth are im-
paired.
• . . [Clertain socially negative factors can be isolated, and these aspects
of corporate policy or performance are considered in arriving at our investment
decisions. When careful analysis shows them to persist . . . they may result
in a negative attitude regarding the company's prospects as a suitable invest-
ment."10
Of the ten investment advisors to mutual funds, six have responsi-
bilities for voting portfolio shares.' None describe a procedure re-
sembling the Wall Street Rule, and one advisor recounted several
incidents when it has voted against portfolio companies' manage-
ments."'
The Wall Street Rule no longer describes institutional inves-
tors' behavior. Evidence shows that many, if not fully a third, of
representative samples of institutions now profess to take corporate
social responsibility into account in selecting and in managing in-
vestments.' They believe that such factors have utility in invest-
ment decisions and in determining long-run yields. Moreover, these
institutions would like to see accounting and disclosure on corporate
social responsibility, including better quality, more comparable in-
formation than that now obtainable. Hence, within the SEC's own
definition of the term, information on corporate social responsibility
140. Id. at 286 (Enclosure to letter from L.F. Loree II, Vice Chairman, The Chase
Manhattan Bank, to Senator Lee Metcalf, dated Oct. 30, 1973). Of a slightly different ilk is
Aetna Insurance's response. Aetna indicates that it generally follows the policy embodied in
the Wall Street Rule. However,
A major exception to this policy is: On items involving corporate social responsibility
... we submit them to our Vice President in charge of Corporate Social Responsibility.
He makes recommendations to our top management, who in turn, depending upon the
situation, will refer it to our board of directors. This procedure is considered a very
serious matter ... and such items get very careful attention.
Id. at 326 (letter from Wm. Ingelhart, Vice President, Common Stock Dept., Aetna Life and
Casualty Ins. Co. to Senator Lee Metcalf, dated Oct. 29, 1973).
141. Id. at 388-95.
142. See, e.g., Fidelity Management and Research Co.'s response, id. at 391. Two other
advisory firms single out corporate social responsibility issues as non-routine proxy matters
which receive special reviews by higher-ups within the firm. Id. at 393 (Loomis-Sayles & Co.,
Inc.) & 394 (T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.).
143. Other observers agree with, and some document, that finding. See, e.g., BAUER &
FENN, supra note 1, at 8-11; Doctors, Who Uses Social Criteria In Institutional Investing, Bus.
& Soc'Y REV. 95 (Summer 1972); Shapiro, supra note 41.
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has become material' and the Commission should require compa-
nies to make some disclosures. Unfortunately, by and large, the
Commission has not moved in the social responsibility area, which
has led one large bank's trust department manager to deplore SEC
nonaction:
It would certainly be helpful to an investor if he was informed periodically
about the practices of corporations in connection with minority hiring, pollu-
tion control, employee relations, consumer policies, community activities and
charitable contributions. It seems to us that such information would give us
an insight into the company attitudes and practices which in the long run will
have substantial impact upon its ultimate success as a corporation.'
(3) Individual Investor Attitudes
Other than supposition based upon statistical inferences, little
evidence exists as to individual investors' desires for disclosure on
corporate social responsibility.'46 Individual shareowners' greater
votes for these public interest proxy proposals calling for disclosure,
as opposed to votes on proxy proposals calling for corporate struc-
tural changes, may be one indication of interest. "' Another may be
144. SEC rules define as material "those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security registered."
SEC Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.12b-2 (1965). See also SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (1964).
In its administration of those rules, however, the Commission endeavors "to provide investors
with the disclosure they want," given that the information has some colorable value in
investment selection. Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of the SEC 233 (remarks of
SEC Commissioner Phillip A. Loomis, Jr.). Since a significant investor subpopulation desires
disclosure on corporate social responsibility and since arguably social responsibility is related,
or at least not unrelated, to long run corporate profitability, some information on corporate
social responsibility is material. See also notes 307-11 infra and accompanying text.
145. Quoted in LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 63.
146. There may be several reasons for the dearth of evidence. A statistically valid,
individual investor attitudinal survey would entail much more cost and expertise than do
institutional investor attitudinal surveys such as those reviewed notes 129-42 supra and
accompanying text. For example, the New York Stock Exchange considers a survey of 78,000
individuals adequate for its shareownership studies. Letter from S. West, Vice-President-
Research, New York Stock Exchange to Editors, Wall Street J. Dec. 22, 1975, at 9, col. 2. Cf.
the 196 institutions the Ford Foundation surveys, text accompanying note 136 supra. Another
reason may be that since institutional investors' activities increasingly dominate the stock
market, inquiries into investors' attitudes immediately focus on institutions rather than
individuals as investors. Still another reason may be that researchers interested in attitudes
about corporate social responsibility may think that an individual investor survey may be
too unproductive to undertake in the first place. Individuals' attitudes would vary so widely
that a survey would produce no clear consensus, whereas institutional investors, with their
own literature, trade groups, and communications networks, constitute a relatively small
coterie of investors whose attitudes and opinions reinforce one another. A survey of institu-
tions' attitudes, then, is much more likely to produce a consensus or signs of trends in current
thinking.
147. Disclosure proposals often receive twice the vote that more heavy-handed or obtru-
sive structural reform proposals receive. See, e.g., notes 123-28 supra and accompanying text.
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the attitude of the public at large. One attitudinal survey indicates
that a majority of the public believe that corporations have not
contributed "as much as they should to the problems facing so-
ciety." In the poll, two-thirds of the sample say that they believe
"business has an obligation to help other major institutions to
achieve social progress, even at the expense of profitability."',
Whether or not those public attitudes carry over into the investor
subpopulation, who may have more at stake when the corporations
in which they invest use assets for social programs, and who may
have stronger profit motives than the public at large, is, however, a
matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, a number of statistical infer-
ences and other observations do suggest that individual investor
interest in corporate social responsibility disclosure is quite plausi-
ble.
Although institutional investors account for 70 percent of the
trading in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks, institu-
tions' disclosed ownership accounts for only 33 percent of the NYSE
list. 4' On the other side of the line, a 1970 NYSE Shareholder Cen-
sus shows that individual investors own $683 billion in publicly
traded stock, 64.1 percent of the total.5 0 More recently, individuals'
direct ownership has been estimated at over $750 billion.'"' Yet indi-
viduals do only 30 percent of the trading. Whether because of reluct-
ance to realize paper losses or a reluctance to realize paper gains
until retirement and the benefit of lower tax brackets, private inves-
tors do not trade nearly as much as do institutional investors. The
"great bulk" of their stock is said to be "locked up and. . . seldom
traded."' 51
That many individuals' stockholdings are locked up might indi-
cate that the Wall Street Rule may not be practicable for them. If
individuals are dissatisfied with a corporate management's social
performance, they nevertheless may not be able to "switch their
bets at the cost of two commissions," as some have maintained.' 53
That may be more true in the 1970's up-and-down stock market,
which would lock in many more investors with paper losses, than it
148. OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PUBLIC OPINION INDEX, Oct., 1970 at 4-5.
149. NYSE 1975 FACT BOOK 50 (Institutional ownership is 33%); Wall Street J., June
27, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (individual trading dropped to below 30% of share volume for the first
time); NYSE 1975 FACT BOOK 52 (institutional trading equaled 69% of the 1974 NYSE vol-
ume).
150. NYSE, SHAREOWNERSHIP 1970, at 25.
151. Welles, The Public: Who Needs Em?, INST. INVESTOR, 33, 35 (Mar. 1972).
152. Id.
153. Hetherington, text accompanying note 120 supra.
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was in the rising market of the 1960's. Hence, individual investors
interested in social responsibility may have more of an incentive to
choose socially responsible stocks in the first place, or to work from
within to persuade management to become socially aware, than do
institutions. Thus, individual investors' desire for disclosure on cor-
porate social responsibility could be as great or greater than the
institutional desires revealed by the studies as described above.
The current prevalence of a relative approach to corporate so-
cial responsibility, one that measures a company's social responsi-
bility against other firms or its own past performance, also may
make individual investor interest in social responsibility, its ac-
counting, and disclosure more plausible now than five or ten years
ago. The early investor social responsibility emphasis was on finding
the clean company, one that not only produced minimal social costs
but whose raison d'etre was to "do good." '54 That emphasis could
dictate investment in a pollution control equipment manufacturer
or a text book publishing firm. The search for such an investment,
however, often proved fruitless, since many clean companies were
likely to be in the developmental state, or unprofitable, or both. The
search's fruitlessness led some investors to take a more realistic
approach. Socially conscious investors realized that "it is hard to
imagine a company completely free of connections that might be
considered objectionable on moral, political, or social grounds." '
Thus, investors began to focus on a relative approach: given three
companies in an industry having roughly equivalent profit prospects
and risk, from among the three the investor will choose the company
that seems to be the more socially aware.'50
Another aspect of the relative approach makes it less righteous
or harsh. Progress in social issues over time may make a company
that imposes some social costs just as attractive an investment as a
clean company. The relative approach to socially responsible invest-
ment selection and management connotes a time dimension that
looks to a company's year-to-year improvement on social issues
154. See the experience of the social mutual funds, note 41 supra.
155. Malkiel & Quandt, supra note 19, at 41. For example, Princeton University found
that Xerox, a supposed paragon of social responsibility, had extensive South African invest-
ments, a supposedly irresponsible activity to many corporate critics. Id.
156. This is the approach the Dreyfus social fund, note 41 supra, uses. It is also the
approach THE ETHICAL INVESTOR, supra note 1, at 26 suggests. The relative approach can,
however, take other and even more relaxed forms. One observer finds prevalent "the more
general notion that investment policies should be at least scrutinized in search of particularly
significant social offenders." Preston, Corporation and Society: The Search for a Paradigm,
12 J. ECON. LIT. 434, 445 (1975).
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rather than just the present picture in frozen isolation.'57 Thus, an
investor interested in social responsibility need not sell stock in a
steel producer that has made good progress on pollution abatement
even though, on an overall basis, that producer presently produces
more effluents than others of comparable size.
Indications are that a relative approach to socially responsible
investing is becoming well-known and widespread. '58 Many more
investors can live with a standard which says that companies in
which they invest ought to have among other goals such as profit
maximization, the aim of not harming through pollution or employ-
ment discrimination the society in which they function. The realiza-
tion that corporate social responsibility is a relative thing, or that
it is a goal which the investor should weigh with other goals, such
as desired risk and return on one's portfolio, has undoubtedly made
social responsibility much more palatable to an increasing number
of individual investors.' 59 Since that palatability probably has in-
creased investor interest in social responsibility, an expanding num-
ber of investors probably want some accounting and disclosure to
aid them in investment decisions.' 0
Another, perhaps perverse, reason why many investors might
want disclosure on corporate social responsibility is simply that
accounting and disclosure are the least costly, drastic, and obtrusive
of the competing measures for corporate law reform. They will entail
less cost for the companies in which those investors have interests
and therefore mean less damage to their investment's worth. This
is the lesser of evils when juxtaposed to federal chartering of corpo-
157. Cf. the quotation from Moskowitz, note 53 supra.
158. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 156, at 445; Rockefeller, Corporate Capacity for
Public Responsibility, 28 Bus. LAW. 53, 55-56 (1973).
159. In turn, corporations' realization that many more investors take a relative rather
than an absolutist approach to socially responsible investing should lessen the corporations'
cost and opposition to disclosure. Companies need not fear that disclosure of some negative
results on social responsibility fronts will cause investors to shun their stock, or will damage
their corporate image. See the discussion of disclosure's costs, notes 440-41 infra and accom-
panying text.
160. The question that then arises is why such investors do not come pouring forth in
SEC proceedings dealing with the question, such as those described in text accompanying
notes 302-08 infra. The answer is that for most individual investors the cost of doing so is too
large given their limited investment activity. Likewise, the transaction costs in their joining
together to name a spokesperson is, on a relative basis, large. On the other hand, corporations
who oppose disclosure perceive much more to be immediately at stake and do speak up.
Those, however, are precisely the reasons why part of the SEC's mission is to act on behalf
of investors and demand disclosure that individual investors themselves cannot obtain or
which the market for information does not produce but for which significant although dis-
persed demand exists. See, e.g., note 255 infra.
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rations, federal minimum corporate law standards, and the like.'"'
That phenomenon explains why shareholder proxy proposals for
disclosure receive greater support than do other intracompany re-
form proposals.1 2 For institutional investors, simple disclosure
proxy proposals put far less strain on the institutional money man-
ager called upon to vote. For that reason, "[d]isclosure . . .is a
more saleable idea that tends to attract institutional support."'' 3
Similarly, many institutional investors reason to a position in favor
of SEC mandated corporate social responsibility disclosure over
other proposed reforms.'64 Disclosure is desired even if only from a
belief that when and if further legislative corporate law reform
comes, accounting and disclosure preceding it will result in its more
careful and less "knee jerk" consideration. '
The concept of shared values probably makes individual inter-
est in disclosure on corporate social responsibility most plausible.
Corporate spokespersons have long spoken of the corporate "good
citizen."'66 More and more, the most respected business community
leaders speak out on social responsibility '67 and their comments
reach the popular press and investors. Whether or not business lead-
ers speak on social responsibility with tongue in cheek, as some
maintain that they do, 6 the impression reaching the public and
161. See notes 385-422 infra and accompanying text on the political feasibility and costs
and benefits of other reforms proposed to induce more socially responsible corporate behavior,
discussed from companies' and government's rather than investors' points of view.
162. See notes 123-28 supra and accompanying text.
163. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1025-26, reviewing votes of Harvard, the Ford Founda-
tion, First Pennsylvania Bank and Trust, and others for disclosure proposals while voting
against substantive shareholder proposals.
164. See, e.g., Mundheim, Book Review: The University as a Shareholder and Investor
in Publicly Held Corporations; A Comment on the Ethical Investor, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1061,
1073, n.37.
165. Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of the SEC 225 (Remarks of Bevis
Longstreth).
166. "Like the ubiquitous reasonable man of tort law, the corporate good citizen is
invisible, but his presence is proved by the testimony of executives and other reputable
witness." Hetherington, supra note 120, at 277. See also the testimony supra note 3. In the
literature with which business executives are likely to have contact, talk of the corporate good
citizen and of corporate social responsibility appears with an increased frequency. See, e.g.,
Ackerman, How Companies Respond to Social Demands, 51 HAv. Bus. REv. 88 (July-Aug.
1973); Andrews, Can the Best Corporations be Made Moral, 51 HAav. Bus. REv. 57 (May-
June 1973); Henderson, Towards Managing Social Conflict, 49 HARv. Bus. REV. 82 (May-June
1971).
167. See, e.g., the work of the late Eli Goldston, supra note 27; J.D. ROCKEFELLER, THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1973).
168. Henning, supra note 126, at 157, calls the reputation of big business as a "social
benefactor" or good citizen "self-made and unfulfilled." Hetherington, supra note 120, at 278
says that "the purpose of such pronouncements is to protect [corporate management's]
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individual investors is that more and more corporations have an
abiding interest in social responsibility. In turn, investors' impres-
sions cause their own expectations to evolve. Investors take on the
same value business leaders profess to have and come to expect
social responsibility of corporations. Quite naturally, some of those
investors want evidence that companies are living up to investors'
and executives' expectations. The most obvious way in which such
evidence would be forthcoming would be through social accounting
and disclosure. Individual investors also must encounter and come
to share institutional investors' beliefs in corporate social responsi-
bility and social responsibility's worth in the investment process.
Institutional investors' statements on corporate social responsibility
find their way into the popular press where individual investors
might encounter them.'
Last of all, some significant number of individual investors
must share the attitude and expectations of the public at large, and
the public's expectation of what constitutes normative corporate
behavior has changed. 7 ' In most of the post-war period, the public,
including investors, consumers, academicians, and politicians, have
wanted ever increased amounts of goods and services. Beyond a
certain level of affluence, however, many individuals have begun to
focus on the quality as well as the quantity of corporate outputs. 7'
autonomy and freedom from interference by outsiders. . . and to create a public image that
diminishes and forestalls pressure for increased governmental regulation. ... However
that may be, with the volume of "good citizen" pronouncements one senses that many
business leaders are becoming true believers in social responsibility.
169. See, e.g., Investor Panel Favors Social Minded Firm with Slower Growth, Wall
Street J., May 14, 1971, at 1, col. 1; More Money Managers Reconsider Their Role in Share-
holder Voting: Some Institutions Now Buck Companies on Social Issues, Wall Street J., Apr.
21, 1971, at 1, col. 6. And institutional investors' attitudes affect the posture of publicly held
companies' managements, always eager to curry investors' interest and thus keep share prices
up:
We are starting to pay attention to ecology because we think that the young financial
analyst who is calling on us has it in the back of his mind. It may never become explicit
in his reports, but we suspect it is going to affect them one way or another.
BAUER & FENN, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting a corporate executive).
170. Indeed, business executives' expectations for social responsibility may now lag
behind, and are being shaped by public expectations. Bell, The Corporation and Society in
the 1970's, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5, 7 (Summer 1971), opines that "[tlhe sense of identity
between the self interest of the corporation and the public interest" has been replaced by "a
sense of incongruence." Other evidence, that benign public attitudes towards corporations
have receded, exists. See, e.g., note 148 supra and accompanying text; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 70's AND 80's (1970); D. YANKELOVICH, INC., A
CONTINUING STUDY OF THE NEW DEMANDS ON BUSINESS (1972).
171. Many onlookers pinpoint Earth Day in April 1970 as the turning point, when with
almost revolutionary momentum public attitudes began to change. See, e.g., D. CURRIE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON POLLUTION XI (1975) (Earth Day 1970 marks "an explosion of popu-
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Concern over quality of the environment, quality of corporate em-
ployees' working conditions, quality of the goods and services corpo-
rations produce, the quality of opportunity corporations offer to
minorities, and other concerns have produced broadened public
expectations of what constitutes proper corporate behavior. These
changed expectations have even produced governmental responses,
such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, automo-
bile safety legislation, and a welter of equal employment opportun-
ity laws and commissions.1 72 It is extremely difficult to deny that a
significant number of the 31 million or so individual investors, a
number significant enough for the SEC to provide some disclosure
on corporate social responsibility, share those public values and
public expectations on corporate social responsibility, or to deny
that some of those investors would like some accounting by large
corporations of what those corporations are doing on social responsi-
bility fronts.
Finally, there are the teachings of the academicians and the
theorists who, both on the practical level and the theoretical level,
make plausible widespread individual investor interest in corporate
social responsibility disclosure. On the practical level, the texts and
primers on how to invest are replete with statements that when one
evaluates prospective investments concentration should be on the
ability, imagination, and overall quality of corporate management.
The pedants teach that good management indicates a probability
that a company's earnings growth and favorable public and investor
images are likely to continue.1 73 Indeed, the SEC gears some re-
quired disclosure towards helping investors evaluate the quality of
corporate management.' 74 One method of evaluating management
lar concern"); P. SARNOFF, THE NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 91 (1971). Other phenomena, close in time to Earth Day, signal a fundamental
change in attitude towards corporate behavior. Campaign General Motors, the Dow Chemical
Corporation proxy fights over napalm manufacture, and Ralph Nader's first real striking of
responsive chords in the public consciousness all date from around the turn of the decade.
172. These and other legislative commands for corporate social responsibility and the
disclosure that legislation presently requires are reviewed, notes 217-22 infra and accompany-
ing text.
173. See, e.g., B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE 668 (4th ed. 1962): "The appraisal of management is considered ... perhaps the
essential ... fact in determining whether an investment should be made. . . ."Of the same
import are B. GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 261 (3rd rev. ed. 1965); D. HAYES, INVEST-
MENTS: ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 10-11 (2d ed. 1966).
174. See, e.g., proxy statement requirements to describe the principal occupation, em-
ployers and employers' business of all executive officers and directors, their remuneration,
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that the texts and primers mention is for the investor to observe the
way in which management reacts to current problems and looks to
and plans for the future. In today's milieu of rapid change, the
management that "stays on top of things" is good management; in
a sense, it is management's ability to track details that is "mate-
rial." In possibly no other management preserve is the ability to
"stay on top of things" as necessary as it is in the social responsibil-
ity area. In that area, consumer, shareholder, public, legislative,
and other governmental demands call for management to respond
to an array of problems. The astute investor will utilize manage-
ment's response to social responsibility's challenges as a bellweather
of management's ability to stay current. An investor should regard
as good "[a] management that has brought about increased sales
at a profit, maintained a good financial position, and been able to
raise long-term capital." In addition, he or she should regard as
better a management "that can change with secular. . . changes,
that can maintain good community, employee, stockholder, and
union relationships, and that can be flexible in its work with govern-
ment . . . ,,11- It is, therefore, plausible that investors who believe
that the best way to evaluate investments is to evaluate manage-
ment would want some data or disclosure in order to be able to
follow through on their beliefs.
On the more ethereal plane, academicians' and theorists' teach-
ings make plausible not only investor, but also governmental, busi-
ness executive, and public interest in corporate social responsibility
and, possibly, disclosure. Theorists and academicians, principally
economists, have been tinkering with the theoretical underpinnings
upon which most corporate enterprises have been thought to be
based. Traditionally, the business firm's primary responsibility was
to its owners, the shareholders. On the shareholders' behalf, the sole
duty of management was thought to be to maximize profits, which
is reflected both in state corporations statutes and SEC disclosure
requirements. The last twenty-five years, however, have shown a
rising consciousness that profit maximization alone and responsibil-
ity to shareholders are no longer adequate goals or sufficient ration-
ales for the existence of business entities."' First the economists,
including bonuses, stock options, and profit sharing, their interests in items to be voted upon,
and other data. Schedule 14A, items 4-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1975). With directors who
would be, if elected, new to the company's board, the company must disclose similar informa-
tion on background and principal occupations for the previous five years. Id. at item 6.
175. See F. AMLING, INVSMENTS 379 (1965).
176. The current version of the corporation-society problem ... can certainly be
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and later, business executives themselves, have come to realize that
earnings figures or other bottom line financial figures alone do not
describe how firms operate or, in allocating society's scarce re-
sources, what firms' goals should be.'77
That is not to say that theorists have evolved a new model to
replace the old model for the firm."' Various theorists have ad-
vanced several concepts by which firms do and should operate: long-
run profit maximization; some secure minimum level of earnings
and then the technostructure's pursuit of self preservation; sales
maximization; social responsibility as the paramount consideration;
and others.' 9 What is common to all efforts to evolve a new theory
of the firm is the inclusion of social responsibility as an ingredient
in the formula.80 Perhaps the most prominent element in "current
economic mainstream literature" is
dated from the publication of H. Bowen's Social Responsibility of the Businessman
(1953). Two contemporaneous works-K. E. Boulding's The Organizational Revolution
[1953] and A. Berle's The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution [1954-present closely
related theses.
Preston, Corporation and Society: The Search for a Paradigm, supra note 163, at 435. An-
other, more substantive summary is Cyert & Hedrick, Theory of the Firm: Past, Present, and
Future; An Interpretation, 10 J. EcoN. LIT. 398 (1973).
177. See Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of
Recent Literature, 10 J. EcoN. LIT. 1137, 1149 (1972), remarking that observation alone
indicates that profit maximization is not the typical corporation's sole objective.
178. LIPSEY & STEINER, supra note 72, at 309-24 describe and evaluate many of these
theories. One may cite Professor Galbraith as one example of a search for a new model to
describe the corporation-society relationship. J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1952)
(countervailing power); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) (the technostructure,
some secure minimum level of earnings, and sales maximization thereafter); and J. GAL-
BRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBUC PURPOSE (1973) (recommending nationalization of large
industry and permitted cartelization of small producers to bring about the corporate social
responsibility natural forces have not produced) all represent milestones in one person's
search. In the words of Preston, supra note 163, at 439, Professor Galbraith "has not been
successful and in each successive book, he seems to acknowledge that the previous analysis
was inaccurate or incomplete." Accord: Nossiter, Economics and the Public Purpose, Wash.
Post, Book World, Oct. 7, 1973, at 1. See also note 331 infra and accompanying text.
179. This article thus recommends disclosure as the reform, rather than other reforms
like federal chartering, which would require government to embrace new regulation based
upon some new theory of firm which has not yet achieved substantial theoretical support.
See, e.g., notes 388-436 infra and accompanying text. It also may be the reason why the SEC
has not yet required disclosure on corporate social responsibility. Heretofore, advocates of
disclosure have based demands on new theories of the firm or to cure social ills rather than
upon the traditional rationales for disclosure, utility in the investment process, etc. See text
accompanying notes 322-29 infra.
180. See Preston, supra note 163, at 435. That is not, however, to say even that the term
social responsibility is a well-defined one:
The term ...means something, but not the same thing, to everybody. To some it
conveys the idea of legal responsibility of liability; to others it means socially responsible
behavior in an ethical sense; to still others the meaning transmitted is that of "responsi-
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[a]nalysis of social costs, externalities, and . . "market failures."...
[T]his literature elaborates and illustrates the well-known proposition that
optimizing behavior by the component units of a system [society] may lead
to suboptimal results for the system as a whole."'1
Concurrently, an even more surprising consensus also has come into
being: many of corporate social responsibility's staunchest oppo-
nents now admit that in almost every major corporation, room for
social activity does obtain, even given profit maximization. This
realization, that some social responsibility is at least not inconsist-
ent with profit maximizing, is important-even if its proponents do
not agree with their more liberal counterparts that social responsi-
bility leads to long-range profits.
No less an incorrigible foe of social responsibility than Professor
Henry Manne has made some of these points.1 12 Professor Manne
now admits that corporate managers may engage in socially respon-
sible action to maximize their personal utility, if not profits. ' , In
today's world, in fact, for the complete profit maximizer, political
and other pressures for social responsibility "represent costs for
businesses as real, and in a sense at least, as natural as an earth-
quake."' 4 Social responsibility thus may be not only permitted but
necessary for traditional profit maximization.
Professor Manne makes another interesting point. Within the
large corporation, he observes, after expenses have been paid, ex-
ble for," in a causal way; ... some take it to mean socially "conscious or aware;" many
of those who embrace it . . see it as a mere synonym for "legitimacy," in the context
of "belonging" or being proper or valid; a few see it as a sort of fiduciary duty imposing
higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on citizens at large.
D. VOTAW & S. SErHI, THE CORPORATE DILEMMA 11-12 (1973). Indeed, social accounting and
disclosure would aid in narrowing what is or is not acceptable as being "socially responsible."
That is a function of accounting and especially of social accounting, see text accompanying
notes 14-17 supra.
181. Preston, supra note 163, at 437 (emphasis added).
182. Manne, The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An Individualistic
Model, 59 VA. L. REv. 708 (1973). For Professor Manne's early caustic statements on social
responsibility, see the works cited note 2 supra.
183. Id. at 709-10.
184. Regulatory agencies, congressional investigating committees, consumer or-
ganizations, and environmental groups, to name only a few, exist, function and influence
events as a matter of legal right, and . . . each has the political power to impose costs
on business by threats or other legal activity. Corporate responses to these threats are
really no different from business responses to more normal kinds of production costs, bad
weather, increased demand or any other exogenous circumstance.
Id. at 714-15. Manne further suggests that for corporate management itself "survival today
may be geared as much to warding off unfavorable political action as to paying dividends."
Hence, corporate social responsibility may even be "nondiscretionary" representing "essen-
tial operating costs." Id. at 718.
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pansion budgeted, and dividends distributed, a not insignificant
amount of cash remains. In the past, these "discretionary funds"
may have gone to executive salaries and bonuses, or, fearing an
attack for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of adverse shareholder
reaction to high executive salaries, executives have channeled dis-
cretionary funds into indirect forms of compensation such as "luxu-
rious office furnishings, attractive co-workers, company jets, lavish
expense accounts." ' 5 Due to fear of adverse reaction to even these
indirect forms of compensation, coupled perhaps with feelings of
insecurity over past corporate failures to engage in socially responsi-
ble behavior, corporate executives may now direct some discretion-
ary funds towards corporate social programs.8 ' An environment that
rewards the executive's ego for being a "corporate statesman or
stateswoman" reinforces the trend toward socially responsible use
of discretionary funds. Such an altruistic use of corporate monies is
thought, by even the most conservative of onlookers, to be consis-
tent with profit maximization. 8 '
Professor Manne's views are indicative of the extent to which
both liberals and conservatives have moved toward center ground. '88
185. Id. at 721; accord, N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE FIRM: MICROECONOMIC PLANNING AND
AcTION 74 (1962) (expatiating on a similar "discretionary funds" concept).
186. Manne, supra note 182, at 719-20.
187. Professor Manne does make a serious misstatement. He states that for the corpo-
rate executive "Maximum utility would come from paying himself the entire amount of
available discretionary funds." Id. at 720. He or she does not do so because of pressures
external to the corporation that keep salaries down. Manne does not take into account that
in terms of executive compensation, those discretionary funds will have declining marginal
utility. The 251,000th salary dollar will not have nearly the marginal utility as the 51,000th
dollar. On the other hand, the executive may derive much more utility from the 251,000th
dollar by having his or her alter ego, the corporation, use that dollar to ameliorate externali-
ties the corporation has produced. In fact, the phenomenon of modem executives' over-
identification with the corporate enterprise, a valid point Galbraith makes in his development
of the technostructure concept, J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 63-71 & 167-78
(1967), indicates that the executive may derive more utility through having the corporate
alter ego use the funds than if the executive himself had first received the funds and then
personally used those funds for altruistic purposes. Or the executive may realize that from
public relations, efficiency, or other standpoints, the corporate entity can use funds ear-
marked for altruistic purposes with much greater productivity than he or she, the executive,
can in personal charitable endeavor.
188. As Henning and Preston, supra note 133, at 152, supra note 163, at 444, indicate,
Milton Friedman appears to be the sole holdout. He does not regard any quantum of social
responsibility as necessary or salubrious. See note 2 supra. Furthermore, he retains a view of
the uninhibited market mechanism achieving pinpoint accuracy in the distribution of corpo-
rate wealth and in the allocation of resources. Therefore, in Friedman's view, discretionary
funds simply do not exist within the corporate entity.
Take the corporate executive who says "I have responsibilities over and above making a
profit." . . . Where does he get the money? Perhaps from the company's employees. If
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To some extent, such views undoubtedly have filtered down to the
business and investor communities. The agreement on center
ground removes one of the last obstacles to some accounting and
reporting on corporate activity in the social sphere. It also makes
individual and other investor interest in corporate social responsi-
bility and in disclosure quite plausible. In fact, given discretionary
funds' existence within the corporate enterprise and the alternative
uses for those funds-executive frills versus social programs-one
could argue that many investors would want some form of account-
ing and reporting, including social accounting, if only on the basis
that management should account for the use of discretionary funds.
Despite these developments, the SEC still limits its disclosure
requirements to those that focus on "optimizing behavior," profit
maximization, and on traditional financial and business informa-
tion. As has been seen, significant institutional investor interest in
corporate social responsibility, if not in disclosure, exists. '89 Also,
there are a number of reasons why institutional and individual in-
terest in social responsibility is quite plausible and quite reasonable.
Many of these reasons are of a traditional nature, for instance a
belief that evaluating management's social responsibility response
is a good method for evaluating management overall, or a belief that
social responsibility portends better long-run profitability. Inves-
tors' primary emphasis on disclosure is traditional; they wish to use
it in the investment process, not as a club with which to bludgeon
corporate managements into solving all of society's problems. At
most, investors, and even corporate managers themselves, want dis-
closure to ascertain if corporations' performances comport with the
new and less unidimensional goals modern economic theory has
been attempting to evolve.
he can pay his employees lower wages than otherwise, he'll have some extra money to
spend. It may come from the company's customers, if he can charge them more than
they would otherwise pay. Or it may come from the company's stockholders ....
Have you ever heard anybody suggest that the "Mom and Pop" comer grocery store
should sell food below cost to the poor people who shop there? Well, that would obviously
be absurd. Any comer grocery store that operated that way would be out of business very
soon. The same is true on the larger scale. The large enterprise can have money to
exercise social responsibility only if it has a monopoly position . ...
McClaughry, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Milton Friedman).
189. Institutional desires for disclosure may not parallel similar interests in social re-
sponsibility because institutions can obtain the needed information on corporate social re-
sponsibility through their trade groups' clearinghouses, notes 40-41 supra and accompanying
text, or using their bargaining power and muscle, through other sources, see notes 238-40 infra
and accompanying text, sources to which most individual investors do not have access.
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C. Parity as a Goal of Disclosure-Presentation of a
Well-Rounded Picture of the Firm
(1) Expanding Financial Accounting Requirements
An unarticulated goal of SEC-required disclosure is to force
companies to disclose good as well as bad, across the entire spec-
trum of a company's affairs. Under the prevailing disclosure philos-
ophy, a corporation cannot accentuate the positive and downplay or
fail to reveal the negative."' To implement that function of disclo-
sure, in recent years the SEC has required corporations and their
accountants to undertake extensive additional accounting and au-
diting. 9' The Commission also is requiring more frequent account-
190. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970), is a dramatic illustration. In Simon, the Second Circuit upheld a national accounting
firm members' criminal convictions. In auditing a client corporation, the accountants had
pressed for disclosure of certain financial results, described by Judge Friendly as "so dismal"
that the accountants believed release of the corporation's annual report would surely cause
the company to fail. 425 F.2d 809. Having so pressed for disclosure of the company's bleak
outlook on almost every front, the accountants relaxed. They did not insist upon detailed
disclosure of a controlling person's defalcation of corporate funds for use in personal stock
market ventures or that his securities, which the accountants had insisted be put up to
collateralize the "loans" to the controlling person, were of dubious worth. The court upheld
a verdict finding, inter alia, that the accountants were criminally liable for "wilfully and
knowingly" making a false or misleading statement of a material fact in reports the securities
acts require to be filed with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78 ff
(1970).
One of the case's principal lessons is that not only for companies, but for their accoun-
tants, even criminal liability could lie for failure to disclose the entire picture, no matter how
dismal or how favorable the picture may be on other fronts.
In the administrative context, an example of disclosure's aim to present a well-rounded
picture of a firm and of its affairs is recent SEC action to require bank holding companies to
account for and disclose more detail on delinquent or bad loans which banks have either
charged off or charged off and then subsequently recovered. Wall Street J., July 7, 1975, at
6, col. 1.
191. The SEC does so through its own extensive accounting manual, Regulation S-X,
17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 (1975). Regulation S-X is a complete, uniform set of accounting require-
ments applicable to all documents corporations file under the various securities acts. The
SEC also supplements and amends Regulation S-X through its Accounting Series Releases
(ASR's) of which, as of Jan. 1, 1976, there are 185. See 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,207.
From 1937 to 1969, there were 114 Accounting Releases, an average of about 3.4 per year. Id.
72,002-72,769. In 1973-75, Accounting Releases averaged 17 per year. Id. 72,156-72,207.
Recent expansions of the amount of accounting which must be done and is reflected in
the increased frequency of SEC accounting pronouncements, include ASR No. 147 (Oct. 5,
1973) (increased accounting for lease commitments in footnotes to financial statements); ASR
Nos. 136 (Jan. 11, 1973) & 148 (Nov. 13, 1973) (increasing accounting for compensating
balance and other borrowing requirements and the effect thereof); ASR No. 149 (Dec. 3, 1973)
(increased accounting for income tax expenses); ASR No. 164 (Nov. 21, 1974) (increased
accounting for long term contracts and risk and liquidity problems involved in amassing
inventories for performance thereof or involved in collecting receivables generated thereby);
ASR 166 (Dec. 23, 1974) (increased accounting for unusual risks or uncertainties showing how
19761 SOCIAL ACCOUNTING
ing.'92 The quasi-independent Financial Accounting Standards
Board, its predecessor, the Accounting Principles Board, and the
parent of them both, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, the accountants' self-regulatory organization, also
have quickened the pace, often upon prodding by the SEC. These
groups are pouring out new pronouncements and expanding the
reach of modern financial accounting."' The volume of material on
SEC-related accounting has become so bewildering that legal peri-
odicals have devoted entire issues to keep lawyers abreast of the
subject. 94 One commercial publisher is devoting a new section of its
weekly securities law reports just to SEC accounting and disclosure
regulation.'95
One development in the SEC drive for pervasive accounting
financial results would vary if estimates of such matters as loan loss reserves, market value
of securities held, or uncertain raw materials costs are varied); ASR No. 175 (July 10, 1975)
(more, separate accounting for subsidiaries).
192. The SEC has recently fattened the 10Q, the quarterly report that sections 12(b)
and 12(g) companies must file with the Commission. The 10Q must now contain income
statements, sales figures, balance sheet data, comparisons with previous years' quarterly
figures, and a narrative describing current trends in the company's business. In addition, the
annual report's financial statement footnotes must review quarter-by-quarter sales and profit
figures for the 8 prior quarters. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 177 (Sept. 10, 1975); Wall
Street J., Sept. 12, 1975, at 5, col. 2-3. The requirement, however, is applicable only to those
12(g) companies whose securities are eligible collateral for purchase money loans under the
Federal Reserve Boards' credit regulations. About 300 over-the-counter stocks fit that de-
scription. Id.
Another requirement for more frequent accounting centers around more frequent use of
non-periodic SEC accounting and disclosure forms as soon as deteriorating conditions in some
division or quarter of a company's business raise the likelihood of a subsequent writeoff or
credit to income, rather than reporting quarterly or annually. SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 138 (Jan. 12, 1973).
193. See, e.g., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 322, at D-4 (Oct. 8, 1975) (FASB proposes
more accounting on operations in industries other than thpse which are a company's main
pursuit; more accounting on foreign operations and export sales); FASB Statement No. 5
(April 1975) (more accounting for loss contingencies); FASB Statement No. 4 (April 1975)
(gains and losses from the extinguishment of debt must in certain cases be reported as
extraordinary items with more descriptive material); FASB Exposure Draft-Inflation Ac-
counting, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 284, at A-13 (Jan. 8, 1975); Financial Accounting
Standards Board [FASB] Statement No. 3 (Jan. 1975) (requires restatement of prior peri-
ods' data when accounting method changes made at other than year's beginning).
194. See, e.g., 30 Bus. LAW. 1-227 (spec. issue 1975), an entire issue on Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants; Symposium, Accounting and Federal Securities
Laws, 28 VAND. L. REv. at 1-279 (1975), in which the editors set aside an entire issue for
articles on the subject.
195. The Bureau of National Affairs' Securities Regulation & Law Report, in announc-
ing its new regular feature "Financial Disclosure and Accounting Practices," states that such
a section is necessary to keep pace with the "initiation and acceleration" of financial account-
ing and disclosure proposals and regulations. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 297, at A-1
(April 9; 1975).
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emphasizes the rule of accounting across the board of a company's
affairs. The area is corporate political slush funds, and donations
and bribes some companies have paid to foreign government offi-
cials. The Commission action is to force accountants to audit with
such illegalities in mind and to require disclosure. The SEC cast
aside accountants' contentions that political donations or bribes are
not material under traditional SEC litmus tests for materiality,
such as ten percent of sales or five percent of profits. The Commis-
sion expects corporations and accountants to account for and dis-
close corporate funds' use for bribery or for political donations even
if such expenditures amount to one-tenth of one percent of sales or
profits.'
To contrast SEC-generated financial accounting to Commis-
sion action on social accounting is to reveal an incongruity. The
Commission, while constantly expanding financial accounting's
reach and detail, has not moved to glance at, study, or encourage
social accounting. As one result, the disparity between financial
accounting and social accounting grows at an accelerated rate.
(2) Expanding Financial Disclosure Requirements
Overlaid upon more extensive accounting requirements are
SEC requirements for companies to disclose more and more of the
information accounting generates, as well as to disclose increasing
amounts of unquantified, narrative information. Again, one
underlying rationale for increasing disclosure is to present investors
and others with a complete, well-rounded picture of an issuer of
securities. SEC-mandated disclosure in 1933 Act registration state-
ments and in 1934 Act periodic reports always has been extensive.'97
Nevertheless, in recent years the SEC has moved to expand vastly
that disclosure, to include, inter alia, disclosure of inflation ac-
counting results, the effect of energy scarcities, disagreements be-
tween auditors and the companies they have audited, expanded
information on quarterly results, product line reporting data, and
much, much more.'9 One corporation has recently formed a subsidi-
196. A good summary of this development is Andrews, Accountants Reassess Disclosure
Standards after Business Scandals, Wall Street J., June 12, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
Curiously, however, the Commission has used those same "ten percent of sales" litmus tests
of materiality to characterize information on corporate social responsibility, including con-
duct illegal in nature as not material, and hence not to be disclosed. See, e.g., note 28, infra
and accompanying text.
197. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 566-71.
198. See, e.g., notes 191-92 supra; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10580 (suggests that
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ary, Disclosure, Inc., that has as its sole activity keeping users of its
services abreast of new developments in the disclosure area and of
the substantive information about companies disclosure require-
ments produce. The service provides an information retrieval sys-
tem that includes "some 270,000 entries posted against 10,000 terms
citing significant events disclosed by some 12,000 corporations."' 9
Not all of the disclosure the SEC requires is in an accounting
format, much less in quantified or monetized form,"' as some would
insist that all corporate social responsibility information should be
before disclosure is required.20 ' For example, in the public offering
context:
[Ihe 1933 Act requires disclosure of all information relevant to the
investment decision that the potential buyer must make . . .. [Tihe statute
focuses on a detailed description of the "product" offered. 2
To produce a detailed description of the product offered, disclosure
requirements include many items that companies can present only
through textual material. Such items include information about a
company's management, the character of its business, the character
of its products, the nature and condition of its capital assets, its
marketing and sales programs, and the like.0 3 Indeed, the narrative,
a firm disclose how inventory profits may be akin to a non-recurring item if inventory has
been sold at inflated price but acquired at lower pre-inflation prices); Form S-i, Item 9, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. § § 7123, 6207 et seq. (line of business reporting); SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 5534 (Oct. 11, 1974) & 11147 (Dec. 10, 1974) (increased disclosure on disputes between
or other changes in the relationship between independent accountants and audited compa-
nies). Another entirely new disclosure area opened through the Rule 10b-5 lever is disclosure
not only about companies themselves but also about the market for their securities. See also
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Mar-
ket Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
199. DISCLOSURE, INC., DISCLOSURE JoURNAL USER'S GUIDE 1 (1974) (a subsidiary of Reli-
ance Group, Inc.). See also the Bureau of National Affairs' expanded efforts to keep apace of
disclosure's expansion, supra note 195.
200. See Hawes, Truth in Financial Statements: An Introduction, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1,
10-11 (1975). He points out that under pain of liability the courts require narrative textual
material "that goes beyond and may even contradict" the quantified or monetized informa-
tion disclosure documents and financial statements contain.
201. See, e.g., the comments of SEC Commissioner Loomis on requiring disclosure of
social responsibility information: "[I]f there is no dollars and cents impact that can be
discerned, then is the fact material. The traditional interpretation of the securities laws has
been 'No'." Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of the SEC, supra note 128, at 232.
See also the search for complete monetization in social auditing which such misinterpretation
in part may have engendered, notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
202. Hetherington, supra note 120, at 262 (footnote omitted). See generally CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. §§ 8120 et seq.
203. Indeed, in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10967 (Aug. 12, 1974), the SEC pressed
accountants and companies to compose even more narrative to explain numbers themselves.
Through footnotes to the financial statements or otherwise, the Commission wants disclosure
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textual material the SEC requires in the footnotes to financial state-
ments alone often exceeds in amount all the quantified, not to men-
tion monetized, information contained in the typical prospectus or
annual report.
Not all the information the SEC requires in disclosure docu-
ments is of the historical variety. In disclosure documents corpora-
tions must review matters that although not currently material in
terms of a percentage of sales or profits, could become so. Al-
though the SEC recently has permitted issuers to project sales and
profits into the future,"5 in the prospective area the Commission has
required companies to describe the perceived competitive outlook,
anticipated product development, expected or possible future cash
flow squeezes, and other contingencies that have not materialized
at the time disclosure is made. These extensive, forward-looking
disclosure rules require no small amount of frank peering into the
future."'
By contrast, in the social responsibility area, present disclosure
requirements not only fail to but do not even attempt to beget "a
detailed description of the product offered." Indeed, without some
disclosure on corporate social responsibility, disclosure can never
provide that detailed description. In the social responsibility area,
documents to include narrative explanation of items described in financial statements.
204. In the Practicing Law Institute's Annual Institute, discussing trends in disclosure,
SEC Commissioner Sommer broke with the traditional, superficial analysis. He noted that
"disclosure in the past has not been confined to historical financial information" and that
"information bearing on future prospects is highly material." BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
327, at A-3 (Nov. 12, 1975). As for information which is both narrative and does peer into
the future, see, e.g., the new regulations for quarterly reports, supra note 199, requiring
companies to review trends or possible trends quarterly reports reveal.
205. For some time, the Commission has been struggling to facilitate projections in
disclosure documents should corporations wish to make projections. It also wants to require
companies that already do make projections in the press and elsewhere to put those projec-
tions in disclosure documents, available to all investors and subject to constraints on puffing
and the like. In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973), the Commission put forth
a definite proposal. Due to an avalanche of adverse comment on the proposed rule's form,
the Commission had delayed the rule's implementation BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 320,
at D-1 to D-4 (Sept. 24, 1975) and then dropped the proposal altogether. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5699 (April 23, 1976). In doing so, however, the Commission stated that its
"longstanding policy not to permit projections in Commission filings" no longer existed.
206. See, e.g., amendments to, inter alia, forms S-1 and S-2 under the 1933 Act and to
form 10K under the 1934 Act, requiring "more meaningful" and extensive disclosure as to
proposed "new lines of business, product development, competitive conditions in the particu-
lar industry and management personnel," SEC Securities Act Release No. 5395 (June 1,
1973); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10041 (Mar. 15, 1973) (guidelines for when reporting
cash flow per share and similar data is undertaken); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5551
(Dec. 26, 1974) (disclosure in registrations and in periodic reports of unusual risks or uncer-
tainties the company is facing or may face in the future).
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the SEC requires only one category of information to be disclosed
and that only after a long fight, including a lawsuit against the SEC
by environmental groups.07 The category is corporate violations of
federal statutory environmental standards, and the disclosure re-
quired is only of the after-the-fact historical variety.2 °8 This disclo-
sure will do little to aid investors in evaluating what corporate man-
agements perceive as future problems, or in determining if manage-
ment is on top of matters that are not presently material in the sense
of five percent of profits or the like, but could become so. The
paucity of social responsibility disclosure, or the lack of a require-
ment that management describe what it perceives the social respon-
sibility outlook to be, pales further when one compares it to the
"almost embarassing abundance of information"2 9 the SEC re-
quires companies to disclose about financial and other matters.
Again, the result is that disclosure fails to achieve another of its
goals-provision of a rough parity of information about all of the
various aspects of a corporation's activities. Moreover, with the
recent Commission drive for even more financial disclosure, each
day the gulf grows wider.
(3) Expanded Accessibility to and Dissemination of
Financial Information
Another function SEC accounting and disclosure requirements
serve is to make the well-rounded picture of a firm's affairs that
disclosure supposedly produces available at a central source or
clearinghouse, namely, SEC offices. Moreover, in recent years, espe-
cially since the Wheat Report's publication in 1969, the Commission
has strived to place upon corporations themselves the affirmative
duty to disseminate widely to investors, investment managers and
advisors, other securities industry professionals, and the public the
207. Reviewed notes 274-321 infra and accompanying text.
208. The proposed requirement is that disclosure documents filed with the Commission
append as an exhibit thereto a "list of the most recently filed environmental compliance
reports which indicate" that the company "has not met, at any time within the previous 12
months, any applicable environmental standard established pursuant to any Federal stat-
ute." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11733 (Oct. 14, 1975); CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310,
at 85,762 (violation of state or local law standards would not have to be disclosed). The
Commission's emphasis in proposing to order even that limited disclosure was based upon
the dictates of the National Environmental Policy Act, not upon the information's use to
investors or any other traditional rationale for disclosure. After some reflection, however, the
Commission has backtracked and withdrawn even that limited disclosure proposal. SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 12414 (May 6, 1976); CCH FED. SEC. L. RPP. 80,495.
209. Sommer, supra note 111, at 1093.
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information that reports filed with the SEC contain." ' It is reasoned
that the well-rounded portrait of the firm at which disclosure aims
will not implement the ultimate goals of disclosure legislation-
utility to investors in the investment process, protection of inves-
tors against speculative or questionable schemes, and the like-
unless investors have access to, or better yet, some actual posses-
sion of, the information disclosures contain.
Hence, the SEC has conditioned the important privilege of ac-
celeration of a registration statement's effective date upon how
effectively underwriters have disseminated the preliminary prospec-
tus. 21' Likewise, the Commission hag conditioned use of abbreviated
registration forms and availability of safe harbor rules on whether
or not a corporation makes generally available financial and busi-
ness information.2 12 In addition to the glossy, picture-filled variety
of annual reports that companies must send to all shareholders
along with or before the annual proxy statement is sent, the SEC
has required that companies send to all shareholders who request it
the 10K, the heavy, gray, disclosure-laden annual report companies
file with the SEC. 23 Moreover, the glossy annual report will have
210. The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 112, gave extensive attention to increased dis-
semination of disclosure documents and of the information contained therein. See id. at 106-
26, Chapter IV, "The Dissemination of '33 Act Prospectuses," and at 313-27, Chapter IX,
"The Breakthrough in Dissemination of '34 Act Reports."
211. Rule 460 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1957). See also Rule 15c2-8 under
the '34 Act, making it a deceptive act or practice for broker-dealers not to take reasonable
steps to furnish preliminary prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1970). On the other hand,
delivery requirements for final prospectuses are relaxed somewhat if the issuer of securities
files periodic reports under the 1934 Act, Rule 174 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.174
(1970).
212. Use of Form S-7, an abbreviated and less costly registration form for securities, is
conditioned upon the company having been a filing company in good standing under the 1934
Act for three or more years. See CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 7190. The form itself is reproduced
at id. 7192. Allowance of more widespread use of Form S-7, depending upon the amount of
information generally available about the company to issue the securities, is recommended
by The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 112, at 96-98.
As to the insurance policy for exemptions from the costly registration process that new
SEC rules provide and the availability of that insurance policy depending upon the amount
of information about the company generally available, see, e.g., Rule 144c, 17 C.F.R. §
230.144c (1975), Rule 146f, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146f (1974).
213. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11079 (Oct. 31, 1974), amending rules 14a-3, 14c-
3 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14c-3 (1974) (effective Jan. 1, 1975). The
Commission went ahead with increased dissemination of the 10K despite indications that few
investors were interested in obtaining it. Of a 1000 company sample, 31% voluntarily notified
shareholders that the 10K was available before the rule became effective. Chrysler Corp. had
only 56 requests, Budd Co. 20, General Motors 40. Other companies had similar experiences.
See Wall Street J., July 11, 1974, at 1, col. 5. Cf. the Commission's denial of social responsibil-
ity disclosure requests because only 2-3 of 1% of the estimated aggregate value of the securi-
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to contain a great deal more required information than has been the
case in the past.2 14 The overall picture is not only one of much more
SEC-required disclosure, but also one of much more required, ready
availability to investors of the disclosed information.
An investor might find financial information about companies
in any of several scattered repositories: in other government agen-
cies' files, in standard financial manuals, with stock exchanges or
broker-dealers, or at a company's headquarters. SEC reporting re-
quirements channel all this information, which otherwise might be
scattered, into one central source or clearinghouse and into compa-
rable form.2 5 Further, SEC requirements see to it that much of the
information so filed in the central source is disseminated back out
to interested parties.
By contrast, on the social responsibility side information that
colorably has worth in the investment process is filed by corpora-
tions with a multitude of governmental agencies. Even when such
agencies do disclose such information to inquirers the information
is not available in anything resembling a central source. An investor
investigating certain companies' postures on various social responsi-
bility issues would have to visit the widely scattered offices of sev-
ties held in this country took the time to travel to Washington and appear before it, SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 11733 (Oct. 14, 1975); CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,719,
reviewed notes 305-16 infra and accompanying text.
214. For years the Commission had kept its hands off the annual report, fearing that
intervention might make the annual report a litigation-avoiding disclosure document and,
hence, less attractive to or readable by investors. See generally Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909(2d Cir. 1968); Sommer, supra note 111. In the interest of increased availability of disclosure,
however, the SEC now believes on balance that mandatory increased annual report disclosure
should win out over any contention that such disclosure would make reports less readable.
Ergo, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11079 (Oct. 31, 1974) amends rules 14a-3, 14c- 3, and
14c-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14c-3 & 240.14c-7 (1974), to expand significantly required
annual report disclosure. Companies' annual reports must now include certified financial
statements for the past two years, along with a management summary and analysis of the
last five years, certain background information on executives, and reports on the company's
stock market performance and dividend records. Corporate management, however, retains
discretion to choose the most suitable format for presentation of the information. See
generally Gapay, SEC Moves to Force Corporations to Put More Financial Data on Their
Annual Reports, Wall Street J., Jan. 11, 1974, at 26, col. 1-3.
215. In its clearinghouse functions, as opposed to enforcing requirements that compa-
nies affirmatively disseminate information, notes 211-13 supra and accompanying text, the
SEC has installed a low cost microfiche system for the use of those seeking information. Also,
to increase the amount of information available, the Commission makes available packages
of information, such as all 10K reports of New York Stock Exchange listed companies. See
generally Wheat, The Disclosure Policy Study of the SEC, 24 Bus. LAw. 33, 40-41 (1968). And,
of course, the SEC makes most all the information in its files available to those persons who
would come to the SEC offices, review, compare, and evaluate it. In part, Rule 24b-3 under
the 1934 Act implements that policy. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-3 (1951).
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eral dozen federal agencies, if he or she could first identify the
proper agencies to which inquiries should be addressed. 26 Visiting
the proper agencies still might not produce a complete picture. The
investor would have to be fortunate enough to have gone to agencies
that make information readily available. Despite legislation requir-
ing such availability, many agencies do not comply, at least without
a fight. To round out the contrast, even of the most visible and
cooperative agencies that gather various types of corporate social
responsibility information, none distributes the information or
places an affirmative duty to distribute on the corporations that file
with it, as the SEC does. Those persons or investors who seek the
social responsibility information must actively go after it.
Many corporations make various filings on social responsibility
issues. The Consumer Product Safety Commission maintains test
reports and product-caused injury records for many kinds of corpo-
rate products.2 17 Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
corporate employers of any size must log occupational injuries and
report compliance with safety standards that the Department of
Labor promulgates.21 8 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act dic-
tates that large interstate businesses file Employer Information
Report EEO-1 setting forth company practices and statistics on
minority hiring and advancement. 29 When a capital improvement
or extractive resources activity is planned, many large companies
have to file an environmental impact statement with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.220
216. There are, of course, private organizations which perform a social accounting and
clearinghouse function for social responsibility information. See, e.g., notes 37-42 supra and
accompanying text. These clearinghouses, however, may not be known to many investors.
Secondly, the private clearinghouse's files are not nearly as complete as would be the SEC
files if it required some social accounting and disclosure. Thirdly, many of the better clear-
inghouses, those with less of a mission and with a more objective view toward such informa-
tion's worth in the investment process, are open only to certain classes of investors, such as
mutual funds or insurance companies. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
217. Created in 1972, the Commission has assumed the functions of HEW, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, and the FTC, among others, in the
product safety area. Consumer Product Safety Act § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 2079 (Supp. II, 1972).
Jurisdiction over the safety of food and drugs remains with the Federal Drug Administration.
Id. The Commission is to maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse open to interested
individuals. 15 U.S.C. § 2054 (Supp. 1I, 1972).
218. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). See also
1 CCH EMP. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE 6520.1 (forms for filing).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1972).
220. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The
requirement is subject to the provision that government is in some manner involved in the
corporate activity. Since governmental involvement, however slight, usually is enough to
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An investor who wants accounting or information of those types
must first realize that under some statute or regulation corporations
have to file such information with some federal agency. Then the
investor must know to which agency he or she should make inquiry.
It is not always straightforward. For example, corporations file
equal employment opportunity information with one or the other of
a welter of public agencies, including the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Division, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance, and with specialized agencies such as the FCC,
CAB, or FPC.12 An investor seeking a corporation's equal employ-
ment opportunity record must know which of over a dozen agencies
would have the data relating to the particular company. Hence,
even if the information is available somewhere in the federal system,
the information is likely to be scattered all over Washington.
Moreover, information is not always available. Legislation re-
quiring corporations to report to federal agencies sometimes makes
the filings confidential, as in the case of Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Report Form EEO-1.22 By and large, though, the Freedom
of Information Act states that government agencies shall make
available the bulk of such information to citizens who are willing to
defray search and reproduction costs and who follow agency proce-
dures under the Act. 22 At the outset, however, one difficulty is that
trigger NEPA impact statement requirements, many corporations wind up preparing and
filing impact statements. See generally Symposium-Complying With the NEPA; Practice,
Problems and Potential, 29 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1974).
221. There has been some consolidation of agencies receiving corporate filings. For
instance, the Department of Labor has consolidated its own three antidiscrimination units
into one new Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Wall Street J., June 17, 1975,
at 3, col. I. Similarly, the Product Safety Commission, note 217 supra, represents a consolida-
tion of functions. Nonetheless information remains widely scattered.
If, however, the information is not scattered among agencies, the obvious agency is not
always the correct agency to which an investor should address inquiries. For example, al-
though companies file many of the required environmental impact statements with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, the impact statements themselves are available through the
Dep't of Commerce. Before making a request of Commerce, though, the investor must find
the particular impact report's National Technical Information Service (NTIS) number. Only
then can the investor make a proper request. Cf. legislative history evincing an intent to make
environmental impact statements freely available to the public, 115 CONo. REC. 17455 (daily
ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (remarks of Sen. Henry M. Jackson).
222. Equal Employment Opportunity Act §§ 709(d)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d)-(e)
(1970). Even though those statutory provisions make leaks of reports by government employ-
ees a misdemeanor evidence exists that such information may be selectively leaked to institu-
tional and other affluent investors. See, e.g., notes 238-40 infra and accompanying text.
223. The Freedom of Information Act is 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974). Section 552(a)(2) requires every federal agency to make the following available for
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each government agency publishes its own rules and procedures and
sets its own search and reproduction charges under the Freedom of
Information statute.2 An investor seeking information under the
Freedom of Information Act, therefore, may encounter a prolifera-
tion of varying agency procedures and forms,, each having its own
pitfalls.
Assuming that the investor finds the right agency, that the
legislation which requires corporations to report information does
not classify the report, and that the investor ascertains what the
particular agency's Freedom of Information Act procedures are, the
investor still might not obtain the social responsibility information
he or she desires. The Freedom of Information Act has a number of
exemptions which experience shows agencies can and do expand or
contract depending upon a particular agency's willingness to dis-
close.225 Thus, depending upon the agency, officials may or may not
deny a Freedom of Information Act request because of the exemp-
tion for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential." '226 There is also
an exemption for "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
public inspection and copying: "final opinions" and orders, "statements of policy and inter-
pretations," and "administrative staff manuals and instructions to the staff that affect a
member of the public." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) states that "each agency on request for identifi-
able records made in accordance with published rules . . . shall make reports promptly
available to any person."
224. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970). The Freedom of Information Act's 1974 amendments
do require agencies to publish schedules of "reasonable fees" applicable to all units of an
agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)4(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). This requirement for reasonable fees is
significant. Prior to the amendments, evidence indicates that agencies have used prohibitive
search and reproduction fees to foil information requests. See, e.g., Fellmeth, The Freedom
of Information Act and the Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 345, 367 (1969) (FTC charges $200-250 for copy of one day's
transcript of hearings before the FTC); Rothchild, Finding the Facts Bureaucrats Hide, THE
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Jan. 1972, at 18 (some agencies require posting of $2000 or more in
costs before they will undertake development of a program and printout retrieving computer-
stored data).
225. See, e.g., Nader, Freedom from Information: The Acts and the Agencies, 5 HARV.
Civ. RiGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 1, at 4-5 (1970): "Information which is claimed to be exempt
from disclosure in one agency is freely given in another agency;" Katz, The Games Bureau-
crats Play: Hide and Seek under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REv. 1261 (1970);
Blasting Facts Free, TIME, Dec. 2, 1974, at 98: exceptions to the Act are still "so numerous
and broad" that they take away "most of what was previously granted" by the Act (remarks
of Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970). See, e.g., Consumers Union v. Veterans Administra-
tion, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971) (VA
denied Consumers Report access to VA hearing aid test report on trade secret exemption
grounds); J. YANACONE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 174-75 (1972) (FDA uniformly
used trade secrets ground to deny environmentalists access to information about pesticides).
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purposes." Judicial gloss has extended the investigatory exemption
to files that an agency claims might reveal its investigatory prac-
tices or techniques, although the file itself will never become the
subject of an enforcement action .22 There is an exemption for mat-
ters "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency. 228 Still other exemptions exist.2 29
Because of these Freedom of Information Act exemptions, an
agency in possession of information about a corporation or industry
might block an investor's request for information or force the inves-
tor to litigate the issue. The underlying reason for the agency doing
so might be the age-old problem of specialized agencies' loyalty to
the industry regulated rather than to the public. 0 For instance,
under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, reports of work-
related injuries remain undisclosed. The Department of Labor's
position is reported to be that the Act "is not an employee law, but
a law for employers. Therefore, we don't have to show . . . any of
this data. '2 3'
Another reason the Freedom of Information Act has not lived
227. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813,817-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972),
involved the investigatory exemption found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). In a derivative action
against directors on the corporation's behalf plaintiff shareholders requested information the
SEC had developed in an SEC civil action against the director. The SEC action had resulted
in a consent decree. Nonetheless, the court held that the SEC could continue to label the
file investigatory in order to preserve investigatory techniques' secrecy.
Another practice under the investigatory exemption is to label files "investigatory" on
an indefinite basis, thus suggesting that the agency may bring enforcement proceedings at
some future date. See Bristol Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
228. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
229. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552b(1)-b(7) (1970). The 1974 Freedom of Information Act
amendments, relative to reasonable charges for search and reproduction, supra note 231, and
legislating a requirement that agencies determine whether or not they will comply with a
request within 10 days after receipt, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1974), basically do not
touch the exemptions. Nevertheless, several agencies have let the information flow a bit more
freely since the amendments' passage. A possible explanation is that by the act of amendment
alone Congress had indicated to federal agencies that it is serious about the Freedom of
Information Act. See Wall Street J., May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 5 (better flow of information
from the CIA, FBI, and IRS after the 1974 amendments); Blasting Facts Free, TIME, Dec. 2,
1974, at 98.
230. For instance, one commentator speculates that product safety information has
"stayed buried" either because of agencies' "non-consumer orientation" or because of "a
commitment to an industry constituency." Gross, Not for Publication, 905 SCIENCE NEWS 508
(1969). See also Engel, Introduction: Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal
Administrative Agencies, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 184 (1973).
231. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION HEARINGS
1509-10 (1970) (discussion of Dept. of Labor's use of the Freedom of Information Act's trade
secrets exemption to accede to corporation's requests to classify work-related injury informa-
tion).
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up to its promise is that the Act has confused aims. Under one
disclosure principle and the same set of exemptions, the Act at-
tempts to provide citizens both with access to the practices and
internal workings of the regulators and access to information about
the corporations which an agency regulates. Often, sensing an inter-
est in an attack on the agency itself, rather than on the companies
or industry the agency regulates, agencies lose much of their com-
mitment to disclosure of any kind.2 12 For whatever reason, the Free-
dom of Information Act is not a panacea for the investor who seeks
information on corporate social responsibility or for the lack of SEC
required social accounting and disclosure.
As matters now stand, the picture is a patchwork. Disclosure
on corporate social responsibility made to government is available
to investors or to citizens only on a spotty basis. Moreover, to reap
the incomplete amounts available, an investor would have to pound
Washington's pavement, visiting many a governmental agency, bu-
reau, or commission. He or she would have to master a variety of
Freedom of Information rules and procedures. Still, an information-
seeker would have to be willing to face journeys up many blind
alleys. Information freely available to some might be available to
another investor only after litigation. The result of the search would
only be that one individual or one private organization would have
some data and a glimmer of whether or not a particular industry or
particular companies are moving forward on some social responsi-
bility fronts. No disclosure would be available to all investors or
even merely to those who might be interested and would expend
some modest effort to obtain information.
By not requiring some modicum of social responsibility infor-
mation, disclosure is failing to achieve its aims. SEC accounting
rules and activities proliferate, forcing financial accounting tech-
niques to improve and increasing the volume of accounting that
corporations must do. At an accelerated rate, financial accounting
outdistances social accounting, both as to its forced development
and as to its volume. Disclosure becomes pervasive, except on social
responsibility, where regulations require only a bit of after-the-fact
disclosure on environmental matters. Information on many of the
issues is not available elsewhere. Through governmental action, the
amount of information available and the disclosure on financial
232. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (law professors request-
ing information in order to study the NLRB's practices in regulating voting in union elections,
the requested information to include data on the regulators as well as on the regulated).
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matters becomes well-nigh all inclusive-the gulf widens. Finally,
and perhaps most egregious of all of present disclosure's failings,
nothing resembling a central clearinghouse for social responsibility
information exists. Disclosure fails because few investors in the
United States can obtain anything resembling a relatively full and
well-rounded picture of the typical, modem, publicly-held firm.
D. Another Parity As a Goal of Disclosure-Equality of Access to
Information for Investors or Categories of Investors
One of disclosure's central purposes is to produce, in theory at
least, a condition whereby "all investors, big and small, insiders and
outsiders," institutional or individual, have equal access to relevant
investment information.m Nowhere is the working hypothesis, that
all investors begin the investment process on roughly the same infor-
mational footing, more evident than in the expanding Rule 10b-5,
insider trading, and tipper-tippee liability areas. As the court in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation remarks, any analysis of disclosure or
a failure to disclose begins from that premise.24 Relatively equal
access to information is just as much a central purpose of the securi-
ties acts' affirmative disclosure requirements-such as the periodic
reporting requirement and the proxy rules under the 1934 Act-as
it is a central purpose of rules like 10b-5 that deal with a failure to
disclose.
Indeed, the SEC pointedly has premised an important recent
disclosure proposal on equality of access. The Commission wants to
adopt a requirement that if a corporation makes sales and profit
projections, the corporation also must include those projections in
the required disclosure documents it files with the SEC. As mat-
ters presently stand, some investors can obtain projections of future
profits directly from corporate officials while others cannot or do
not. "The Commission expressed concern. . . that all investors do
not have equal access to this significant information" and, based
principally upon a belief that investors should have access to projec-
233. Benston, supra note 117, at 133.
234. See supra note 118. Of course, perfect equality of access or simultaneous distribu-
tion of investment information is impossible. For example, a broker-dealer in possession of
new, important information necessarily must call some customers before others. See, e.g.,
Herman & Safanda, Allocating Investment Information, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 23, 27 (Jan.-
Feb., 1973). Nevertheless, a rough parity of access is a goal for which Rule lOb-5 and much
of present securities regulation incessantly strive.
235. See note 205 supra. Despite its evident desire, due to adverse reaction the Commis-
sion recently withdrew the proposal.
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tions, proposed required disclosure of them in SEC filings.26
Assuming that information on corporate social programs has
worth in the investment process, is conducive to long-run profitabil-
ity, or is a useful tool in evaluating management quality,21 without
disclosure of some social responsibility information, SEC-mandated
disclosure is failing to achieve its goal-equality of access to infor-
mation. Evidence indicates that some investors, most notably insti-
tutional investors, can and do obtain social responsibility informa-
tion, not only from their trade groups' clearinghouses but also from
corporations themselves, while many individual investors cannot
obtain such information.
Thus, the social performance fund of a large mutual fund com-
plex can obtain the social responsibility information it feels it
needs. 238 The fund even obtains from companies the confidential
Equal Employment Opportunity Report.2 39 Other institutional
investors indicate that prior to investing they seek information on
social questions from corporate managements. Some institutions go
so far as to conduct a "personal interview with top management
prior to investing," including an interview on corporate social per-
formance or vulnerability.2 0 This is access that most individual
investors do not have, or, even if they have potential access to infor-
mation, they cannot avail themselves of the access that interviews
with management present. With a small investor the benefit to be
gained outweighs the time and cost that traveling and meeting with
corporate officials involves.
236. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 320, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1975). In withdrawing its
projections proposal, note 205 supra, the Commission restated its concern "about the problem
of selective disclosure of material non-public information" and for that reason referred the
projections problem to its Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5699 (April 23, 1976).
237. Even assuming that, justifiably or not, a significant number of investors believe
that social responsibility may be a key to long-run corporate profitability or to an evaluation
of management competence, some investors will purchase some corporations' securities upon
receiving, along with business dnd commercial disclosures, information that particular com-
panies' social responsibility outlook is good. If such purchasing takes place, increased demand
will cause those corporations' stock prices to rise, regardless of whether social responsibility
does in fact contribute to profits. Thus, those investors who do not have the social responsibil-
ity data are deprived of an opportunity to share in the gains stock price rises generate.
Inequality of access to such information, and hence, inability to participate in the stock
market gain social responsibility may portend exacerbates problems of investors' dwindling
confidence in the capital markets' fairness. See, for example, the investor attitudinal studies
discussed note 246 infra.
238. Viz., the Dreyfus Fund, supra note 41.
239. Shapiro, supra note 41, at 66-67.
240. LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 69.
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Preferential access to social responsibility information con-
tained in government agencies' files is another privilege institutions
and some classes of individuals enjoy. Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, one study finds "an established system of preferential
access" to industry or commercial groups.24 ' Paradoxically, some
public interest groups now enjoy access to social responsibility infor-
mation that ordinary citizens or investors cannot obtain.242
Without disclosure of corporate social responsibility informa-
tion in the proxy statement, or in the annual report that must pre-
cede the proxy statement, the present system produces further in-
equality of access to social responsibility data.
Once a shareholder could address the [stockholders'] meeting, today he
can only address the assembled proxies which are lying at the head of the
table. The only opportunity that the shareholder has of expressing his judg-
ment comes at the time when he considers the execution of the proxy form
... : [Tihat is the time he should have the full information before him.4 3
Under current SEC regulations, proxy statements or annual reports
need not contain social responsibility materials. Yet those share-
holders who can attend annual meetings do raise issues of social
responsibility at those times. In response to shareholders' questions,
many managements make disclosures.2 44 Organized shareholder
groups, perennial attenders of annual meetings, and corporate gad-
flys who attend the meetings obtain disclosures on corporate social
responsibility. Concerned investors or shareholders who cannot at-
tend do not get the disclosures.24. Without some social accounting
and disclosure, proxy statements and annual reports do not fulfill
241. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONsIVE LAW, INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION HEARING,
supra note 231, at 3. See also Nader, supra note 225, at 8.
242. Schorr, Public-Interest Units Gain More Influence with Federal Agencies, Wall
Street J., July 15, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (Pac. ed.). (Aviation Consumer Project, Center for Science
and the Public Interest, Environmental Defense Fund, Citizen Communication Center, etc.,
gaining preferential access to information in various agencies' files).
243. Statement of SEC Chairperson Purcell in Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and
H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and-Roreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 174-75 (1943).
244. In his review, Blumberg finds that:
[1Information otherwise not publicly available, such as the amount of corporate contri-
butions to charitable ... institutions, amount of expenditures for environmental pur-
poses, extent of black and other minority employment and similar matters, have been
elicited through the direct question at the Annual Meeting.
Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1034. See also Yaeger, Evelyn Y. Davis: Unhappy Gadfly's Lim-
ited Success, Washington Post, June 23, 1974, at M-1; the discussion of public interest proxy
proposals, notes 123-28 supra and accompanying text.
245. Unless they are willing to pay for it. Yaeger reports that investors can obtain some
of this information by subscribing to gadfly Davis' annual publication Highlights and
Lowlights of Annual Meetings of Corporations. Yaeger, supra note 244, at M-1.
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the goal of being near substitutes for the annual stockholders'
meeting for those who cannot attend or otherwise be represented.
Instead, preferential access to arguably relevant investment infor-
mation goes to those investors who can attend corporations' annual
meetings.
Thus absent some disclosure on corporate social responsibility,
investors do not start the investment process on roughly the same
informational footing. Failure to reach a parity of access among
various classes of investors means that institutional and other influ-
ential investors continue to receive even more information while
individual investors and members of the public fall farther behind.
Public confidence in the fairness of the investment process dwin-
dles, 26 and a goal of the securities acts-equality of access to invest-
ment information-goes unsatisfied.
246. There probably is widespread interest in information on corporate social responsi-
bility. See notes 146-88 supra and accompanying text. The intensity of that interest or
investor's propensity to utilize it once obtained, however, is an unknown. But even given
marginal use of such information in the actual investment process, in order to promote public
confidence in the capital markets and in their fairness, the Commission should require any
disclosure that would eliminate any actual or perceived inequality of access to investment
information. Individual investor confidence in the market is a central problem the Commis-
sion faces today, and any inequality of access to any arguably relevant information exacer-
bates that problem.
Thus, attitudinal surveys of individual investors show that a belief in preferential distri-
bution of investment information is a principal reason why many individuals have withdrawn
from direct equity investment. MARKET FACTS, INC., MARKETING SECURITIES TO THE SMALL
INVESTOR-A REPORT TO NYSE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS 42 (1973) states the "belief, held by
six in ten small investors, that large investors are making money on the basis of 'inside
information.'" The survey also finds that "Potential Investors are even more likely than
current small investors (79% vs. 60%) to believe that tips, inside information, and other
services are available to large investors but not to small investors." The Securities Industry
Association's attitudinal study finds that 61% of the subpopulation individual investors feel
that institutional and other wealthy investors are favored with more research, information,
and disclosure. OPINION RESEARCH CORP., THE PUBLIC AND INVESTORS EVALUATE THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY 24 (1972). A proprietary study by Arthur D. Little, Inc., finds that of 2,000 individu-
als 70 of the investors, 74% of the ex-investors, and 64% of the non-investors feel that the
markets are manipulated through "unfair advantages and access by institutions, brokers and
other insiders." Wall Street J., May 4, 1973, at 30, col. 3-4. See also OPINION RESEARCH CORP.,
supra at 24; Welles, The Public: Who Needs Em?-How the Street Is Putting the Little Man
Out of the Market, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 37, at 92-93 (Mar. 1972); BUSINESS WEEK, Apr.
17, 1971, at 86; Wall Street J., May 4, 1973, at 30, col. 3-4. One writer feels that an important
step the SEC can take to restore public confidence in the securities markets is to eliminate
potential informational advantages some investors may have over others. Social responsibil-
ity disclosure seems to be one area in which the SEC might move to insure equality of access.
Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60
VA. L. REV. 553, 557-72 (1974).
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E. A Third Parity As a Goal of Disclosure-Equivalent Amounts
of Information Available About Different Corporations and Classes
of Corporations
The time period preceding the passage of the Securities Act of
1933 indicated that without legislative command many corporations
had been providing investors with much of the information a 1933
Act prospectus would disclose.247 While that may have been true,
other companies disclosed little. Even among companies that did
disclose, legislators and others felt that investors' manifest desires
and other demand and supply forces would not produce all the
disclosure regulators felt would be beneficial.248 Another problem
was that those disclosures which were provided were not nearly
identical in content, or in format and, therefore, were not readily
comparable by investors. 49 Then, too, it was felt that some corpora-
tions disclosed too much. Some were engaged in puffery and in
outright misrepresentation.2s° Last of all, prior to the 1933 Act some
corporations wanted to disclose, but to avert being upstaged by
others, would not until other corporations had disclosed.25 Thus,
247. See Benston, supra note 117 at 133. Mr. Bentson also found that 62% of New York
Stock Exchange listed companies made relatively full financial disclosures prior to the 1934
Act's passage and that the percentage had been increasing "fairly steadily" prior to 1933.
248. Professor M. P. Dooley, in The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking
and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 776, 835 n.257 (1972), gives a cogent explanation:
Government intervention to prescribe what is "adequate" [information] is justified if
it is assumed that the true demand for information is greater than that which is reflected
in market transactions. There are good reasons for believing that these conditions exist
and that governmental intervention is justified . . . . In the first place, the class of
investors is large and many will invest only small sums. Consequently, the costs of
bargaining for adequate information may exceed the value of that information in im-
proving the investment decision. The bargaining process is also complicated by the "free
rider" problem. To the extent that the use of information provided to one investor cannot
be kept from other potential investors, some or all of such potential investors will refrain
from purchasing information in the hope that they can take a "free ride" on the informa-
tion purchased by others.
Despite the small number of shareholder requests to corporations who voluntarily had under-
taken to furnish to shareholders the annual 10K report, the SEC made mandatory its require-
ment that companies furnish the report. See note 213 supra. Despite a demonstrated paucity
of demand, the SEC apparently concluded that disclosure, or the availability thereof, would
be beneficial. Precisely the same statement might be made of social responsibility informa-
tion, although in that area the SEC persists in counting heads. See notes 305-10 infra and
accompanying text.
249. See Knauss, supra note 13, at 631 ("lack of standardized accounting reduces the
value of disclosure . . .
250. See, e.g., Benston, supra note 117, at 134-36.
251. Id. at 144; Knauss suggests that the "legal requirement of disclosure removed any
competitive disadvantage incurred by those who had volunteered full information." Knauss,
supra note 13, at 616.
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one principal impetus behind the securities acts' passage and subse-
quent administration has been to require certain 'disclosures by all
corporations of a certain size. 2 2 Those corporations must disclose in
roughly the same format and with the same frequency.2 53
Today, in the social responsibility disclosure area, precisely the
same state of affairs exists as that which prevailed before the securi-
ties acts' adoption.254 Some corporations do conduct social audits.
Many disclose audit results in the annual report.255 Other companies
try to make the social responsibility data available to investors and
to the public generally. 256 Other corporations, who are wont to
disclose, do not because their competitors do not. They feel that
even though they are relatively socially responsible for their indus-
try or region, if they disclose while other corporations refrain, when
viewed in isolation, their disclosures will result in some activists
typecasting them as corporate ne'r-do-wells.27 Many corporations
disclose their positive social responsibility results while failing to
disclose nonfeasance or other failures. Still other firms disclose re-
252. I.e., so-called 12(g) status, described in note 116 supra.
253. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1055-56. Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-
Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43-44 (1968), describes past SEC generated
"pressure for uniformity in accounting standards and reporting practices." In 1974-75, low
share prices and Securities Exchange Act housekeeping and periodic reporting requirements
induced some publicly held firms to consider "going private." They do so through buying
back shares held in investors' hands and reducing the number of shareholders below 300.
With less than 300 shareholders, the company can deregister and discontinue periodic dis-
closures to the Commission under the Securities Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange
Act § 12(g)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970); Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L.
REV. 1019, 1032-33 (1975). See also Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
254. The similarities are uncanny. Compare the 62% of New York Stock Exchange
listed companies who were disclosing financial information prior to 1934, supra note 247, with
the 76% of a similar sample who report that they have undertaken some sort of Social audit,
if not public reporting. J. CORSON & G. STEINER, MEASURING BUSINESS' SOCIAL PERFORMANCE:
THE CORPORATE SOCIAL AUDIT 24 (1974).
255. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
257. The late Eli Goldston described how the company of which he was president,
Eastern Fuel and Gas Associates, Inc., did disclose. Although competitors were non-disclosing
worse polluters, Eastern bore the brunt of environmentalists' attacks. See Goldston, Book
Review, FOUNDATION NEWS 30, 31 (July-Aug. 1970). See also Note, Corporate Altruism: A
Rational Approach, 59 GEO. L.J. 117, 118-20 (1970) (pointing out many of the good deeds
companies perform but do not disclose, partly out of fear of attack from some quarters). Of
course, this damned if you do and damned if you don't dilemma has been eased by the softer,
relative approach, notes 41 & 154-60 supra and accompanying text, adopted by many parties
interested in social responsibility. That may be one incentive behind the increased amount
of social auditing companies are undertaking, note 284 supra. On the other hand, required
disclosure by all large publicly-held firms would be, for relatively responsible firms, the best
relief or protection from misguided attacks. See notes 271-77 infra and accompanying text.
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sults, good or bad, but on only one issue of social responsibility.5 8
Last of all, some corporations disclose, but only as part of glossy,
saccharine, and heavily financed public relations efforts. 59 These
firms have been accused of puffing by some and outright misrepre-
sentation by others.2 10
By not containing any significant amount of corporate social
responsibility disclosure, SEC disclosure requirements thus fail to
achieve yet another goal of parity-a roughly equivalent reservoir of
information available about each large, publicly held firm. In addi-
tion, present disclosures fail to meet the subsidiary goals that disclo-
sures be somewhat comparable and that they not be misleading or
the products of imaginations prone to exaggeration. As a result,
some responsible corporations suffer misguided attacks when they
do disclose. Others fail to reveal the good they do for fear of attack.
At the same time, other corporations take the opportunity that lack
of governmental constraints presents to bootstrap themselves into
images of social responsibility. The uneven and incomparable
amounts of disclosure now available lead investors to misallocate
their investment resources, not only in a way that might offend their
own moral sensibilities, but possibly in ways that affect their pock-
etbooks as well.
258. Compare Calame, Stonewalling It at Gulf Oil, Wall Street J., Apr. 18, 1975, at 8,
cols. 3-6, with Newman, GE's Hiring of Blacks, Long Its Commitment Slow But Sure, Wall
Street J., Dec. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (after two years' pressure from stockholders General
Electric Co. begins disclosing its minority hiring and advancement record) and Bank America
Corporation's and similar publicly reported social audits, notes 27-35 supra and accompany-
ing text (statistics with historical comparisons on minority hiring as well as disclosure on a
half dozen other social responsibility issues thought relevant to the disclosing company's
business).
259. See Connor, Mobil's Advocacy Ads Head a Growing Trend, Draw Praise,
Criticism, Wall Street J., May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (IBM, IT&T, Mobil, and other campaigns
reviewed); notes 380-84 infra and accompanying text.
260. The principal beneficiary of the current flood of corporate social concern has
been the media. The so-called "public" utilities spend well over three hundred million
dollars per year for advertising, much of it expressing their concern for the environment.
One might think they were in the business of wilderness preservation . . . until one
examines their dismal record . . . . Their ads do not reveal that utilities rank at rock
bottom when it comes to hiring. . .blacks. The four biggest can makers. . . have been
heavily advertising their "recycling centers," but privately the industry admits the
campaign involved no investment.
Henning, supra note 126, at 154. As to outright misrepresentation, see, e.g., id. (discussion
of a forest products producer's advertising involving water purification efforts-with pictures
of a stream taken upstream from the company's pulp plant).
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F. A Traditional Purpose of Disclosure-Prevention of Fraud and
Forced Revelation of Risk
Of the reasons for which all acknowledge disclosure is required,
the last to be discussed is an important one-disclosure's role in the
prevention of fraud and in the discovery of questionable acts or
practices that have been committed. In this fraud area, disclosure
operates in two ways. First, the requirement of full and fair disclo-
sure before a company may sell securities tends to make manage-
ment lessen conflicts of interest and to deter other questionable or
speculative practices or ventures.2 6  Students of disclosure have
termed the registration process a "housecleaning:"
[O]ne of its most valuable consequences is the elimination of conflicts
of interest and questionable business practices which, exposed to public view,
have what Justice Frankfurter once termed a "shrinking quality.
' 2
11
It is important to note, however, that disclosure requirements do not
prohibit conflicts of interest or other questionable practices. If, de-
spite disclosure's "shrinking quality," management nevertheless
decides to proceed with the questionable act, disclosure only re-
quires that management spell out the proposed scheme's details and
nuances. 6 3 This is the full and fair disclosure philosophy often jux-
taposed to some states' Blue Sky regulations. Federal regulation
does not pass on the enterprise's investment merits or on the fair-
ness of the participation offered to investors. 21 Indeed, assuming
261. See also Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1352
(1966):
[Tihe act of making information public, where it may be read, is a prophylactic of
uncommon effectiveness: many a transaction that could not stand the light of official
or public scrutiny has not occurred (or has been undone) simply because it would have
been exposed to that light.
While Chairperson of the SEC, Professor William Cary gave some examples:
I firmly believe that disclosure does operate in this deterrent manner. It is illustrated
by following various registration statements in their journey through the registration
process. Upon filing, a statement may disclose that insiders are getting seventy percent
of the company for five percent of the cash. Ofttimes, in response to requests by ...
the Commission that benefits to insiders be . .. clearly spelled out, this percentage
share may be substantially reduced.
Cary, supra note 13, at 411.
262. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 112, at 51.
263. For instance, in the dilution example, supra note 261, the SEC only requires that
insiders disclose. Thus, the registration statement must contain pie charts, hydrographs, or
other bar charts showing that insiders will receive 70% of the stock in return for 5% of the
cash. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 at 6-10 (July 26, 1972). But the practice is not
forbidden if disclosure has been made. See In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648
(1945).
264. Despite full disclosure on the federal level, some state securities administrators
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proper disclosure, the Commission cannot block a security's sale, no
matter how insubstantial or amoral the issuer of that security may
be.
Disclosure's second purpose in this fraud area is to force man-
agement to tell the entire story. The aim is not really to prevent
fraud because the essence of fraud is prevarication or failure to give
the complete picture. Rather, disclosure's aim becomes protection
of investors against significant or catastrophic losses, the risk of
which they could not otherwise evaluate. Disclosure is made so that
investors can knowingly assume or refrain from assuming risks.',
New legislative enactments, emerging consciousness in the ju-
diciary and among regulators of the social costs companies' opera-
tions impose, and public values and expectations all are creating
significant risks for socially irresponsible companies. In the equal
employment opportunity area judgments and settlements have
ranged as high as $30 million."' For regulated industries the costs
of employment discrimination may range even higher, as plaintiffs
are claiming and will continue to claim that regulatory agencies
must or can take into account in rate-making and licensing matters
may block a sale of securities on the grounds that the sale would be unfair or tend to work a
fraud on that state's citizens. The comparison between state and federal regulation is made
in Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300,
301 n.6 (1961).
265. Another example is investment in a company touched by criminal or shady con-
duct. Thus, even if insiders are to receive 70% of the stock offered for only 5% of the cash, as
in the example in note 261 supra, knowing investors may still believe the idea behind the
company or its product to have such a high probability of success that future profitability
outweighs any disadvantage inherent in management receiving so much stock for so little.
Investors may purchase even after full disclosure of a questionable scheme.
266. The AT&T consent order called for $15 million in payments to 13,000 women and
2,000 minority male employees. New promotion and pay policies entailing future outlays were
also part of the consent order. 8 BNA LAB. REL. REP. FAIR EMPL. PRAc. No. 431, at 73 (Jan.
18, 1973). In all actions against AT&T, the backpay and raises to date total $75 million.
Thinking Smaller, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1975, at 541-55. The steel industry consent decrees
required nine steel producers to pay $30.94 million in back pay and damages as well as adopt
hiring, promotion, and pay raise timetables which will entail added future costs. 8 BNA LAB.
REL. REP. FAIR EMPL. PRAc. No. 431, at 125 (Apr. 18, 1974). United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Industries, Inc. 63 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Georgia Power Co., 301 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ga. 1968); Estate of Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Co., 2 CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 5311 (D.N.J. 1975) (jury verdict of
$750,000 to one individual on age discrimination grounds). The Supreme Court generally has
upheld back pay awards, adding that an employer must pay for past discrimination even if
it has done its best to eliminate such practices. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975). See generally Wong, Lawyer William Gould Prods Courts to End Job Bias; His
Activism Sometimes Irks Peers, Wall Street J., Aug. 21, 1974, at 26 cols. 1-3 (judgments as
high as $50 million sought from a number of corporations).
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a company's progress in ending discrimination."' 7 Capital costs for
eliminating one narrow form of environmental pollution are cited as
$795 million."' In the product safety area, one lawsuit calls for $284
million in damages resulting from the use by Cleveland, Ohio area
butchers of cancer-causing polyvinyl chloride wrap. Other, similar
lawsuits are predicted to follow. 169
Yet in disclosures filed with the SEC companies need not de-
scribe programs or actions to lessen or eliminate the risks of social
irresponsibility. The only social responsibility disclosure the SEC
requires is of the after-the-fact variety-only when governmental
enforcement action or other litigation has commenced need compa-
nies disclose, which they do most often in the financial statements'
footnotes discussing contingent liabilities. 2 ° This paucity of disclo-
sure contrasts with other SEC disclosure requirements looking to
the making of future profits or the avoidance of future liabilities. In
the central portion of prospectuses and in other disclosure docu-
ments, corporations must size up the competition in advance, de-
scribe progress for developing new products, tell how the company
will utilize a public offering's proceeds, or set forth information to
enable the investor to judge on the basis of present management
affiliations and interests the significance of possible conflicts of in-
terest on the company's future.21 Under present SEC requirements,
however, nowhere must a company describe programs and progress
in elimination or minimization of job discrimination claims, per-
ceived environmental liability or exposure and programs to reduce
that exposure, or product safety defects or difficulties and proposed
cures. Yet failure to have programs such as those may for the inves-
tor entail a risk of loss or result in as precipitous a decline in the
value of his or her investment as would failure to develop saleable
new products.
Should the SEC extend disclosure requirements to certain so-
cial responsibility areas, planning benefits and the avoidance of
267. See NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has also recommended to the President a number of
steps the independent regulatory agencies should be taking to promote equal employment
opportunity. Wall Street J., Nov. 12, 1974, at 2, cols. 3-4.
268. Occupational Health and Safety Act proposed standards would require such an
outlay by steel companies to control coke ovens' carcinogenic emissions. See Proposed Stan-
dard, 40 Fed. Reg. 32,268 (July 31, 1975), amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,849 (Sept. 4, 1975); Wall
Street J., July 28, 1975 at 2, col. 2 (Pac. ed.).
269. Wall Street J., Aug. 21, 1974, at 4, cols. 3-4.
270. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 277-84 infra.
271. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 264, at 305 et seq.
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questionable acts or practices would obtain, just as in the financial
area."' The requirement to disclose would force companies to con-
centrate on areas where liability could result or where adverse pub-
licity could tarnish the corporate talisman. With a view towards
ultimate disclosure, the next stage would be the corporate undertak-
ing of a no-nonsense description and evaluation of the company's
programs for avoiding harm to the firm from social irresponsibility.
Based upon what a working copy of the social responsibility disclo-
sure reveals, a reordering or restructuring of some corporate pro-
grams might then be in order. The company would disclose this
information, and fraud would be prevented. Under this type of dis-
closure information would be available to the investor on what steps
issuers of securities are taking or are not taking to prevent occurr-
ences that pose a chance that the investor could sustain a loss or
reap a reward from investment in a socially regressionist, socially
pragmatic, or socially enlightened corporation. In this way, some
harm to pocketbooks as well as to investors' moral sensibilities
might be averted.
VI. THE PRESENT POSITION AND ATTITUDE OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
A. Introduction
After testing the various theses that corporate social responsi-
bility disclosures are needed at least to enable regulation by disclo-
sure to fulfill its traditional goals, it is appropriate to review the
SEC's present posture on social accounting and disclosure. Whether
because of limited agency resources that the Commission feels un-
able to stretch to police social disclosure, an antagonistic attitude
toward its critics, a lack of clear thinking about disclosure's tradi-
tional purposes, or some other factor or factors, the SEC has proven
obdurate on this issue. The Commission has required disclosure on
only one issue of social responsibility-not much more than would
have been required if the SEC had never spoken on the matter.
272. Preparing registration statements or periodic disclosure reports has always been
thought to have a value independent of having a legal, public market for a company's securi-
ties. Preparing elaborate disclosure tends not only to deter questionable acts and practices,
supra note 253 and accompanying text, but also to force introspection about corporate goals,
programs, products, weaknesses, and future vulnerability. The 1933 Act registration process
especially is thought to be a highly beneficial planning exercise.
273. Some onlookers have emphasized this point. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 5,
at 572, which points out that in its release mandating minimal disclosure on "material legal
proceedings" involving civil rights or environmental matters, discussed notes 276-80 infra and
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Moreover, in its most recent encounter with requests for disclosure,
the Commission acted only after receiving a court order. A fair
reading of the Commission's pronouncements that the court ordered
hearings have produced suggests an intransigent agency doggedly
reasoning toward a preordained conclusion against disclosure.
Those pronouncements further show the Commission engaging in
almost childish obfuscation of the issues.
Because the Commission has deservedly earned the highest
marks as a federal agency, its action on social accounting and disclo-
sure seems mystifying. In view of various commissioners' remarks,
which reveal favorable individual attitudes, the SEC's latest pro-
nouncement is even more difficult to understand. In part the latest
reaction may be reflected of the shrill voices who have called for
disclosure. Further, many of those who call for SEC-required disclo-
sure do not do so with the traditional corporate model or disclosure's
traditional purposes in mind. Instead, many of the individuals the
Commission encounters call for disclosure on the theory that corpo-
rations have become quasi-public entities who through disclosure
should demonstrate fulfillment of responsibilities to labor, consum-
ers, the local community, and society in general. Others argue, con-
versely, that disclosure should be required with the purpose of forc-
ing corporate ne'r-do-wells, or all corporations, for that matter, to
incriminate themselves, or with the aim to generate adverse public
reaction that will force corporations to attempt the cure of social ills
rather than to focus on economic missions such as long-run profit
maximization.
Understandably, the Commission may have shied away, but it
has overreacted. When one views disclosure on social responsibility
as fulfilling disclosure's traditional goals, its necessity becomes ap-
parent. Any self-incrimination or adverse publicity that disclosure
produces should be considered as only an incidental by-product of
a disclosure system living up to its stated aims. In that light, some
required accounting and disclosure becomes only the moderate
choice. Viewed in comparison with the many other corporate-
securities law reforms others propose, requiring some social account-
ing and disclosure appears to be the wisest action the Commission
could take.
accompanying text, "[alithough the Commission announced this release as its response to
changing national priorities, it is evident that little more is required . . . than was already
necessary under prior laws and regulations."
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B. Formal Action by the SEC
On June 1, 1971, the Nader Project on Corporate Responsibility
and the Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned the SEC to
adopt disclosure rules on certain environmental and employment
discrimination matters.214 The petition proposed that the SEC re-
quire a company to describe with regard to each product it produced
the nature and extent of the resulting injury to natural resources
and the feasibility of and plans for correcting that injury. The peti-
tioning groups also requested that the Commission mandate disclo-
sure on whether or not a company had changed products, produc-
tion methods, or advertising in order to enhance environmental val-
ues. In the employment discrimination area, petitioners requested
the SEC merely to require that those companies who had made
public claims about their equal employment records provide sub-
stantiation as reflected by data in filings with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. 75
The Commission's first response to the petition was the
promulgation of a July 19, 1971 interim release stating the SEC's
position.276 That position was that companies must disclose only "if
material, when compliance with statutory requirements with re-
spect to environmental quality. . . may necessitate significant cap-
ital outlays, may materially affect the earning power of the busi-
ness, or cause material changes in registrants' business . . 27
For a definition of materiality, the SEC referred readers to its exist-
ing rules.278 On civil rights matters, the Commission reiterated its
views that companies need disclose such matter only "if material"
274. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 106, at D-1 (June 16, 1971); Wall Street J., June
10, 1971, at 22, col. 3.
275. The petition's contents are more thoroughly reviewed in Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693-94 (D.D.C. 1974). Petitioners also requested
that the SEC define as material and therefore subject to disclosure any litigation against a
company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or under equal employment regula-
tions governing parties contracting with the federal government. Id. at 694. The then and
current SEC position is that disclosure need be made about equal employment matters only
if legal proceedings actually have commenced under statutory requirement, and if the possi-
ble penalty is cancellation of a government contract, termination of further business with
government, or similar material and tangible effects on business or profits. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5170 (July 19, 1971).
276. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5170 (July 19, 1971).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. A term "which limits the information required to those matters as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling a security."
Rule 12b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1965). Cf. note
144 supra and accompanying text.
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and, in general, only "if arising in legal proceedings under statutory
requirements.""2 9 The SEC's interim determination thus fell far
short of what petitioners had requested. Indeed, it required nothing
more than previously existing general disclosure requirements had
mandated.280
In February 1972, however, the Commission had an apparent
change of heart. New environmental proposals with some guide to
materiality appeared. Companies were required to disclose any im-
pact of state or federal environmental requirements carrying a cost
of compliance equaling ten percent of a company's consolidated
"current assets. '281 The SEC declared all governmental legal pro-
ceedings material, although guidedly remarking that "it is obvious
that is not necessarily true for purposes of security valuation. ' '21 2
After more than fourteen months of deliberation, the SEC for-
malized its guidelines for environmental disclosure and, as a court
was to remark later, "in io way enlarged and in some respects
retreated from those changes which the SEC had proposed" in Feb-
ruary 1972.23 Companies were to disclose governmental or private
litigation only if potential liability exceeded ten percent of the com-
pany's consolidated current assets.284 All governmental actions need
not be disclosed; they need only be generally described in groups,
according to the generic nature of the claims involved. The Commis-
sion made no mention of equal employment opportunity, presuma-
bly resting on what traditional disclosure rules might bring forth in
an instance or two.
In the meanwhile, the Commission had given the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council short shrift. In December 1971, the Com-
mission had announced it would not issue the rules petitioners had
279. See note 275 supra.
280. The position was roundly criticized. Schwartz viewed the release as
[A] myopic response . . . because it is a rejection of the most important device avail-
able for the Government to further an important social objective. It is a needlessly
narrow concept of the role of the SEC ....
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 98. Accord: Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 572-73.
281. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972). The test had been 15% of
current assets. Id. A 10% test would still require drastic outlays before the company need
disclose. For forest products producers, the outlay for environmental remedial action might
have to be $48 million, Weyerhauser Corp. 1973 Ann. Rep. 26, or $47 million, Boise Cascade
Corp. 1973 Ann. Rep. at 38, before disclosure need begin. For a large oil producer, the figure
triggering disclosure would be a $577 million capital expenditure, Gulf Oil Corp. 1974 Ann.
Rep. 26.
282. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972).
283. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695. (D.D.C.
1974).
284. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5386 (April 20, 1973).
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requested.2 5 Along with its cohorts, Natural Resources Defense
Council went to court.26 Petitioners characterized the SEC's treat-
ment of their claims as violative of both the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA)87 and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) .218 The SEC never had complied with NEPA requirements,
or with an implementing Executive Order requiring agencies to re-
form their programs and policies so as to aid in the enhancement of
environmental values. Finally, after two deadlines for reports on
agency compliance with NEPA had passed, 29 in its February 1972
release the Commission announced that "[t]his action is being
taken pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act.219 Peti-
tioner Natural Resources Defense Council complained that if, as the
SEC maintained, the rules the SEC proposed in February 1972, and
adopted in revised form in April 1973, fully satisfied NEPA, then
the notice of the February 1972 proposed rules failed adequately to
inform the public that this was to be the agency action meant by
the SEC to satisfy NEPA once and for all. Petitioners argued that
such a failure to give adequate public notice of what rule-making
action an agency intended to take violated the APA. 211
The District Court for the District of Columbia, per Judge
Charles Richey, upheld virtually all of petitioners' NEPA and APA
claims. The court ordered the SEC to conduct new rule-making
procedures, including public hearings. Out of those proceedings the
SEC was to provide the court with a narrative sufficient to enable
the court to review "the SEC's concept. . . of its statutory obliga-
285. 389 F. Supp. at 694.
286. After first filing in the Court of Appeals, No. 72-1148 (unreported dec. D.C. Cir.)
(Feb. 8, 1973) and after dismissal, petitioners refiled in the District Court.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
289. The NEPA requires each federal agency to review its " . . . regulations, and
current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficien-
cies . . . therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes" of the Act, that is,
enhancement of environmental quality. Agencies were to "propose to the President not later
than July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies
into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures" of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4333. Exec.
Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 285 (Supp. 1973) implementing NEPA § 4333, directed all agen-
cies to "develop programs and measures to protect and enhance environmental quality."
Further, agencies were to make a preliminary review of the type NEPA contemplated, sub-
mitting the review to the Council on Environmental Quality not later than Sept. 1, 1970.
290. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5235 (Feb. 16, 1972). The release announcing the
adoption of a revised version of the Feb. 1972 proposals also announced the SEC opinion that
the revised version would "promote the purposes of the NEPA." SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5386 (April 20, 1973), discussed notes 283-84 supra and accompanying text.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (APA rule-making notice provision).
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tion to the public under the securities acts and NEPA."'92 The court
also ordered the SEC to develop a record to resolve the "overriding
factual issue" of "the extent of 'ethical investor' interest in the type
of information which Plaintiffs have requested." '293
The tenor of Judge Richey's decision was quite illuminating. He
began with the premise that Natural Resources Defense Council,
the Project on Corporate Social Responsibility, and similar groups
"want information about corporations to make socially responsible
investment decisions" and "to further public education." '294 More-
over, as evidence of such information's usefulness in investment de-
cisions, the judge took notice of the "large number of 'ethical inves-
tors' in this country-individuals and institutions . . . which...
need the information Plaintiffs seek in order to make investment
and voting decisions in accordance with their high principles and
societal interests." '95 He viewed the SEC's prior history in providing
social responsibility disclosure as "an apparent decision" by the
Commission that "no reasonable investor in this country wants the
type of information which Plaintiffs seek," a conclusion the judge
was not about to accept:
There are many so-called "ethical investors" in this country who want to
invest their assets in firms which are concerned about and acting on environ-
mental problems. . . .This attitude may be based purely upon a concern for
the environment, but it may also proceed from the recognition that awareness
of and sensitivity to environmental problems is the mark of intelligent man-
agement. [T]his Court is not prepared to say that they are not rational inves-
292. 389 F. Supp. at 701.
293. Id., citing THE ETHICAL INVESTOR, supra note 1. Judge Richey's reliance upon that
volume is a bit misplaced. The Ethical Investor reaches the conclusion that in the manage-
ment of their endowments, investors should observe only what the authors describe as the
Kew Gardens principle. Id. That is, to avoid possible infringement on others' academic
freedom, etc., see note 136 supra, universities should interfere only when a portfolio company
is doing affirmative harm to other persons. The authors derive the principle from an incident
in which bystanders stood by while a young woman was attacked in New York's Kew Gardens
area. Id. at 22-25. Commentators have criticized The Ethical Investor as going only a very
short way towards encouraging socially responsible investment selection and management.
See, e.g., Mundheim, Book Review, supra note 164, at 1073, n.37. Much better evidence exists
as to the extent institutional investors, at least, take social responsibility into account in
investment management. See notes 129-42 supra and accompanying text. Judge Richey
might have relied upon much of that better evidence.
294. 389 F. Supp. 692. Those particular groups' motive behind the desire to obtain
information may be more for use as evidence with which to incriminate corporations or as
fodder with which to generate adverse publicity. See notes 345-51 infra and accompanying
text. Perhaps Judge Richey should have characterized the wants as those of investors gener-
ally, or a subpopulation thereof, rather than as of the Project on Corporate Responsibility, a
severe and vocal critic of corporate behavior.
295. 389 F. Supp. 693.
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tors and that the information they seek is not material information within the
meaning of the securities laws.
29
'
The SEC resolved to heed the letter of Judge Richey's order.
Using the order's exact wording, the Commission announced public
hearings to commence April 15, 1975.2 As to the spirit of the judge's
opinion, however, the SEC agreed not at all. The release announcing
hearings characterized the scope of the planned inquiry to be "the
basis and extent, if any, of the Commission's authority to require
disclosure of matters primarily of social concern but of doubtful
economic significance .... ,,211 The Commission did not announce
the scope of the inquiry to be if social responsibility information has
economic significance in the first place, or even if a significant num-
ber of investors believe that it has, or even if a number of investors
merely desire such information, economically significant or not.99
The Commission also all but foreclosed inquiry into equal employ-
ment opportunity disclosure. Its announcement read:
The Commission feels that it would be difficult, if not impossible to
make a meaningful evaluation of a company's current hiring and promotion
practices .... [to the extent that unequal educational opportunity or...
incentive has produced a lack of qualified women or minority group members
.... individual employers would find it most difficult to recruit .... Raw
statistics, reflecting only the fact that a company has not successfully recruited
persons within these categories would provide little or no insight into the
quality or extent of the company's recruitment efforts].3 ®'
Despite its foregone conclusion, the SEC held hearings on social
responsibility disclosure. Predictably, the final results those hear-
ings produced reflected the same negative tone with which the Com-
mission had announced hearings. The Commission's opening gam-
296. Id. at 697-700.
297. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5569 (Feb. 11, 1975).
298. Id. (emphasis added). The SEC noted: "The fact that the Commission is conduct-
ing these proceedings should not be taken to indicate any view as to its authority to assist
members of the investing public in matters primarily of social rather than financial concern."
Id. at n.2.
299. After all, members of the Commission have stated in the past that "[W]e do
endeavor to give investors what they want." See note 144 supra.
300. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5569 at n.9 and accompanying text (Feb. 11, 1975).
Of course, one could make the exact same statement about the naked sales, profit, or other
financial statistics present disclosures contain. Any statistics, including minority hiring data,
gain value only through comparison with those of other companies and by comparison with
the same company's statistics for prior years. See, e.g., notes 154-57 supra and accompanying
text. Furthermore, disclosure uses narratives and other communication devices to show the
quality or the promise in business or financial areas, whether or not the statistics support
that viewpoint. See notes 200-06 supra and accompanying text. Likewise narratives or data
other than final results can show something of the quality or extent of a company's minority
hiring efforts, as the process audit, notes 25-52 supra and accompanying text, contemplates.
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bit was again to stereotype disclosure on social responsibility as the
"promotion of social goals unrelated to the objectives of the federal
securities laws. "31 In nineteen days of formal hearings, the Commis-
sion had heard fifty-four oral presentations and had reviewed 353
written comments. 312 Deep in the text of the lengthy release summa-
rizing those hearings, the Commission noted that:
[Tihose investor participants who supported social disclosure were vir-
tually unanimous in stating that such information is economically significant.
They argued that non-compliance with environmental, equal employment, or
similar laws could lead to extensive costs and liabilities; that the ability to
avoid such problems provides an index to management's overall quality; and
that in the long run corporate social responsibility determines the public rela-
tions and regulatory framework within which a company operates. Relatively
few investor-participants expressed interest on non-economic grounds.3 13
Nevertheless, casting aside the manifest weight of at least that testi-
mony before it, the Commission made characterizations of social
disclosure throughout its conclusions as "being for the sole purpose
of promoting social goals unrelated to those underlying the Acts."3"4
One raison d'etre for a Securities and Exchange Commission
has always been to require corporations to disclose information
when investor demand for it exists but is not readily apparent be-
cause of the widely scattered or defused nature of that demand and
the small monetary stake of those interested in the information.
"Consequently, the costs of bargaining for adequate information
may exceed the value of that information in improving the invest-
ment decision."3 5 Similarly, an SEC mission is to require disclosure
of information for which perhaps no overwhelming demand exists
but which regulators nonetheless feel would be beneficial for inves-
tors.
Despite that vital SEC role, in its social responsibility disclo-
sure proceedings the SEC counted heads as a determinant of
whether the demand for social responsibility information was suffi-
cient to require disclosure. More egregiously, or perhaps with a bit
of duplicity, the Commission counted only the heads who had ac-
301. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5677 (Oct. 14, 1975); [Current] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. T 80,310 at 85,706.
302. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,706.
303. Id. at 85,713.
304. Id. See also id. at 85,716, refusing to take hearing participants' words at face value
and maintaining that they want disclosure "as a weapon to influence, if not control, most of
the activities in the private sector which have an impact" on social responsibility issues.
305. See the quotation from Dooley, note 248 supra. See generally Benston, supra note
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tually traveled to Washington and appeared before the Commission
or who had taken the time to submit written comments as being
seemingly indicative of total demand for social accounting and dis-
closure."' Nevertheless, the results were not insignificant. Of those
persons who took the time and expense to appear before or to com-
ment to the Commission in favor of social responsibility disclosure,
many "did not identify their investment portfolios." Impressively,
though,
[tihe holdings of those who did . . . [seven foundations, 22 religious
groups, 11 educational institutions, two mutual funds, five environmental
groups, 37 individual investors, and one state, Minnesota .... ] constitute
approximately 2/3 of 1% of the estimated aggregate value of the common and
preferred stock and corporate bonds held in this country at the end of 1974.'1
Although the SEC had never before counted the heads appearing
before it as indicative of the demand for or the wisdom of complying
with requests for disclosure, the interest in social responsibility dis-
closure actually arrayed before the Commission seemed to exceed
the total demand upon which the Commission has based earlier
commercial disclosure requirements.0 '
In the social disclosure hearings, the Investment Company In-
stitute, the mutual funds' trade group, The American Bankers Asso-
ciation-Trust Division, and the Financial Analysts Federation all
submitted written comment stating that social responsibility cri-
teria should be part of the investment process. The mutual funds
group and the bankers also submitted long-standing policy state-
ments to their members recommending use of such criteria in
investment management. 309 The Commission noted that
306. See [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 80,310, at 85,719-23. The Commission
made no attempt to project the interests of investors before it to the investor population as a
whole, or to warn readers of its release that such a task might be in order to determine the
true investor demand for social responsibility information.
307. Id. at 85,719 & n.49.
308. See, e.g., the Commission's implementation of the requirement that companies
send the 10K report despite experimentation showing that only 40 General Motors or 20 or
so shareholders in similar large corporations wanted it, supra note 213; the Commission's
foray into the breakdown of sales and profit figures according to the corporate products which
produced them at the behest of several New York financial analysts who felt that they needed
the information, see, e.g., Wall Street J., Jan. 14, 1974, at 4, col. 3-4 (analysts requesting
expanded line of business reporting).
309. [Currentl CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,720. In a representative year
before the 1973-75 market slide, mutual funds held $79.6 billion in assets, mostly in stocks,
and bank trust divisions managed $185.5 billion in personal and common trust funds. 32 SEC
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 866-67 (1973). Pension funds held $150 billion. Id. As many pension
funds' assets are invested by banks, any indication of interest or a policy statement to
members on socially responsible investment by the most influential mutual fund and bank-
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"[u]nfortunately there was no broad participation by financial in-
stitutions in the hearing." The trade groups comments were deemed
only "indirect indications" of interest in social responsibility infor-
mation.30
Well-known indications of institutional investor interest in so-
cial responsibility are available to the Commission. 31 An open re-
view of the question, however, would have told the Commission
that, despite that professed interest, many financial institutions
neither appeared before the Commission nor pressed for social re-
sponsibility disclosure by written comment. One possible reason for
this lack of response is that financial institutions do not actually use
social criteria in investing; hence, they have no need for disclosure.
In view of many institutions' strong and repeated expressions of
interest, however, that explanation is not likely to be universally
true. The other explanation for institutions' failure to appear before
the Commission to support'disclosure might be that large institu-
tional investors already have the needed social responsibility infor-
mation that disclosure would provide. Institutional investors can
and do obtain the information from their trade groups' social re-
sponsibility information clearinghouses, directly from portfolio
companies themselves, or through preferential access to other
information sources their size and bargaining power give them.312
In its reasoning to a preordained conclusion, however, the Commis-
sion discusses neither possibility.
The Commission indicates that little evidence of individual
investor attitudes toward social responsibility exists. 31 3 That is prob-
ers' trade groups might lead to an inference of substantial demand for social responsibility
information.
310. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 80,310, at 85,719.
311. See, e.g., the Ford Foundation study and the Senate study, supra notes 129-42 and
accompanying text. In that regard, Commissioner Sommer discussed and agreed with the
Ford Foundation study's findings of a high degree of institutional interest in a symposium in
which other Commission members participated. See Corporate Social Responsibility, The
Role of the SEC, supra note 128, at 215-16 & 220-21.
312. See notes 39-42 and 238-42 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the question
arises as to why public interest groups' clearinghouses, notes 36-38 supra and accompanying
text, cannot satisfy individual investors' demands for information just as trade groups' clear-
inghouses satisfy some institutions' demands. One answer is that, given knowledge of clear-
inghouses' existence, many moderate individuals may not relish using those clearinghouses.
Many of the information sources to which individuals can gain access are, however well-
intentioned they may be, biased or messianic in outlook. The National Council of Churches
or Council on Economic Priorities are not as likely to produce assessments as dispassionate
as are the insurance industry or mutual funds group clearinghouses.
313. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 80,310, at 85,719.
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ably true."4 On the other hand, in its hearings the Commission
unfairly infers that the only credible evidence of individual investor
interest on social responsibility would be an in-depth statistical
survey of the country's 30 million investors. 31 The Commission it-
self, however, inconsistently gave credence to evidence of doubtful
validity for the proposition that individual investors have very little
interest in corporate social responsibility.311
One further part of the proceeding amply demonstrated the
SEC's bias against social responsibility disclosures. In addition to
implying at one point that anything resembling worthwhile environ-
mental disclosure effectively would require disclosure documents to
reproduce the thousands of pages typical environmental impact
statements contain, 317 the Commission forwarded other weak
reductio ad absurdum arguments against social accounting and dis-
closure. One was that investors had expressed interest in informa-
tion on over "100 different" social responsibility matters. Inclusion
in disclosure of data on all these categories would make "disclosure
documents wholly unmanageable. '31 8 In a bewildering, small-print
footnote, without any discernment whatsoever, the Commission
listed all matters in which "'ethical investors' were said to be inter-
ested," including the vague ("[c]ommitment to the 'human com-
munity' "), the esoteric ("expenditures on the land grant college
system"), and the ridiculous ("discrimination against persons less
than six feet tall") .31 The Commission's inference was that, if im-
plemented, social responsibility disclosure would have to speak to
all or most of those matters, or that corporate social responsibility
is a frivolous notion.
314. See notes 146-48 supra and accompanying text.
315. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,712.
316. The Commission's evidence is the poor performance of two, and the marginal
performance of a third, of four "Social Fund" mutual funds. Id. at 85,719. The literature
presents ample evidence to show that the late 1960's limited social fund experiment failed
because of its nature. The social funds tried to combine a sense of mission and searches for
clean companies rather than adopting a relative approach to socially responsible investment.
See, e.g., note 41 supra. The poor investment performance that resulted caused the funds to
lose attractiveness to investors. Moreover, the Commission's evidence comes from a period
when investor interest in mutual funds generally spiraled downward. See Wall Street J., Mar.
21, 1972, at 1, col. 6; the 1973 MARKET FACTs SMALL INVESTOR SURVEY, supra note 246, at 26
(asked to invest a $10,000 windfall, 65% of the small investors and 72% of the active small
investors would not invest in mutual funds at all, feeling that their commission charges are
too high and the financial return too low).
317. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,712 & n.27.
318. Id. at 85,724-25.
319. Id. at 85,724 & n.72.
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Moreover, what the Commission failed to note is important. For
example, the Commission might have noted that in any open, plen-
ary proceeding dealing with financial disclosure generally, investors
and others probably would also posit needs for over a hundred cate-
gories of information. That would be especially likely if no prior
financial disclosure requirements were in existence, as is the case in
the social responsibility area. The Commission could have made a
serious review of corporate social responsibility's recent history,
which would show that serious interests of investors and academi-
cians have focused on five or six areas of concern, out of the multi-
tude of social responsibility areas activists had pointed to a few
years ago."' The Commission, however, failed to probe such consid-
erations.
All in all, the SEC's October 22, 1975, refusal to require signifi-
cant social responsibility disclosures seemed less than a good faith
effort.32 ' Whether through oversight or not, the Commission alto-
gether failed to comply with a statute (NEPA) and an executive
order implementing that statute. Once the agency acted, it acted in
an incomplete and somewhat arbitrary manner, at least in one
judge's and some commentators' opinions. A court order was neces-
sary to force the SEC to hold something like a wide-ranging inquiry
into corporate social responsibility disclosure. In announcing those
hearings, the SEC adopted a very negative and chilling tone. And
the SEC pronouncements those hearings produced seem a parody,
a thinly veiled charade. Moreover, the process took five years. So
indications are that the SEC will act with less than alacrity and will
move fitfully, if at all, in the social responsibility area. Why the
Commission finds this area so troublesome is mystifying. Perhaps
an inquiry into and a clarification of this question may lead to a
melting away of some of the agency's recalcitrance.
320. E.g., product safety, minority hiring and advancement, employee health and
safety, environmental matters, corporate philanthropy, energy conservation and develop-
ment, and perhaps involvement in community affairs. See, e.g., note 107 supra.
321. The hearings did result in one slight proposed expansion of the environmental
disclosure requirements-that a company must file as an exhibit to disclosure documents,
but not in the documents themselves, a backward-looking review of cases in the past year
where it has failed to meet federal, but not state, statutory environmental requirements. See
note 208 supra. But in a later, seemingly begrudging move the Commission backtracked to
square one and retracted even the small expansion of disclosure requirements the Natural
Resources Defense Council had apparently won in the five year proceeding. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 12414 (May 6, 1976).
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C. The Revolution on the Theory of the Corporation
The reasons for the Commission's formal stance against disclo-
sure are no doubt many, and some are posited in the introduction
to this section. The Commission's position has not been supported
by other authorities. 3 2 Serious and able commentators have been
calling for some social responsibility disclosure for a long time. In
the current period, calls for disclosure date as far back as the early
1960's. Writing in 1962, Professor William Cary, then SEC
Chairman, argued for some sort of social responsibility reporting.3 23
More recently, other writers have entered the field. 324 The difficulty
with that writing, however, has been that, able as they are, the
commentators have not called for disclosure on traditional grounds.
For example, one writer in the 1960's echoed the view that a major
"role of disclosure" is
[a]s a method of regulating the major economic centers of power within
our country . . . .[A]n important by-product of the disclosure required...
is that management of these major centers of power . . must operate in a
goldfish bowl . . . The interests of employers, consumers, and the general
public are protected by the required disclosures.2'
Such early thinking reinforces the SEC's conviction that most social
responsibility disclosure is sought as a "weapon to control" corpo-
rate activity, 3 2 and not primarily to satisfy investors' needs.
Later commentators have given further grounding to the SEC's
conviction. For example, one commentator criticizes "the en-
trenched concept" of disclosure as relating merely to investors.
Rather, the proper view is that:
[D]isclosure is . . .society oriented. The efficient allocation of resources
is secondary to the ethical and moral aspects of disclosure. . . .The heart of
the problem is getting at the impact of corporate behavior on society, not only
as to its financial affairs . . .
322. See note 13 supra.
323. Knauss, note 13 supra; see also Knauss, supra note 253 at 43-44.
324. E.g., the authorities cited note 5 supra.
325. Knauss, supra note 253, at 43 (footnotes omitted); see also Knauss, supra note 13,
at 647 (footnotes omitted):
It is frequently stated that the large corporation has an obligation not only to its share-
holders, but also to its employees, its consumers, and the community in which it oper-
ates. The officers and directors of large corporations have been compared to public
officials . . . . [Any evaluation of . ..disclosure . ..must acknowledge that the
disclosures required. . . enable employees, consumers, and the general public to obtain
information and thus exercise pressure ....
326. Even Professor Cary's 1962 article dwells upon the operation of the "public consen-
sus" to restrain modem corporate management. Cary, supra note 13, at 417-18.
327. Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 578. Professor Schoenbaum also shares the idea of
disclosure "regulating corporations as major power centers of our society." Id.
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The opening paragraph of another recent article calling for social
responsibility disclosure goes farther:
The American corporation has emerged as one of the primary sources of
power in the society, with profound impact on the lives and fortunes of those
subject to its influence. It has become a major political and social, as well as
economic, institution inseparably inter-related with the fundamental prob-
lems in the society . . . .In brief, "private" has become "public. ' ' 3n
Such views only cloud the issue, if not inflame feelings already
sensitized by dealing with such a touchy subject.
Indeed, in the corporate law reform area generally, the most oft-
heard premise is that the modern, publicly held corporation is no
longer primarily an economic entity but has become something else
or something more-a public institution, a socioeconomic or social
entity, a major uncontrolled power center in society that must be
made accountable. 29 The corporation is a runaway trust with no
cestui qui of influence who can control the "trustee" or a quasi-
public institution: disclosure or other reforms are needed not to
fulfill the traditional goals but to tame or check the "runaway
beast," to reassert the lack of accountability separation of owner-
ship and control causes, or to force corporations to set and make
progress toward social as well as economic goals.
The steady chain of literature opining that the existing large
company is not an accurate reflection of what the model corporation
law envisions began in 1932 with Adolf Berle's and Gardiner Means'
The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle and Means
predicted the separation of ownership and control. That is, in a
large country, with a vast population and efficient capital markets,
public shareholders and their stock ownership would become so
diffused that seldom could or would public shareholders band to-
gether to exercise the control over the corporation their ownership
interest and voting power had given them. Instead, a small group
of investors, owning perhaps fifteen to twenty percent of the stock
and holding directorships and the principal corporate offices, would
be able to perpetuate themselves in control of the corporation, an-
328. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 1025.
329. A leading exponent of that view is John Galbraith:
The public view of the corporation ...holds that not only Lockheed and General
Dynamics but also AT&T, General Motors. . .and the other great corporations involve
a clear break from the economy and polity of the classical market. As they grow and
become more powerful, such firms acquire, increasingly, a public character. They be-
come public institutions.
Galbraith, On the Economic Image of Corporate Enterprise, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA
3, 5 (R. Nader-M. Green eds. 1973).
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swerable only to themselves. The check on management corporate
laws presumed to exist, shareholders' votes, no longer would be
effective. 30
After Berle and Means a succession of writers perceived other
forces rising up over time to supply the missing check on corporate
management. Each, however, later admitted the fallacy infecting
their analysis. For example, Galbraith saw organized labor and
other forces as a "countervailing power," reinstating some control
over management or as a group to which management would have
to account.3 ' He, however, later recanted, realizing that labor's
goals were often so similar to management's-increasing sales, pro-
duction, and so on-as to render labor nugatory as a countervailing
force .31
After the American discovery of the British takeover bid, or
tender offer, many saw forces in the market for shares as another
check on management that might substitute for the vanquished
notion of accountability to shareholders. If management's activities
did not win acceptance among shareowners, they sold and share
prices fell. Lower share prices posed the threat of market purchases
by insurgents who, upon obtaining enough voting power, deposed
management. Hence, most directors managed well for fear of the
market holding them accountable.3 That theory did not hold ei-
ther. In certain accommodating jurisdictions, courts permitted
poorly performing incumbent managements to use any number of
tactics to defeat threats to their control. To dilute insurgents' inter-
est and voting power, management could issue a large block of stock
to a friendly third party, or management could use corporate funds
to bribe would-be usurpers by purchasing their shares at a premium
over market price. 34 Next, federal tender offer legislation gave man-
agement more means with which to defeat a challenger's tender
330. To date, most writers have agreed with Berle and Mean's thesis. See, e.g., Eisen-
berg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1969); Hetherington, supra note 120; Manning, Book
Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958); Ratner, supra note 93.
331. See generally J. K. GALBRAITH, AMEmcAN CAPITALISM (1952).
332. See generally J. K. GALBRAITH, THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
333. The best statement of the theory is Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
334. The Delaware cases best illustrate courts' approval of such tactics. See Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (stock purchases); American Hardware
Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (stock issuance).
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offer. "" Thus another new model of corporate accountability faded
away. 3 36
Accompanying the realization that corporate managements
were no longer accountable to shareholders was a movement that
said if corporate accountability were to be reinstated, it should also
run to groups other than shareholders-employees, consumers, the
local community, and society. Instead of having a single goal of
profit maximization for shareholders, corporations should have in a
coequal position, along with profits for shareholders, the goals of
safety and welfare for employees, clean air and water for society,
and safety and utility for consumers.3 7 This viewpoint is reflected
in recent proposals for legislative reform that have followed recogni-
tion of the failure of gradually rising forces to reassert control over
corporate managements. These reformers do not want to reassert
legal control as of old, by returning it to shareholders. They want
legislative controls to take cognizance of and define corporate res-
ponsibilities to consumers, the community, and the society as a
whole. The federal government would be the representative of the
society to whom those responsibilities would flow. Federal charter-
ing of corporations, legislatively imposed public interest directo-
rates, and federal minimum corporate law standards are part of that
movement.
338
The SEC may misunderstand social responsibility disclosure to
be but one device competing with others to force government to take
cognizance of a new corporate model that would impose hydra-
headed rather than just shareowner-oriented responsibility upon
corporations and view them as quasi-social, quasi-public institu-
tions. Indeed, disclosure could do that, but, as has been seen, 3
unlike most other proposed reforms some social accounting and dis-
closure also can rest on traditional rationales for regulation by dis-
closure. Social accounting and disclosure also can rest on the tradi-
335. See generally Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman
Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231; Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers:
Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 431 (1968).
336. In a bit of overkill, certain states have passed legislation not only limiting the
tender offer's effectiveness but making it virtually impossible to depose incumbent manage-
ment via tender offer if the target company is domiciled in the state. See, e.g., NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 78.376-78.3778 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-528 to -531 (1973); Wysocki, To Stall Takeover Bids, Many Companies Use Obscure
New Statutes, Wall Street J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
337. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS at 229-49 (4th ed. 1969) summa-
rizes these developments.
338. See notes 397-435 infra and accompanying text.
339. E.g., notes 120-272 supra and accompanying text.
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tional model of the corporate entity as a primarily economic, private
entity with major responsibility to shareholders and to prospective
shareholders (investors).
The confusion of disclosure with other more radical reforms,
based as they are on new theories of the corporation, presents a
difficulty. The difficulty is that although as a reform measure dis-
closure is not radical, the Commission may believe that the premise
upon which the reform is based has vague and far-ranging implica-
tions. Those who first called for disclosure may have thus done a
disservice by failing clearly to think out the purposes such disclosure
would serve. Calls for disclosure, or for some other reform, based
upon some new view of the corporation have upstaged the evolution
of investor expectations that has made disclosure on traditional
grounds possible. Change in the fundamental policy upon which not
only regulation by disclosure, but also the traditional corporate
model, is based, to be replaced by a nebulous model of unknown
dimensions,34 is feared.
Widespread belief or possible governmental acceptance that
the large corporation is a public entity has possible ramifications
that would worry the SEC. Such a view might transform corpora-
tions' actions into state action to which the fourteenth amendment's
due process and equal protection clauses apply.341 Governmental
acceptance of the view that a corporation is a public entity, imple-
mented through disclosure premised upon such a view, could have
far-reaching antitrust law implications. Such a view might be found
to subsume a view that like stock ownership, competition no longer
exists as a check on the large corporation. Just as agencies could
340. All of the economists and theorists have discarded the old model but no two can
agree upon a new paradigm. See notes 176-81 supra and accompanying text. So the SEC view,
believing that social responsibility disclosure must be based on some new view of the corpo-
rate entity, if at all, is a view like that of Adolf Berle in For Whom Corporate Managers are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. Rxv. 1365, 1367 (1932):
You cannot abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations exist for the sole
purpose of making profits for their stockholders until such time as you are prepared to
offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.
341. Mr. Justice Douglas has articulated a view that the equal protection clause applies
to prevent invidious discrimination by private groups whenever the activity involved is gov-
ernmental or public in nature. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384 (1967) (concurring
opinion) (private group's action to rezone neighborhood to foster segregation violates equal
protection); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (privately owned park's "mass
recreation" function is "municipal in nature" and equal protection applies); Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1963); (concurring opinion) (restaurant's function is public
in nature). With the heretofore private entity, the corporation, being considered a public
entity, equal protection and due process might touch a broad spectrum of corporate affairs.
See generally Ratner, supra note 114, at 42-43.
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require disclosure on that basis, courts could exact antitrust reme-
dies to reassert control over the unchecked corporate entity. "4 '
Then, too, the SEC may have resisted disclosure on social re-
sponsibility issues because many of the voices calling for disclosure,
or for other proposed reforms, not only premised reform upon a new
view of the corporation, with much wider responsibility than tradi-
tional profit-making, 34 3 but they did so with radical, threatening,
and shrill voices. Many have taken a confrontation approach by
portraying their programs or reforms as efforts to "tame the corpo-
rate tiger."3" Painting all corporations as the protagonists behind
the society's doomsday has made the path to reform neither easy nor
clear.
Premising disclosure on a new view of the corporation with
hydra-headed but undefined responsibilities, and doing so with
shrill voices, makes any social responsibility disclosure the SEC
might require take on more the complexion of the stick than the
beguile of the carrot. Reformers would have the SEC implement
disclosure much like that other areas of the law contemplate, and
this may cause the Commission to bridle. For example, under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, labor
union officials must disclose information about the use of union
342. Galbraith, supra note 329, at 4-5 expouses such a view, as does Henning, supra
note 126, at 152.
343. One of the most shirill is M. MINZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC.: WHO OWNS AND
OPERATES THE UNITED STATES (1971), called a "one sided and distorted picture" by even one
of the more vocal, yet responsible corporate law reformers. See Blumberg, Book Review, 50
TEXAS L. REV. 598 (1972). Other shrill voices are M. TANZER, THE SICK SOCIETY (1971) and
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (R. Nader-M. Green eds. 1973). In surveying that literature,
Preston characterized these and similar works as expounding on the "exploitation thesis" of
the modern corporation, not through careful analysis, but through "popular and anecdotal
presentations." Preston, supra note 156, at 439.
344. N. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1970, at 44, col. 1 (statement of R. Nader christening the
launch of Campaign GM). See also Henning, Federal Chartering For Big Business: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 923-82 (1972) advocating federal chartering
with a perhaps eloquent but less than conciliatory tone:
[Tlhere are those who reject a fundamental structural approach [i.e., federal charter-
ingi to corporate reform. Some men who have held high office in business and govern-
ment believe the better alternative is to surrender society to the corporation ....
Others are equally prepared to surrender to . . .the conquering corporations but pru-
dently throw themselves upon their mercy, pleading for "corporate social responsibil-
ity." . .. [Tihey urge business managers to assume economic statesmanship, to bal-
ance the interests of all corporate constituencies and the general public . . . .These
supplicants ignore Lord Acton's rule concerning power in the hands of unaccountable,
self-perpetuating rulers. They also conveniently overlook the palpable evidence of corpo-
rate irresponsibility in our air, water and food, on our highways, railroads and television
sets, and in our sacked and gradually abandoned cities.
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funds. 4 ' Presumably, they must do so because union officers have
fiduciary duties and because unions have some appearance of quasi-
public institutions.3 14 Legislation requires such disclosure for rea-
sons similar to securities law disclosure requirements-to allow
union members to evaluate how well management is doing its job.
An added aim, however, is to force union officials to reveal illegal
conduct so that corrupt union officials may be prosecuted. On the
other hand, if corrupt union officials do not incriminate themselves,
the government will prosecute them for disclosure law violations.
Such a use of disclosure is known as "the enforcement effect." 347
Disclosure's enforcement effect is not unknown to the securities
law area,348 but most onlookers do not regard the enforcement effect
as a principal aim of the securities law disclosure system. Some of
the more vocal of those who seek social responsibility disclosure,
however, do so to import larger amounts of disclosure's enforcement
effect into securities regulation and into the social responsibility
area.3' Based upon information the SEC would require, government
agencies other than the SEC would prosecute firms for substantive
law violations SEC disclosure reveals, such as environmental law or
345. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). Union officials must make still other disclosures under the
Welfare and Pension Plans Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1970).
346. See, e.g., Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REV.
609 (1959).
347. Union officers must disclose both illegal conduct, such as payments and loans to
themselves, and conduct giving rise to perhaps only civil liability or political opprobrium. 29
U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1970). The discussion in Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1962), uses the first type of conduct and disclosure laws requiring public
reporting of the same as a use of disclosure to achieve an enforcement effect.
348. One recent application with which the SEC has been grappling is the forced revela-
tion of corporate campaign contributions and bribes to foreign officials, note 196 supra and
accompanying text. SEC-forced disclosure may ease the prosecutor's task in investigating
crimes under statutes making corporate political contributions or bribes illegal. Another
example might be the Securities Exchange of 1934's short swing profit provisions. Under the
threat of § 16(a) penalties, insiders must report their purchases and sales of their company's
securities. The revelation of purchases and sales, however, may give use to certain civil
liability under § 16(b) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. 78p (1964). Knauss
reviews other governmental uses of disclosure to aid in enforcement of substantive law mea-
sures such as a means of uncovering politicians' and governmental employees' conflicts of
interest, or as a means of forcing revelation of the imposition of usurious costs in borrowing
money. Knauss, supra note 13, at 648.
349. In mild form, Schoenbaum recommends use.of disclosure to achieve an enforce-
ment effect. That is, to
lelxpose those areas of corporate behavior which cannot be reformed internally, but
which must be dealt with through government action and legislation. . . . [T]here will
be matters which can be corrected only through direct action by government.
Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 588. Schwartz perhaps similarly seeks disclosure in the way of
"adding costs to the type conduct we wish to discourage" in order to "force managers to direct
business more in the service of our entire society." Schwartz, supra note 35, at 91.
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anti-discrimination statute violations. Other information that dis-
closure reveals would be the basis for legislative proposals to make
certain types of conduct illegal.
Another use to which some laws outside the securities area put
disclosure is the "publicity effect.""35 Certain corporate activists
would have the SEC use social responsibility disclosure in much the
same way.35' To produce a publicity effect, regulators with whom
persons or corporations file disclosures give wide dissemination to
those disclosures that reveal certain failures of persons to meet min-
imum performance standards. The purpose of this dissemination is
not to bring criminal or civil prosecutions, as with an enforcement
effect, but to generate adverse peer-group and public reaction and
to increase pressure on the exposed persons to reform themselves.
In the corporate social responsibility area, dissemination of
disclosed corporate irresponsibility would result in investor pressure
on the firm to make amends for laggard performances. Wider dis-
semination might produce pressure not only from investors, as pres-
ent SEC disclosure and dissemination might try to do in the finan-
cial area, but from consumers who would stop purchasing a com-
pany's products, from more responsible, peer-group corporate man-
agers who might hesitate to do business with notorious corporate
ne'r-do-wells, and by the popular press, who would fuel the fire.
The use of disclosure under the securities laws heretofore has
largely been designed to achieve what is termed "an information
effect." '352 An information effect does not require a new view of the
corporation as a socioeconomic institution with responsibilities to
many groups beyond shareholders, as do publicity or enforcement
effects. 13 Under disclosure whose primary purpose is to achieve an
350. See Note, supra note 347, at 1282-83.
351. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 35, at 96-98 illustrates a publicity effect as a principal,
if not the principal value of social responsibility disclosure.
The disclosure of unflattering information imposes a cost-the cost of embarass-
ment-which might turn into the cost of consumer retaliation. To avoid paying that cost,
companies would have to change the facts required to be disclosed ....
See also the quotation from Knauss, text accompanying note 325 supra.
352. Indeed, Note, supra note 347, at 1276-79 uses securities law disclosure require-
ments as a prime example of a legislative-regulatory use of disclosure to achieve an "informa-
tion effect."
353. Except perhaps on the part of investors themselves. Indeed, the gradual realization
by investors, especially institutional investors, and by corporate executives, economists, and
theorists, notes 170-81 supra and accompanying text, that a corporation's sole goal can no
longer be profit maximization, or profit maximization pure and simple, is one reason why
social responsibility information has come to have utility in the investment process. But
private realizations are one thing; abrupt governmental policy shifts, such as using a new
legal model of the corporate entity as the basis upon which to base disclosure, are another.
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information effect, companies file disclosures, including some social
responsibility disclosures, with the SEC. The SEC merely makes
such information available, primarily for investors' use in invest-
ment selection and management. Dissemination to other classes of
individuals, to prosecutors, to the public in general, or to the popu-
lar press is not the primary goal. Commercial, business, financial,
or social responsibility disclosures are required to achieve an infor-
mation effect alone-a passive regulatory function of disclosure to
be utilized by individuals, rather than groups, as each should
choose.
SEC-mandated social responsibility accounting and disclosure
necessarily will produce some enforcement effects and a bit of a
publicity effect, at least as respects some absolute scofflaws.
Nevertheless, congruence with the end for which the Commission
requires most of the currently enforced disclosure, that is, an infor-
mation effect, is the ground upon which requests for corporate social
responsibility disclosure should stand or fall. The Commission
should not and cannot deny requests for some social accounting and
disclosure merely because as a by-product such disclosure produces
a substantive-law enforcement action here and there or gives rise to
public or investor pressure for a corporation to put its social house
in order.
It is probably true that many corporations are no longer ac-
countable to shareholders. It may also be true that no sufficient
check has come into being to replace the missing constraint of ac-
countability to owners. Sudden SEC and corporate immersion into
that reality's cold waters, however, may delay or prevent any corpo-
rate reform; the transformation of the corporate model from eco-
nomic entity into something much more would raise more questions
than it would provide answers. Disclosure or any other reform mea-
sure specifically aimed at producing enforcement effects and con-
comitant publicity effects, or legislative or administrative denigra-
tion of the traditional accountability to shareholders, without a new
well defined legal model to replace the old, only delays reform and
obfuscates the issues.354 At most, if disclosure produces enforcement
and publicity effects and thereby induces more corporate social
354. In one respected chronicler's view, it is precisely why previous reform efforts,
whether for disclosure or of any other type, have failed. "The principal pressures for reform
. came from outside forces that are primarily concerned not with business itself, but with
social goals and values." Hetherington, supra note 120, at 292. At least as to one reform
measure, disclosure, viewed in the proper light, changing investor and shareholder attitudes
make that no longer true.
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awareness, those results should be viewed as incidental benefits,
only by-products of a traditional disclosure system. Both the SEC
and those who will press it for disclosure reform should bear those
considerations in mind in analyzing the social disclosure requests
that undoubtedly will appear before the Commission. Clear think-
ing about disclosure's purposes and whether or not the particular
disclosure requested will serve those purposes, not the motives of
those seeking the disclosure, should control both the Commission's
and reformers' thinking.
Social responsibility disclosures should be sought for the same
reasons securities regulation has sought disclosure in other areas:
utility in a still primarily economic investment process; prevention
or revelation of irresponsible or questionable acts and practices that
could cause market losses for investors; a parity of roughly compara-
ble information about different companies; a well-rounded presen-
tation of each particular company's affairs; and a rough equality of
access to an available reservoir of information for all investors, large
and small, concerned with social responsibility or not. On those
bases, securities regulation can require some social accounting and
disclosure now.
In the meanwhile, disclosure based on traditional rationales
nevertheless can cause concrete, reform movement toward that new
corporate model, for which academicians and theorists have been
clamoring for forty years. Social responsibility disclosure would
show how the modern corporation impinges on some elements of
society. Through whatever public and investor reactions this infor-
mation produces, disclosure might define the new model's norma-
tive corporate behavior. Disclosure would begin the evolution of a
clear and reasonably enforcible scheme of responsibilities to replace,
without immediately forsaking the old, shopworn, and much criti-
cized corporate law model.
VII. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FROM NONINVESTOR POINTS OF VIEW
A. Introduction
Utility in the investment process, equality of access to relevant
investment information, and similar end products are the benefits
investors would obtain from social accounting and disclosures. 5
355. The major cost social responsibility disclosure could impose upon an investor is
the chance that his or her investment would be misdirected. Unwittingly, emphasis on corpo-
rate social responsibility could bring returns lower than those desired by the investor. See,
for example, the finding by one sizeable institutional investor that investment in companies
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Incidental by-products of such disclosure would be benefits flowing
to society. Those by-products might include some adverse publicity
and group pressure on companies that disclosure reveals to be lag-
ging in progress toward limiting social costs to desired levels. Also
must be considered are the costs and benefits to the principal sec-
tors other than investors and society involved in a social responsibil-
ity disclosure program. Those sectors are the corporations them-
selves-who would be doing the social accounting and making dis-
closures-and government-which must first require the disclosures
and then police the system to insure that companies are providing
the information.
The intent of this section, then, is to provide a cost-benefit
analysis of social accounting and disclosure from the government's
and corporations' points of view. It will be seen that the benefits of
accounting and disclosure are many. Significant costs also are in-
volved. As will be seen, however, depending upon the precise way
the disclosure system embraces social responsibility, the costs for
industry and for government can be sidestepped or minimized in
such a way that the benefits to be gained will far outstrip the costs
to be incurred.
B. Benefits Social Accounting and Disclosure Might Bestow
(1) Uniformity, Comparability, and Resulting Benefits
Much as some may protest, investor demands and governmen-
tal action have stuck corporate managers with some public expecta-
tion of social responsibility. "' Corporate social accounting, coupled
engaged in an activity some think socially irresponsible brings a return three percent higher
than the remainder of the portfolio, supra note 19. Several factors, however, militate against
such a result. First, beginning social responsibility disclosures would be quite modest in
scope, with disclosure documents placing no undue emphasis thereon. See notes 450-59 infra
and accompanying text. The data provided by disclosure would be available only to be used
or not, as each investor individually decides. Second, most interested investors would adopt
a relative approach to social responsibility. See text accompanying notes 154-60 supra. Given
an industry, they would choose those companies whose securities provide roughly the same
desired risk and return. Thus only at the margin would social responsibility considerations
intervene in the investor's selection process. Thirdly, no comprehensive evidence exists to say
that socially responsible enterprises provide lesser returns; indeed, many believe that social
responsibility leads to increased long-run corporate profitability, notes 19 & 138 supra and
accompanying text.
356. An expectation "as real, and in a sense at least, as natural as an earthquake," in
the words of Henry Manne, text accompanying note 184 supra. Many business leaders view
social responsibility as a matter of survival. Corporations "will survive only if the public is
convinced that they are contributing more to the public good." Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity Panel: The Constituencies of the Corporation and the Role of the Institutional Investor,
28 Bus. LAW. 177, 208 (1973) (remarks of George D. Gibson) [hereinafter cited as Corporate
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with some required disclosure, will result in comparable social re-
sponsibility information being available about most large compa-
nies. In turn, available information about other companies, in the
comparable format required disclosure would produce, 7 will aid
corporate managements in defining what social responsibility
means for their company and in measuring how much of it is
enough. The benefit to corporations is that social disclosures will do
much to aid corporate executives who, up to now, have struggled
with the question of what constitutes "normative behavior. '38
Of course, profit maximization, the neoclassical economic
model explaining how corporate managers operate, is a theoretical
abstract. The observer cannot ascertain whether or not a company
is maximizing profits. 3 9 Instead, normal practice by corporate man-
agers is the same as that of investors."' Executives set a number of
comparable corporations' sales and earnings figures side by side
with those of their own company. By comparing the figures and by
comparing the year-to-year trends in their own company, managers
can shade toward an opinion as to what profit maximization may
resemble for their company or for their industry. As a goal, "social
responsibility" is similar. Required social responsibility disclosures
will better enable corporate managers to form an idea of what "so-
cial responsibility" is and to determine whether or not their own
firm is moving toward that end.
Social Responsibility Panel]. Other executives have become more attuned to social responsi-
bility because the radical demands social responsibility has in the past connotated have
softened into more realistic expectations held by larger segments of the populace. Executives,
also being members of the society, also have come to share values and expectations of social
responsibility. See notes 166-72 supra and accompanying text. But executives need a device
to aid them in defining what is social responsibility for their company and industry and to
help sort out "the confusing turbulence of demands and charges and concerns all marching
under the umbrella of 'social responsibility.'" See note 1 supra.
357. See, e.g., notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
358. Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of the SEC, supra note 128, at 227
(remarks of Bevis Longstreth).
359. Hetherington, supra note 120, at 257-58, and Schwartz, supra note 33, at 468-70,
the former having a slight bias against corporate involvement in "social responsibility" activi-
ties, and the latter favoring more social responsibility, nonetheless both agree that the present
construct, profit maximization, is not as definable as some think it to be. Indeed, both authors
agree that in actuality profit maximization cannot be pinpointed. For that reason, courts have
never adopted profit maximization as a goal the law imposes. Instead, the law judges corpo-
rate waste and other legal claims against the standard of whether or not an activity arguably
confers a "long term benefit" on the corporation. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App.
2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (minority shareholder action challenging baseball club policy
against night baseball struck down on the basis that management claim that the absence of
night baseball kept ballpark neighborhood stable, and thus conferred long-term benefit on
corporate image and treasury, was colorable).
360. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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(2) More Efficient Allocation of Corporate Resources Devoted to
Social Responsibility
One widespread criticism of corporate attempts at social re-
sponsibility programs is the questionable competence of corporate
management to undertake such activities. One observer postulates
a "serious question as to both the technical competence and social
legitimacy of any efforts by business executives to identify and take
account of the 'public interest.' "361 Another commentator questions
"the competence of management to make such determinations and
the effect of such activities on the ability of outside institutions,
such as the stock market, to evaluate managerial institutions. ' 36 2 A
further common criticism is that when corporate managers do order
or undertake social responsibility activities, they mysteriously fail
to impose upon such activities the accounting and other managerial
controls they would place upon any profit making venture.3 3 One
oft-cited anecdote is the extreme of complete corporate acquies-
cence in the company president's choice of altruistic goals. At the
other extreme is the power of any single director to veto a proposed
program. 34
Required SEC disclosure would force some corporate account-
ing on social responsibility issues. Although simple in form, the
accounting required might produce more sophisticated internal ac-
counting. Management might extend cost-benefit studies and other
forms of systems analysis to social responsibility as well as to pure
profit making. 35 One author has stated "[I]f business has any ex-
pertise, it is management and technology. Our current social crises
have moral, legal and political dimensions which only incidentally
(if at all) require business skills. 3 6 The contention here is to the
contrary-that what many attempts to solve social problems need
is more, not less, management and technical skill. Seldom found is
361. Preston, supra note 156, at 435.
362. Hetherington, supra note 120, at 286. One can question even more the ability of
outside institutions, such as the stock market, to evaluate managerial performance when data
is not available or when it is available on only a spotty basis, as is now the case.
363. See, e.g., Address by A. C. Neal, Toward the Efficient Pursuit of Happiness, Oct.
1, 1965, quoted in W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA'TONs 242 n.21.
364. The funny thing is that you can get all sorts of people that can spend a half
a million dollars, can keep seven fellows who earn twenty thousand a year on the payroll
... but if you want to give fifty bucks to some charity, it has to come to the head office.
Corporate Social Responsibility Panel, supra note 356, at 211 (remarks of Eli Goldston). See
also Bauer & Fenn, supra note 1, at 84, discussed note 43 supra.
365. As some social accountants and consulting firms want to accomplish completely
under the label "social accounting," notes 72-88 supra and accompanying text.
366. Henning, supra note 126, at 157.
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an activity of a governmental or large private institution that man-
agers do not submit to a cost-benefit analysis.3 7 Given normal man-
agement treatment and skills application, corporate social responsi-
bility might exceed in effectiveness any governmental program or
any endeavor social scientists alone could conduct. Even if social
problems have "moral, legal, and political dimensions which only
incidentally require business skills," for better or for worse corporate
managers are stuck with expectations of social responsibility. Cor-
porations will be engaged in social responsibility activities. Given
that reality, most managers should welcome as a benefit the effi-
ciency that disclosure-forced accounting would bring to the area.
Given a fixed amount of corporate resources devoted to social
responsibility progress, the amount of social responsibility produced
might increase. Moreover, as disclosure forces accounting systems
to evolve and produces a greater ability to determine if corporate
programs are succeeding, corporate managers might become even
more interested in social responsibility for its own sake, irrespective
of the public relations mileage to be gained.3 16 Business managers
seem more willing to engage in activities "where they have some
opportunity of influencing the outcome of a series of events by their
own actions and by knowing concretely what those actions have
accomplished. '" 39 Revelation of what other large corporations are
doing, another product of required disclosure, also may aid in pro-
ducing more social responsibility outputs. Disclosure of what others
are doing may give corporate managers ideas on how to improve
upon what other companies have done in achieving social responsi-
367. As pointed out in Abt, Social Audits-Why Do Them? (unpublished memorandum
1974). See also Address by Dr. Clark Abt, Social Audits for Federal Audits, Annual Seminar,
Boston Section of the Federal Gov't Accountants Ass'n, Apr. 30, 1974.
368. And to relieve investors, the public, and corporate executives from the public
relations drivel many of those executives' competitors attempt to make do as a substitute for
meaningful social responsibility efforts. See notes 380-84 infra and accompanying text.
369. D. MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SocIm 238 (1961). Hetherington elaborates:
Psychological studies show that business executives rate high in need achievement; that
is, they have a drive to do well and evaluate their performance in relation to a standard
of excellence. See generally D. MCCLELLAND . . . 259-300. . . .Further indications are
that business executives . . . work harder "when there is a chance that personal efforts
will make a difference in the outcome." Id. at 226. A business executive is oriented
toward "concrete feedback in how well he is doing ... " Id. at 233. Finally, the studies
suggest that money rewards (beyond certain levels. . .) do not have much influence on
the performance of high need achievers: "they are interested in achievement." Id. at 235.
Hetherington, supra note 120, at 266 n.71. Cf. Henry Manne's assumption that, given the
discretionary cash available in the large corporation, but for potential adverse publicity most
executives would use that cash to compensate themselves, note 187 supra.
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bility, or it may cause them to contemplate how they might do it
more efficiently.
Again, disclosure will force accounting. Accounting will force
application of traditional management tools to social responsibility.
Corporate social preference will no longer be "an afterthought, like
a quarter in a blind man's cup. ' 370 Gone also will be the blanket and
shotgun approaches to social responsibility that some companies
have adopted in response to the demands placed upon them. Man-
agers will select programs and priorities on the basis of the feedback
accounting and disclosure give them. No longer will companies tilt
at windmills. Social accounting and disclosure will cause corporate
social programs to be better considered, more efficient, and more
apt to achieve their goals. Indeed, they will be more apt to have
goals in the first place.
(3) Relief of Corporate Social Performances from Misguided
Attacks
Relief from misguided attacks on corporations' social prefer-
ences is a benefit some public social accounting seemingly would
bestow and a benefit many corporate managers would welcome.
Required social responsibility disclosures will reveal which corpora-
tions are, on a relative basis, the more responsible ones. Year-to-
year comparisons of a particular company's disclosure will also re-
veal whether or not a particular company is making progress. By the
same token, some required disclosure will, in part at least, reveal
which corporations are less concerned about or are expending little
effort on some responsibility issues. Many managements are socially
responsible and do considerable good.37' Some of those manage-
ments do disclose, others do not. One reason some responsible man-
agements do not disclose is that when their responsible brethren
have disclosed the good that they have accomplished or attempted,
many of those disclosing companies have become targets upon
which corporate gadflies and watchdog groups have focused. Not
knowing how little other companies are doing, critics have deni-
grated socially responsible companies' actions as paltry or of poor
370. Schwartz, Proxy Power and Social Goals: How Campaign GM Succeeded, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 764, 770 (1971), so characterizes many current corporate efforts.
371. Agreement on that point ranges from those who are skeptical of more corporate
social responsibility, e.g., Hetherington, supra note 120, at 286, to even idealistic student
scholarship strongly in favor of using governmental resources to bring about more social
responsibility from "unaccountable, irresponsible power centers," Note, 59 GEo. L.J., supra
note 257, at 118-20 & nn.6-15.
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quality.372 The phenomenon is not fair to those companies who do
disclose, only to become victims of misguided attacks. Fairly exact-
ing required disclosure, however, perhaps when buttressed by rules
against puffing or misrepresentation in such disclosure, could re-
lieve relatively good companies from the corporate critics' fire. A
correlative benefit of required disclosure may be that the fire it
generates will shed more light; that is, disclosure will enable activ-
ists and gadflies to aim their barbs at those companies or industries
that really need or deserve prodding.
Disclosure and the accounting data that leads to disclosure also
will enable corporate managers to more ably defend their compa-
nies' track records against both critics of "too little" and detractors
of "too much" social responsibility. To defend themselves, manag-
ers need a more overall picture of the social responsibility records
of their own company, their industry, and the entire corporate sec-
tor. For that reason alone, one well-known corporate manager
"heartily endorses" social accounting and disclosure for "both the
public and private sectors. 373
Preparation for required disclosure also may have the effect of
highlighting those social responsibility situations upon which the
company can easily mount an effective assault. Knowledge that one
will have to disclose what action has been taken or what one has
failed to do causes a certain amount of "putting one's house in
order" before the time arrives when management has to begin com-
piling final data for periodic disclosures. 374 The honest window
372. Eli Goldston, while president of Eastern Fuel and Gas Associates, Inc., for its
industry a socially responsible firm and one which had regularly been making disclosures,
made the point:
About three years ago some students at Harvard Law School blocked recruiting efforts
by a law firm which represents my company in many matters. The law firm had abso-
lutely nothing to do with the particular matter in controversy and, even more aggravat-
ing, my company was actually on the same side of the issue as the militant but carelessly
confused students . ...
A little earlier we had a problem at an old plant of ours in New Haven. Already sched-
uled for demolition in two years and with careful personnel planning targeted to this
date, the plant was cited as an air polluter and ordered to close at once. The union
showed city hall that the pollution for which their jobs were being threatened was about
one-quarter of that caused by the automobiles owned by Yale freshmen. After some
controversy the plant was permitted to operate until the scheduled demolition. No one
ever considered doing anything about the Yale automobiles.
Goldston, supra note 257, at 30. See also Henning, supra note 126, attacking those companies
that have been disclosed as being involved in nothing more than a "shell game."
373. Rockefeller, supra note 158, at 55-56.
374. This is the housekeeping and planning feature of disclosure, discussed note 272
supra and accompanying text. Cary observes that a good manager has "wisdom in being
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dressing that disclosure would bring about is thought to be justifia-
ble and, moreover, a benefit that required disclosure bestows in
financial and other areas. The same would be true for disclosure
requirements in the social responsibility area. Corporations would
avoid attacks for social irresponsibility in those areas where they
could easily be avoided.
In the above ways, then, social accounting and required disclo-
sure will lead to far fewer headaches for those many corporate man-
agers who do want to ascertain and then do the "right thing." Per-
haps perversely, another benefit disclosure may bring is that corpo-
rate critics' resources will be more efficiently allocated.
(4) Relief from Some Shareholder Proxy Proposals and the Waste
of Corporate and Governmental Resources They Entail
Concrete examples of misguided attacks on corporations and
the waste involved therein come from the public interest proxy pro-
posal area. The SEC recently has refined its shareholder proxy pro-
posal rule .3 5 The rule now permits incumbent management to ex-
clude from the proxy statement proposals involving "any matter,
including a general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or
similar cause, that is not significantly related to the business of the
issuer or is not within the control of the issuer. ' 36 By reverse impli-
cation, however, management must include in the proxy statement
and present at the annual meeting some shareholder proposals re-
lating to "general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or
similar" causes. The only required nexus is that the general matter
relate to the company's business or be within its control. The stan-
dard seemingly paves the way for a possible increase in the number
of shareholder proxy proposals submitted on a great variety of is-
sues.
In the past, many shareholder proposals called merely for dis-
closure about a company's action or nonaction in certain areas.
377
Perhaps because managements tend to view any shareholder pro-
posal as an attack on management's stewardship, they invariably
sensitive to, and anticipating, public reactions that may crystallize." As a regulatory force,
disclosure may be most valuable to management in leading it to such sensitivity and aware-
ness and to the ability to solve matters before they do become problems. Cary, supra note
13, at 408-09.
375. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9784 (Sept. 22, 1972), amending Rule 14a-8, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1972).
376. Rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1975).
377. See notes 122-28 supra and accompanying text.
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resist such proposals. Many corporations either try to exclude the
proposal from the proxy statement, and wage a fight at the SEC
level to do so, or lobby heavily to obtain an overwhelming vote
against a proposal once it has found its way into the proxy state-
ment. This can result in significant waste of corporate assets-in
legal fees, public relations costs, and lobbying efforts." 8 Other
shareholder proposals evoke management opposition on more spe-
cific grounds. Many proposals are poorly worded, are fishing expedi-
tions, or are just thrown at a variety of companies, regardless of their
relatively good or bad records.3 ' In these cases, too, corporations
and the government may needlessly expend resources in dealing
with shareholder proposals.
Required social responsibility disclosure could reduce the num-
ber-of shareholder proposals for disclosure by making available some
of the information shareholders typically seek. This would enable
other shareholder proposals to be better reasoned and more specific.
Then, hopefully, many managements' categorical opposition to
public interest proxy proposals might diminish. As a result, corpora-
tions might expend fewer resources defending against shareholder
proposals and sometimes simply volunteer to undertake disclosure
or other actions shareholders seek. Likewise, those shareholder pro-
posals that remain for consideration at annual meetings might be
better considered in that they will be properly aimed toward those
companies where questioning or reform is needed. Thus, in the
shareholder proxy proposal area, some required accounting and dis-
closure might well lead to more efficient use of both SEC and corpo-
rate resources, including the resource of management capacity for
378. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 47-48 explains why the process is often costly:
Management could probably defeat any proposal for social action merely by arguing that
it would be bad for business. But it does not do so. . . . [I]t will not do so . . . since
what is said to the shareholders will also be overheard by nonshareholders. Therefore,
management must justify its opposition to the proposal in public interest terms lest the
nonshareholder public react adversely to the corporation.
379. The Ethical Investor views some of the activity as part of "an endless stream of
mindless or frivolous or harassing complaints, moved more by narcissism than social con-
cern." THE ETHICAL INVESTOR, supra note 1, at 59. One mutual fund officer, charged with
voting his fund's shares finds that:
Most of the public questions . . . that I have seen on proxy statements displayed an
amazing lack of knowledge concerning the company, the management's . . . effort to
be a good citizen and the characteristics of the industry. It seems to me that companies
that have tried very hard to do the right thing are often more subject to pressure and
are more likely to have public interest proxy questions . . than some companies that
have clearly neglected their social responsibility.
LONGSTRETH & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 1, at 70.
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mental and emotional strain that public interest proxy proposals
sometimes cause.
(5) Relief from Public Relations Drivel Now Substituting for
Controlled Disclosures
Public utilities spend so much on image advertising that "one
might think they were in the business of wilderness preservation."
The classic abuse of social responsibility advertising was recently perpe-
trated by [a major forest products company]. Its ad depicted an idyllic river
scene with the caption "It cost us a bundle, but the Clearwater River still runs
clear." Indeed, it does, where the photo was taken, upstream of [the com-
pany's] pulp plant2. °
There is much truth in the view that "many companies limit their
concern to press releases, empty speeches, or less."' 38 And the cost
is staggering. Advertising sources estimate that billings for company
image advertising, as opposed to product advertising, run between
$500 million and $1 billion annually. One oil company alone spends
$10 million a year for a multi-media image advertising blitz.82
Social accounting and disclosure will not stop image advertis-
ing altogether. Indeed, freedom of speech considerations proscribe
that.3 ' Yet, if all companies' track records are a matter of public
record, companies might feel less constrained to state or overstate
their cases in advertising. Disclosure might slow or stem the tide of
wasteful and self-serving advertising. Even if social responsibility
disclosures do not slow the volume of image advertising, disclosure
might stop the extreme puffing and outright misrepresentations
many advertisements contain. Disclosure would produce accurate
records against which interested parties might compare media-
based social responsibility claims. The corporate embarassment
caused by the revelation of the truth, as required disclosures reveal
it to be, would reduce the exaggeration and outright fabrication
found in today's image advertising.
384
380. Henning, supra note 126, at 154.
381. Wall Street J., Apr. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1 (statement of Whitney Young, Executive
Director, Urban League).
382. Wall Street J., May 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
383. See the Federal Trade Commission's refusal of six congressmen's petition that the
agency require major oil companies to substantiate image advertising claims, principally on
first amendment grounds. BNA ANTITRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 712, at A-3 to -5 (May 6,
1975).
384. SEC-promulgated disclosure rules might include a rule that all social responsibil-
ity data be accompanied by a statement of any assumptions the company has made and
reflected in the company's disclosures, along with a strongly worded proviso against exaggera-
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Few corporate executives would disagree with the proposition
that some image advertising is economically wasteful. Other execu-
tives might join in labeling some image advertising as bordering on
the dishonest. Still other executives would agree that dishonest ad-
vertising places at a disadvantage those companies who regularly
and accurately disclose. Required social responsibility disclosures
could materially aid in reducing both the economic waste and the
shading of truth that much company advertising involves.
(6) Social Accounting and Disclosure as the Most Efficient Use of
Governmental Resources
With each year the litany of reforms proposed to induce corpo-
rate accountability grows longer. Proposals range from tinkering
reforms, such as the installation of public interest directors on major
companies' boards of directors, to pervasive reforms, such as com-
plete federal regulation for larger corporations or nationalization of
key industries. Social accounting and disclosure are near the middle
of that spectrum. Furthermore, accounting and disclosure may have
the most promise-of all the proposed reforms they seem the most
politically feasible and economically sound. Because disclosure
would utilize an existing agency-the SEC-an existing reporting
system under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and a function-
ing dissemination network through which present financial disclo-
sures are digested, 35 disclosure seems destined to provide the most
social responsibility and traditional returns for the regulatory dol-
lars spent. Even the most persistent critics of federal agencies award
good marks to the SEC, which would administer the disclosure sys-
tem."'5 Relatively speaking, the SEC is one of the smallest federal
tion or omission of material facts. From the beginning the Commission's various proposed
rules on sales and profit projections have contained such rules. See, e.g., SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973). Also, the traditional antifraud rules applicable to disclosures
companies file with the Commission would strengthen social responsibility disclosure require-
ments' quest for accuracy.
385. No one has ever posited that all interested investors do or should peruse disclosure
documents that companies file with the SEC. Rather, brokerage house research departments,
investment advisors, authors of market letters, and the like read those.documents, cull out
pertinent information, and along with other information, use the information as the basis for
investment monitoring and recommendations. Through this established filtration system,
"[ilnformation communicated to and absorbed by professionals filters out to and benefits a
wider public." WHEAT REPORT, supra note 112, at 10.
386. See Lazarus, in Halfway up From Liberalism: Regulation and Corporate Power,
in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 215, 216-24 (R. Nader-M. Green eds. 1973), rates the SEC
as the most effective of the eleven principal agencies the New Deal has spawned.
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agencies,3 ' but it is a very efficient agency.
On the other hand, both pervasive and tinkering reforms are
demonstrably inefficient. Many pervasive corporate reforms that
have been proposed probably would result in yet another new and
untried bureaucracy. These reforms include a radical and abrupt
restructuring of the way in which major corporations operate, which
would entail losses in the private sector. Further, the amount of
social responsiveness or traditional accountability to shareholders
and investors such reforms would produce for each tax dollar in-
vested is problematical. By contrast, the tinkering reforms involve
very little in the way of governmental expenditure. The costs might
be even less than those under a social accounting and disclosure
proposal, for under the latter the SEC would have to hire some new
personnel and develop expertise in relatively uncharted waters. The
tinkering reforms' inefficiencies arise because, for any amount of
money and human resources the government expends in imple-
menting them, most commentators now agree that the social re-
sponsibility or other return would be nil. Thus, if one examines each
corporate law reform proposal, whether it calls for pervasive or tink-
ering reform, it becomes evident that social accounting and disclo-
sure involve the most efficient use of both governmental and corpo-
rate resources.
(a) Federal Chartering
Ralph Nader and the Corporate Accountability Research
Group are the principal architects of the federal chartering move-
ment." - The reform measure they propose would dictate that corpo-
rations above a certain size, as measured by assets, sales, employees
and similar indicia, would have to drop their state charters. These
large corporations would then reincorporate under a federal statute.
Under the federal scheme, the corporations would become subject
to more stringent antitrust and anticoncentration rules. Federally
chartered corporations would have to make much more pervasive
financial and social responsibility disclosures than those the law
and the SEC now require. Federal law would reverse the liberalizing
387. SEC manpower is about the same as in 1940, when the SEC staff numbered 1,670.
6 SEC Ann. Rep. 189 (1940). At the end of fiscal 1973, SEC personnel totaled 1,556. 39 SEC
Ann. Rep. 134 (1974).
388. See generally Henning, supra note 344; R. Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering,
in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67 (R. Nader-M. Green eds. 1973); D. Schwartz, Federal
Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering
of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89 (1972).
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trend in state corporate law by beefing up the standard of care and
the duty of loyalty corporate managers owe the company. The fed-
eral statute would further reverse state-law permissiveness through
increased shareholder rights of inspection for corporate books and
records, expanded shareholder access to the proxy machinery, the
outlawing of staggered boards of directors, and a requirement for
mandatory cumulative voting." 9
A new regulatory unit, the Federal Chartering Agency, would
administer the scheme. The agency's sway over regulated corpora-
tions would be greater than that of many agencies, for much like
broadcasters, federally chartered corporations periodically would
have to apply for renewal of their charters. The Federal Chartering
Agency would have the power to condition charter renewals upon
compliance with federal laws in any area, upon spin-off of a subsidi-
ary or division if the company has grown too large, and upon other
conditions when similar corporate failures to meet established stan-
dards have occurred.3 90
Proponents of federal chartering go to some lengths to demon-
strate that it is politically feasible and that it involves efficient,
limited use of governmental resources. As to political feasibility,
they point to some twenty-five occasions in this century when legis-
lators have introduced bills to create a federal incorporation scheme
for large industrial companies 9.39 Based on that historical fact, fed-
eral chartering is "[a]n idea whose time has come and come and
come. Our present economic and social ills-in the midst of corpo-
rate abuses and unbridled power-make it topic again.1 39 Just as
plausible an explanation, however, is that federal chartering's past
failures indicate that politically it is a bankrupt idea. In fact, federal
chartering had its greatest support in the Theodore Roosevelt and
Taft administrations. Thereafter, federal chartering has gathered
less support each time it has been proposed. 93 Perhaps federal
389. Nader, supra note 388, at 86-87.
390. Id. at 80-82; Henning, supra note 344, at 922.
391. Twenty bills for federal chartering were introduced between 1903 and 1914. The
pace slowed to eight bills over the 1915-32 time span. Apparently, the last attempt at federal
chartering was the 1938 O'Mahoney-Borah bill. Nader, supra note 388, at 76-77. See also
Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA.
L. REv. 91, 106-07 (1942).
392. Nader, supra note 388, at 78.
393. The periodicity with which bills have been introduced, note 391 supra, supports
that conclusion. Lazarus observes that "Federal chartering received its most sustained and
serious political attention during the Republican Administrations" shortly after 1900. "[Ilt
was then the pet project of Wall Street forces who believed that it would cement a cooperative
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chartering represents a broad-based governmental incursion into
the private sector so far beyond what the country has ever experi-
enced that solons fear that not only public apathy but public antip-
athy would greet its implementation. "4
On the efficiency side supporters of federal chartering go to
great lengths to assure inquirers that chartering portends only a
slight bureaucratic extension to an otherwise overgrown federal gov-
ernment:
The bureaucracy created [the Federal Chartering Agency] would be as
trim and nondiscretionary as possible. Only the top one thousand interstate
corporations . . . would be chartered .... The kind of charter provisions
being enforced would be as objective as possible.3 5
Aside from the impossibility of predicting how trim the bu-
reaucracy created will be or will remain, one learns that even before
adoption, some of its proponents are expanding federal chartering's
reach. Beyond a certain number of the largest corporations, it be-
comes necessary to require "a national franchise"
foif a smaller corporation if it wishes to do a significant amount of busi-
ness with the federal government, to operate ... facilities in foreign countries,
or to engage in certain industries where there is an existing, overriding federal
interest, such as energy or interstate transportation.3 6
Federal chartering would thus bring into being not only a new,
untried federal agency, but one that undoubtedly will be hungry to
extend the application of the new concepts it administers. The new
agency would be likely to surpass quickly in size the present SEC,
if not larger federal agencies.39 Of necessity, a Federal Chartering
relationship between the federal government and big business." Lazarus, supra note 386, at
227-28.
The only other near achievement of something akin to federal chartering was the Na-
tional Recovery Administration (NRA). Much of the impetus for the NRA also came from
business, not from reform interests. For a description of the NRA, of course, Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), is quite good.
394. Nevertheless, an Ohio Congressman has announced an intention to introduce a
Corporate Citizenship and Competition Act for federal chartering of the nation's 100 largest
companies. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 298, A-15, at A-17 (April 16, 1975). See also
Bleiberg, Whither the Corporation, BARRONS, July 7, 1975, at 8-9.
395. Nader, supra note 388, at 83.
396. Henning, supra note 344, at 922.
397. In both the legislative and executive branches of government, a persistent failure
to make inroads in solving problems, despite continuing budgetary deficits, seems to be
leading to bipartisan awareness that the New Deal is dead. A new federal agency cannot come
into existence each time a new social problem is perceived to exist. See, e.g., Miller, The
Uneasy Liberals, Wall Street J., Aug. 6, 1975, at 8, cols. 3-5. Hence, federal chartering may
not be politically feasible merely because federal chartering requires a new agency.
Moreover, in the movements to not only refrain from creation of new bureaucracies but
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Agency would have an activist role. It would need a large staff to
make complex determinations about how corporations and their
charters should be restructured upon initial incorporation and to
make controversial decisions on charter renewals.
Social accounting and disclosure would utilize the proven con-
cept of required disclosure and an existing, effective agency that is
not out to prove itself. By and large a passive regulatory device,
disclosure would necessitate only supplementing those personnel
who receive and screen documents now filed with the SEC and those
who bring enforcement actions. In all, with a promise of efficiently
producing some furthering of the SEC's traditional goals of investor
guidance and protection, social accounting and disclosure seem a
good and modest use of federal power, funds, and bureaucracy.
Accounting and disclosure, therefore, seem to be a measure the
government should try before launching federal chartering and the
vast new bureaucracy and far-reaching power that scheme entails.
(b) Federal Corporate Uniformity Statutes
The reform most often juxtaposed to federal chartering is mini-
mum legal standards for large corporations. Indeed, minimum stan-
dards and federal chartering dominate most of the ever-growing
discussion of corporate law reform. 398 Federal minimum standards
is a relatively new proposal in the reform area-the idea springs
from a 1974 article by Professor William Cary.3 11 Because federal
chartering has so many times failed to pass Congress and because
it has "no public appeal," Professor Cary rejects federal chartering
to cut present government's size, agencies that have an activist role, like that proponents
contemplate for the Federal Chartering Agency, are increasingly under attack. See, e.g.,
Lazarus, supra note 386, at 232:
[There seems to be two kinds of regulatory institutions . . . : those with defensive or
policing tasks . . . and those with "offensive" or managerial responsibilities ....
Agencies in the latter category represent far more ambitious undertakings. Their task
[not unlike that of a Federal Chartering Agency] is to structure all or part of an
industry's operations and thereafter direct the industry's course in the public interest.
In contrast, policing agencies [like the SEC in a social disclosure program] are designed
not to pre-empt the free market but to enable consumers to make better use of its
processes by thwarting anticompetitive or deceptive . . . practices . . . In general,
experience seems to teach that regulation of the "offensive" or managerial genre should
never be instituted . ...
398. Indeed, those were the only two alternatives discussed when the American Bar
Association's Federal Regulation of Securities Committee hosted a recent symposium. BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 307, at A-1 (June 18, 1975).
399. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
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as "politically unrealistic."4" Instead, he proposes a Federal Corpo-
rate Uniformity Act. The minimum standards contained in such an
act would aim at reversing state laws' "race for the bottom." The
standards would not pretend to break new ground, to induce social
responsibility, or to satisfy investors' needs or wants. Rather the
motive is to reinstate the traditional corporate law model of ac-
countability to shareholders.40' To that end, a new federal statute
would impose upon corporations of a certain size or larger:
(1) fiduciary standards with respect to directors and officers. .. ; (2) an
"interested directors" provision prescribing fairness a a prerequisite to any
transaction; (3) a requirement of certain uniform [charter] provisions . . . for
example, authority to amend by-laws, initiate corporate action, or draw up the
agenda of shareholders' meetings shall not be vested exclusively in manage-
ment; (4) a more frequent requirement of shareholder approval of corporate
transactions. . . ; (5) abolition of nonvoting shares; (6) the scope of indemnifi-
cation of directors specifically prescribed . .. ; (7) adoption of a long arm
provision comparable to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. ... 402
Like federal chartering, the federal minimum standards pro-
posal tries to anticipate criticism that such standards will expand
the federal bureaucracy. For that reason, the "participation of a
government agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion is not contemplated.""4 3 The proposal does raise a kindred prob-
lem involving government expenditure, however, namely that per-
haps "the proposed amendments would flood the federal judiciary
with litigation."'04 Certainly, the Uniformity Act would represent a
vast new extension of federal power. For corporations of any size the
federal standards would displace lax state laws. The new act would
apply:
[t]o corporations having more than $1 million of assets and 300 share-
holders . . . .To prevent disparity in the law, however, it might be preferable
to make such an act apply to all public companies engaged in or affecting
400. Id. at 700. Professor Cary adds that "American business would unanimously reject
such a convenient vehicle of government control . . . ." Id. (footnote omitted).
401. And "to escape from the present predicament in which a pygmy [Delaware]
among the 50 states prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy
as an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders . . . ... Id. at 701.
402. Id. at 702.
403. Id. at 701.
404. Id. at 704. For that reason, Professor Cary suggests state court jurisdiction "with
some form of certiorari jurisdiction on the part of the [federal] courts of appeal." Id. at 705.
Abruptly usurped of their traditional role in regulating intra-corporate affairs, one wonders
how sympathetic state courts might be to Federal Uniformity Act claims; one also can ques-
tion how sympathetic federal courts would be to any significant expansion of their jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps Co. v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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interstate commerce. A line might be drawn arbitrarily . at $250,000 of
assets and 50 shareholders . . .
With such a scope, organic federal corporate law would reach into
the offices and plants of many surprisingly small companies. Given
the notorious laxity and lack of formality with which most small
corporations operate, a flood of Uniformity Act litigation surely
would be forthcoming.
On a theoretical level, federal minimum standards would repre-
sent a reversion to the old corporate model, an anachronism. With-
out more, minimum standards represent a return to accountability
to shareholders and, perhaps, profit maximization as the corporate
goal. A federal uniformity act is not an attempt to develop gradually
a model encompassing accountability to shareholders and other
constituencies or a search for a formula that includes some quantum
of social problem-solving along with long-run profitability."' There-
fore, disclosure seems better suited to answer the basic questions of
"where to go" and "how to get there," for social accounting and
disclosure seem to shade in forward-looking directions without com-
plete abandonment of the old corporate model before a new para-
digm evolves.
(c) Installation of Public Interest Directors
Many persons have viewed mandatory installation of directors
who are responsible to the public rather than to fellow board mem-
bers or to shareholders as the way to reform corporate laws and to
induce more corporate social awareness." 7 Variations suggest the
use of well-known public figures or of trained full-time professionals
as the public interest directors, of independent directors' staffs to
supplement the directors' own efforts, or of two-tiered boards of
directors with one tier representing groups other than sharehold-
ers.4 8 By now, however, most commentators have abandoned hope
405. Cary, supra note 399, at 701-02.
406. Professor Cary does recognize that ideally "We might go even further and ask what
representation the modem constituencies of the corporation-employees, consumers, and the
public, as well as shareholders-should have on the governance of the corporation." Id. at
701. As an empirical study, of course, social accounting and required disclosure would be a
first step in that direction.
407. Mr. Justice Douglas advocates full time professionals to serve as public directors.
W. DOUGLAs, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 52-53 (1940).
408. See, e.g., Long, The Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, inTnE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 202 (E. Mason ed. 1960) (in addition to the board of direc-
tors, a company is required to have locally selected boards in each community where the
company has extensive operations); Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspec-
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for this device as a means of achieving reform, at least when its use
is suggested without accompanying structural reforms." 9 This aban-
donment has been on efficiency grounds. The inefficiency does not
lie in use of governmental resources; the device contemplates nei-
ther a federal agency nor expanded federal jurisdiction. Rather, the
inefficiency lies in the belief, based upon some experience with the
idea, that public interest directors do not achieve enough even to
expend the resources required to have them installed.
Significantly, a principal difficulty with public interest direc-
tors has been the impossibility of their obtaining from companies
the information the directors feel they need to represent the pub-
lic. 10 Too little traditional corporate disclosure, much less social
accounting and disclosure, is made to outside directors to enable
them confidently to go about their tasks. The same paucity of infor-
mation, perhaps in exaggerated form, surely would greet one who is
not only an outside director, but an outside director who represents
the public rather than shareholder or corporate interests. Even if
they could obtain needed information, public interest directors
would vary widely in their effectiveness. Each such director might
have his or her own notion of where the public interest lies, resulting
in efforts that cancel each other out or are splintered and frag-
mented. For these and many other reasons, 41 1 proposals for public
tives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 50-53 (1966) (German two-tiered boards have
not worked well; the supervisory board chosen by shareholders and labor under co-
determination rules often "rubberstamps management decisions."); Goldberg Resigns from
TWA, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1972, at 47 (Mr. Justice Goldberg recommends independent staffs
for outside directors and liberal access to corporate information for those staffs).
409. Schwartz examines public interest directors' use on the Union Pacific Railway
(1862) and in the Communications Satellite Corporation (1962). His unequivocal conclusion:
such directors "cannot effectively protect the public interest. . . ." H. Schwartz, supra note
4, at 363. Interestingly enough, one of the roles government intended a Union Pacific or
Commsat director to play was as a surrogate for disclosure. Public interest directors were to
serve as "two way windows" for the President and for federal agencies, keeping them informed
of the corporation's activities. Id. at 354. The Union Pacific and Commsat directors failed in
that as well as in their other roles.
410. The Union Pacific directors complained that they were given little information and
that they were treated as "spies and antagonists, and were kept in the dark about many
things." Id. at 422. More recently, a mere outside and not public interest director made a
similar complaint. Goldberg Resigns from TWA, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1972, at 427. On the
inability of outside directors to obtain information or to function generally, see M. MACE,
DIRECTORS: MYrH AND REALITY (1971). But see Calame, Gulf Officer's Ouster Was Boldly
Engineered by Mellon Interests, Wall Street J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
411. Under any scheme, the number of public interest directors would probably still be
a minority on the board of directors. The simple human phenomenon, that such directors
would soon discontinue representing the public interest and overidentify with the company
on whose board they serve, also would often intervene to lessen their effectiveness. See, e.g.,
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interest directorships no longer seem to surface very often.
By comparison, social accounting and disclosure seem much
sounder reform devices. Unlike public interest directorships, ac-
counting and disclosure do not call for strangers to be thrust into
corporate officers' midst."2 Whatever results accounting achieves
will be uniform to a point, as each company will have to disclose
roughly the same amount of information in comparable format.
That information will be taken up and utilized through a reporting
system that has already become a central part of corporate regula-
tion. In any case, past history shows that, at a minimum, some
forced intra-firm social accounting and disclosure are prerequisites
to even a limited chance of success for public interest directorships.
(d) A Liberalized Shareholder Proxy Proposal Rule
The spate of shareholder social responsibility proxy proposals
in the early 1970's has produced suggestions to liberalize the proxy
proposal rules as a means of achieving corporate social responsive-
ness.1 3 Liberalization would begin with a more restrictive definition
of what activity constitutes a solicitation and thereby triggers the
proxy rules' applicability."4 Both incumbent management and pro-
ponents of public interest measures would thus be able to speak to
the issues without first being required to file a proxy statement or
other participants' materials.41 5 Supporters of resolutions would be
allowed to have longer supporting statements printed in manage-
ment's proxy statement, and some grounds upon which manage-
ment can now rely to exclude shareholder proposals would be elimi-
nated.4"'
Conard, supra note 4, at 207; Henning, supra note 126, at 167 (one of 23 directors on the $20
billion dollar General Motors board, which meets only twelve times a year, cannot be effec-
tive); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 354-56 (3 of 15 at Commsat) & at 358-61 (5 of 25 on the
Union Pacific).
412. Despite the public interest director device's demonstrated benign nature and de-
spite the threats of one or the other more drastic reforms being thrust upon them soon (see,
e.g., the sentiment for federal chartering growing in some quarters, supra note 394), corporate
executives demonstrate "little interest in opening the board to constituency representatives."
Burgen, The Scenario for Tomorrow's Executive, Bus. WEEK, May 4, 1974, at 85, 86. There
is a feeling that it is worth some cost to keep the corporate inner circle unbroken.
413. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 523 passim.
414. Id. at 524. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1969), the controlling
decision, includes activity, however slight, within the term solicitation. In Studebaker,
merely requesting other shareholders to join in seeking a shareholder list was held a solicita-
tion.
415. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 524-26.
416. Id. at 523-24.
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To be sure, the shareholder proxy proposal should continue as
a valuable forum for management-shareholder exchange, but liber-
alization of the public interest proposal rules and reliance upon
them to induce more corporate social responsibility is another mat-
ter. Public interest proposals often are poorly worded. Activists in-
discriminately fire them at many companies with both good and
bad records on the issue involved. Government resources go into
policing the proxy proposal rules. More time and money go into
corporate efforts to deal with them.41 7 Moreover, since many such
proposals simply seek information, primary reliance on shareholder
proposals as a means to force disclosure, or as a means to induce
social responsibility generally, is inefficient because it forces share-
holders and investors to do in an indirect and costly fashion what
they should be able to do directly, through simple disclosure.
(e) One-Person-One-Vote Restructuring
The one-person-one-vote concept involves graduation of voting
rights so that with each marginal share purchased the investor ob-
tains less voting power.41 8 The proposal never reaches complete egal-
itarianism; rather it merely shades toward one-shareholder-one-
vote, as opposed to one-share-one-vote (the present system). The
proposal's rationale is to restore shareholders with widely scattered
and smaller shareholdings to the role they would enjoyed before the
separation of ownership and control. Management could no longer
dominate with fifteen to twenty percent of the vote because the
widely scattered small holdings would, on a relative basis, have
more power.4"9
This proposal would require few governmental resources. Liti-
gation probably would not increase, and no new agency, much less
new bureaucracy, would be necessary. Despite those advantages,
however, since a respected author first made the suggestion, the
proposal has received virtually no play in the literature. Like federal
minimum standards, the difficulty may be that, standing alone, the
one-person-one-vote device is geared only to a return to the old
corporate model, accountability to shareholders. Serious reform ef-
forts have moved beyond that, seeking to evolve a new, nonradical
417. See notes 377-79 supra and accompanying text.
418. Ratner, supra note 114. Professor Ratner points out that several civil law countries
have such a pattern or model.
419. See the discussion of Berle and Means' thesis of the separation of ownership and
control, text accompanying note 330 supra.
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corporate model that provides a well-defined role for groups other
than shareholders and a corporate goal other than pure profit max-
imization.
(f) Nationalization
As a drastic remedy for the perceived dearth of social accounta-
bility, nationalization still raises its head. Admitting first the failure
to take hold of countervailing power and then of an enlightened
technostructure, Professor John Galbraith's latest prescription com-
bines with other measures the nationalization of key economic sec-
tors.42 With due respect to Mr. Galbraith, experience shows that
nationalization is the most inefficient corporate reform of all. The
British nationalizations demonstrate that society's benefit from the
resources available drops precipitously under nationalization. Ob-
servers swear that managers of nationalized industries pay more
attention to financial results than do managers in privately owned
firms.2 1 Moreover, from governmental efficiency viewpoints, na-
tionalization represents an increase in red tape and bureaucracy of
infinite proportions. Even to Galbraith, this latter point is a stum-
bling block for his proposals.4 22
(7) Accounting and Disclosure as the Most Politically
Feasible of Reforms
Simply because accounting and reform are the "lesser of evils,"
corporate managers might object less to them than to other pro-
posed reforms. Disclosure represents a reporting out, rather than the
more tangible incursion of governmental presence into executive
offices and boardrooms that federal chartering or other reforms rep-
resent. Additionally, among academicians and reformers, disclosure
is a common denominator. Every proposal for corporate law reform,
no matter how disparate, contains a proposal for corporate social
responsibility disclosure as an integral part of the reform. That is
true for one-shareholder-one-vote proposals, for expanded use of
shareholder proxy proposals, and for federal chartering proposals.4 23
420. J. K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973). One other current call for
nationalization is Shepherd, Public Enterprise, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 235 (R.
Nader-M. Green eds. 1973).
421. Crossman, Socialism and the New Despotism, Fabian Tract No. 208, at 5-6 (Feb.
1956).
422. Nossiter, supra note 178, at 10.
423. Ratner, supra note 114, at 18-19 (one-shareholder-one-vote plus disclosure);
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 94 (liberalized public interest proxy proposal plus disclosure);
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Although all reformers strongly advocate disclosure, they do so
only in passing. None give consideration to methodology-for exam-
ple, social auditing-nor do they examine what disclosure's pur-
poses are or can be and what disclosure can accomplish in reaching
sometimes conflicting goals.41 4 Perhaps if these critics of the modem
corporation did examine disclosure more closely, and regarded it as
the reform instead of as ancillary to some other reform measure,
they might argue for disclosure as a first reform, a moderate reform,
and the most attainable reform on the horizon.
(8) Disclosure as a Means of Forcing Social
Accounting's Development
Another benefit required disclosure would produce is to regular-
ize and speed social accounting's heretofore fit-and-start develop-
ment. Under required disclosure, companies would have to conjure
up methods to determine the impact the firm's activities have in
certain areas.4 25 The imposition of a disclosure doomsday date would
foster more intense discussion and rapid development of accounting
tools. 4 2' An interchange of ideas between companies, accountants,
and academicians would take place. Once disclosures began to flow,
firms could see how other firms go about the social accounting task.
Nader, supra note 388, at 86 and Henning, supra note 344, at 915 (federal chartering includes
added disclosure). Even a skeptic of all New Deal reform, Lazarus finds worth in disclosure:
Information access. . can be useful. . . . The SEC and the securities laws. . . show
that . . . disclosure can transform the climate in which an industry operates-if there
is an active constituency (in this case securities firms, lawyers, and investors) ....
Lazarus, supra note 398, at 225-26. Even Shepherd, supra note 420, at 245-46, as a believer
in nationalization, calls for social responsibility disclosure as the "first legislative priority."
424. Conflicting goals include those such as utility to investors, protection against loss,
and equality of access to information, text accompanying notes 120-272 supra, versus enforce-
ment and publicity effects, supra text accompanying notes 345-51. For instance, Schwartz
considers none of that. His total consideration of the accounting that necessarily must pre-
cede disclosure is that it is "doubtless a very complex subject" and "is not an area in which
the SEC has developed any particular competence over the years." Schwartz, supra note 33,
at 528.
425. As has been pointed out, notes 103 supra and accompanying text, social auditing
has advanced beyond the point casual observers think it may have reached. In contrast,
though, social accounting suffers because demands have been made for social accounting or
social disclosure to do much more than the financial accounting or financial disclosure have
even attempted to do. Development, although proceeding, is on again, off again due to that
phenomenon and perhaps also because there is no sense of urgency to social accounting's
refinement.
426. Setting such a date would be similar to SEC imposition of a time certain for
phasing in negotiated brokerage commission rates which was necessary to bring innovation
and reform to the broker-dealer community. See, e.g., Kaplan, Merrill Lynch Prepares for
Mayday, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 47 (Apr. 1975).
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Further refinement in executives' ability to see precisely how their
firms' operations impinge on their surroundings would occur.
(9) Disclosure Will Make Further Reform Less Abrupt
and Better Considered
Disclosure might convince ersatz reformers that certain indus-
tries or certain companies are doing more than critics have given
them credit for in some areas of concern and thus render some
reforms unnecessary. On the other hand, corporations' impacts in
certain areas, although deleterious, might be altogether different
from what critics now think they are. In those cases, with proper
disclosure, reform can be redirected. An additional pragmatic argu-
ment for disclosure is that unless it is implemented, some other type
of reform, probably more drastic, could be near. 27 A benefit of dis-
closure's acceptance might be merely to delay that reform. Whether
disclosure postpones reform or makes some or all of it unnecessary,
however, the probabilities are that the knowledge disclosure brings
and the accounting techniques disclosure develops will benefit those
contemplating further corporate law reform. Disclosure can provide
the data that is needed to gain confidence in any new arrangement
and, in the meanwhile, have a healthy effect on the way in which
many enterprises operate. Such a double result would be a certain
benefit to companies, to academicians, and to government.
C. Costs Social Accounting and Disclosure Might Impose
(1) The Information Social Accounting Could Provide Would Be
of a Soft, Speculative Variety
The cost of social accounting for corporations would be that
much of the social responsibility information they would disclose
would not be in quantified, much less monetized, form.24 Time,
effort, and hence cost, would be required to develop techniques and
to convert the information into something resembling hard data. In
427. Federal chartering advocates believe that with recent revelations about corporate
bribery and political contributions, the "political possibilities" for federally legislated corpo-
rate law reform have "changed drastically . . . anything [is] possible." BNA SEc. REG. &
L. REP. No. 307, A-i, at A-4 (June 18, 1975).
428. This was a concern of the SEC in the Natural Resources Defense Council Proceed-
ing, notes 301-20 supra and accompanying text. See, e.g., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91 80,310, at 85,717. In the better considered social audits, however, quantification, monetiza-
tion, and relationships to profit are not matters of overriding concern or urgency. See text
accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
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the meanwhile, the soft social responsibility information disclosed
would be subject to puffing and to multiple interpretations by inves-
tors. Those concerns who took a conservative accounting approach
would be seen in a bad light; those who took advantage of the
latitude soft information permits could paint a picture of social
performance better than reality would warrant. The more honest
corporation would incur a penalty, a public relations cost.
An obvious answer to this problem is that presently required
disclosure contains much more soft data and narrative information
than many observers realize or care to admit.429 Another answer is
that hard financial accounting, with its complete reduction of infor-
mation to dollars and its relation of all information to a bottom line
profit figure, can disguise the true situation as readily as can words
and quantified, but nonmonetized data. Because of that reality, the
trend in financial accounting is toward more narrative and so-called
soft information. There is a growing realization that perhaps prior
regulation has erred in giving accounting results too much certitude
and in fostering an impression among investors that numbers and
financial statements are unassailable. 430
Certainly, with increasing frequency plaintiffs' lawyers are
finding that traditional accounting results do not reveal, or indeed
can hide, the true state of corporate affairs.43" ' Lists grow longer of
fiascos in which financial accounting has misled or disguised ac-
tual results. Such lists include the National Student Marketing,
Equity Funding, Penn Central, Westec, and Four Seasons Nursing
Homes affairs, to name a few. 32 As a result, courts are close to
holding that adherence to generally accepted financial accounting
principles may not be enough to paint a sufficient picture of a com-
429. See, e.g., note 94 supra and accompanying text.
430. Fiflis finds that one of the most difficult problems with the current financial
"accounting model" is that, without fraud or intent to mislead, it is "likely to mislead the
layman, unaware of its qualifications, into believing it depicts the facts of the real world
.... " Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND.
L. REv. 31, 44 (1975).
431. In 1973 more than 500 lawsuits were pending against accountants. Arthur Ander-
son & Co. 1973 Ann. Rep. 4. As of September 1974, the estimate was as high as 1000 lawsuits
pending and 200 decisions rendered for a total of 1200. Fiflis, supra note 430 at 33; Liggio,
Expanding Concepts of Accountants' Liability, CALiF. CPA Q. 18, 19 (Sept. 1974).
432. Professor Briloff lists celebrated recent cases, including his "A to Y Roll of Dis-
honor," in which financial accounting has failed to tell the truth. Briloff, "We Often Paint
Fakes," 28 VAND. L. REV. 165, 185, 191, 197 (1975). Professor Fiflis, supra note 420, at 33,
compiles a similar list. Although the flood of litigation may be recent, the underlying unrelia-
bility of accounting in certain situations is not. See Katz, Accounting Problems in Corporate
Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 764, 776-77 (1941).
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pany's affairs. The trend is for courts to hold that accountants must
go beyond traditional accounting, if need be, and paint a "fair"
corporate portrait through footnotes to financial statements and the
like.' "3 The further inference is that to achieve a realistic representa-
tion, in many cases full and fair disclosure may require accountants
to go beyond financial statements altogether.'34
Social accounting may produce soft and speculative informa-
tion, but not much softer nor more speculative than does financial
accounting. In fact, there may be a benefit rather than a cost: a
partly narrative, partly quantified (but not forcibly quantified) so-
cial audit may point to how financial accounting can cure the false
impressions of certitude it increasingly seems to create.
(2) Social Responsibility is a Moving Target, and Costs Will Be
Incurred in Hitting a New Target Each Year
Disclosure will saddle corporations with a duty to account. As
the emphasis of social responsibility critics shifts from minority
hiring to environmental matters to whatever is the greatest current
concern of vocal activist groups, companies will incur accounting
costs. Firms will expend time and effort in constantly developing
new reservoirs of information and the accounting and disclosure
techniques needed to live up to their duty to disclose.41 Again,
however, this problem is no more severe for social accounting and
disclosure than for financial accounting and disclosure. In financial
accounting technique, recent emphasis has skipped from purchase-
pooling accounting to contingent liabilities and thence to last-in-
first-out versus first-in-first-out inventory valuation.36 The underly-
ing substantive matters to which the various accounting techniques
attach have risen to the fore and then, after a few years' publicity,
have faded away. The late 1960's conglomerate boom, lawyers' and
433. See the discussion of United States v. Simon in note 190 supra.
434. Hawes, supra note 200, at 10-11, demonstrates that such is the import of recent
decisions such as Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), and Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973).
435. The SEC attempts to demonstrate that such a problem exists by listing 100 areas
in which those interested in corporate social responsibility ostensibly want disclosure.
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,724 n.72. The SEC's list, however, is
strikingly redundant and makes no attempt to discern between the ridiculous, the vague, and
the frivolous. See notes 318-20 supra and accompanying text.
436. See Briloff, Dirty Pooling, 42 ACCOUNTNG REV. 489 (1967); Briloff, supra note 103,
on the purchase-pooling controversy; note 67 supra on lawyers' attempts to reconcile their
professional responsibilities with those of accountants; Hawes, supra note 200, at 12-15 with
reference to inflation accounting and the LIFO-FIFO controversy.
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accountants' professional responsibilities, and inflation in turn have
been causes celebre. Each has given rise to data gathering and ac-
counting problems-and to costs for corporations.
Another answer to the charge that social responsibility is a
moving target is that the number of matters of concern to those
persons seriously interested in corporate social responsibility seems
to have lessened and that number's rate of change lessened and
stabilized. Further, a consensus seems to have developed as to what
those matters of central concern are. Peripheral concerns, such as
Department of Defense contracting on the one hand and trade with
Communist countries on the other, have altogether disappeared
from most laundry lists. A small number of items now appear at the
top of every list of what constitutes social responsibility or of what
social accounting and disclosure should treat-environmental pollu-
tion, minority and female hiring and promotion, product safety,
employee plant safety and welfare, corporate philanthropy, and per-
haps corporate involvement in the local community.423 No doubt
that list will change over the coming years, but assuredly more
gradually than it has in the past. Social accounting changes and the
shifts in emphasis that engender them will still entail costs but not
those of each year bringing to the corporate and SEC doorsteps
myriad new questions to which disclosure must respond. More cor-
porate and SEC time in which to anticipate gradually evolving con-
cerns will mean a more dispassionate, relaxed atmosphere in which
to develop programs and accounting and disclosure techniques. A
more dispassionate, relaxed atmosphere translates into lower social
responsibility costs for businesses and for government.
(3) Compiling Data on Corporate Social Performance
Will Be Costly
Had large corporations never attempted to do so in the past,
they might incur significant costs in ascertaining the impact their
operations have on employee safety or on the environment, in struc-
turing programs to ameliorate those effects that are deemed harm-
437. See the authorities cited in note 107 supra. That also seems to be the consensus
at which Congress and federal agencies other than the SEC have arrived, believing that in
those areas private business corporations do have responsibilities, agreeing in what direction
those responsibilities lie, and requiring them to make one sort of account or another. See notes
217-20 supra and accompanying text. Gearing a social audit to such areas will reduce busi-
nesses' accounting and disclosure costs. The same consensus seems to emerge from institu-
tional and other investors' desires for information. See, e.g., the quotation accompanying note
145, 152 supra; the Investment Company Institute's suggestions, supra note 134.
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ful, in monitoring those programs and gathering data, and in dis-
closing information about the programs and the results they believe
those programs achieve. Many large companies, however, already
have begun these tasks. Many corporate managers have voluntarily
embarked on a bit of social auditing.38 The enlightened manager
wants to know all he can about his business, including the impacts
it has on various matters. To that end, he may have undertaken
some social accounting to see if matters of social concern affect the
financial bottom line, the company image, or share prices. Many
managers have assembled program descriptions and results into
disclosable formats, and some actually are doing the disclosing.
Many corporations' added costs in meeting SEC disclosure require-
ments, therefore, might not be as large as some individuals imagine
or claim.
Governmental regulations already require most large compa-
nies to compile statistics on a variety of matters with which social
responsibility advocates are concerned. Furthermore, companies
must report those statistics to various government agencies. Re-
quired social accounting and disclosure could keep corporate costs
down by being largely confined to those areas in which federal filings
of one sort or another already are required. 3 The only added corpo-
rate cost would lie in preparing a summary of the programs and
resources the company has devoted to achieving the statistical re-
sults required to be reported to other federal agencies. Thus, most
large American corporations are or should be only a step or two away
from a reportable social audit that would satiate the desires of most
individuals who call for social responsibility disclosures. If the SEC
confines the required disclosure to a simple audit format, along the
lines many current process audits utilize, corporate costs involved
in meeting disclosure requirements would be relatively low.
(4) Image Costs to Corporations Will Arise When Disclosure
Forces Revelation of Negative Items or Lack of Progress on Certain
Social Fronts
The maturity that recently has come to the corporate social
responsibility area answers the problem of image costs. The shrill
ultimatums of the late 1960's on a wide variety of issues have been
438. By one tabulation, 76 percent of a sample of large companies have undertaken
social accounting of one sort or another. See note 254 supra.
439. That is precisely the proposal made herein, notes 451-52 infra and accompanying
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displaced by a handful of more serious and responsible, yet more
sustained demands for corporations to relate to society. Also, there
is an ever-growing realization among investors that corporate social
responsibility is a relative concept. Thus, social responsibility no
longer means a search for a clean company in which to invest or for
a company blackened by social irresponsibility which investors
should shun. There are many shades and gradations of social per-
formance, and more and more people interested in social responsi-
bility have come to realize that fact.44 Further evidence of inter-
ested persons' relative approach to social responsibility is their will-
ingness to compare a particular company's disclosures over time to
determine if the company is making progress. Hence, relative ap-
proaches will aid in preventing corporations' initial social disclo-
sures from becoming the basis upon which a company is castigated,
if over time a company's own and other companies' disclosures show
that a corporation is earnestly moving in the right direction. Thus,
most investors, at whom social responsibility and financial disclo-
sures primarily are aimed, realize that "[o]ne must learn over time
what inferences are warranted from the numbers which any mea-
surement system generates." '441
In fashioning a social responsibility disclosure program, the
SEC also can minimize the embarrassment or breast-beating
through which companies would have to sojurn in disclosing. Disclo-
sure should not concentrate on past sins; rather, it should have a
prospective, positive focus. In the disclosure program's beginning
years, disclosure could center on a description of the problem as the
disclosing company perceives it, on a description of the program the
company has fashioned to attack the problem, and on a quantifica-
tion of the resources the company is devoting to that program.
Hence, initially, disclosure merely would force some companies to
think about and refine programs a bit. Then, gradually, disclosures'
emphasis could widen to include results that the described pro-
grams achieve and year-to-year statistical comparisons. In this way,
interested persons would have relative information while companies
developed their social programs.
440. See, e.g., notes 41 & 154-60 supra and accompanying text.
441. Commentary on Let's Get on With the Social Audit, Bus. & Soc'y Rav. 42-44
(Winter 1972-73) (remarks of Raymond A. Bauer).
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(5) An Excursion into the Socioeconomic Arena Will Cause
Loss of the SEC's Non-Controversial Status and,
Therefore, Its Effectiveness
Over the years, industry, academia, and investors have given
the SEC high ratings.14 2 With the respect of the regulated as well as
the critics, the Commission has been able to extend its track record
as an effective regulator. On a number of matters, ranging from
integration of the '33 and '34 Acts disclosure systems to implemen-
tation of negotiated brokerage commission rates and creation of the
central market system, the Commission has moved slowly but
surely toward meaningful reform. The danger is that a sudden tur-
nabout in its opposition to corporate social responsibility disclosure
would thrust the SEC into the center of controversy. Business exec-
utives would lose respect for the Commission's edicts, whereas here-
tofore businesses by and large have tried to conform to SEC policy.
These results, the scenario goes, would flow from corporate resent-
ment for the Commission's having made companies reveal all the
skeletons in the corporate closet.
There is some credibility to the belief that SEC social responsi-
bility disclosure requirements might impair the Commission's effec-
tiveness. A large portion of the SEC's good reputation derives from
its limited role, a role it has not sought to expand. Hence, the
Commission does not "make economic determinations. . . as to the
merits of any particular security or investment recommendation."' 43
The Commission requires full and fair disclosure. Once an issuer
makes that disclosure, the issuer can sell its securities, whatever the
enterprise's investment merits. By requiring companies to disclose
social performance information, the SEC would not be passing on
securities' investment merits, but the Commission nevertheless
would be expanding its role. Moreover, the Commission would be
moving toward forcing the issuers themselves to make a statement
about the moral worth or social merit of an enterprise.
Several observations can be made about this scenario. First, at
most firms social audit results would not be odious. In fact, many
large corporations do not know themselves the good things they do.
Hence, SEC-required social accounting and disclosure would not
create a wave of investor and public revulsion, coupled with corpo-
442. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 386, at 216-24; Nader, supra note 388, at 89; Ratner,
The SEC: Portrait of the Agency as a Thirty Seven Year Old, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 583 (1971).
443. Ratner, supra note 442, at 584. Cf. some states' Blue Sky law philosophy, supra
notes 113 & 272.
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rate resentment, as companies are forced to spew forth reams of
incriminating evidence."'
Secondly, although the SEC does not pass on a security's finan-
cial merits, in reality the Commission already comes close to forcing
issuers to do so themselves. As administered by the Commission,
full and fair disclosure requires a company to disclose and disclose,
until an investor's conclusion may be well-nigh irresistible. A com-
pany may not have to state flatly that it has little merit, but the
SEC will require such complete and straightforward disclosure that
in their entirety disclosure documents virtually say "there is really
very little merit here. '"1 5 Even if corporate social responsibility dis-
closures were aimed at flushing out mea culpa statements and issuer
conclusions as to their moral or social posture, the resultant disclo-
sure would not be significantly different from much financial disclo-
sure the SEC now requires.
Thirdly, the Commission's reputation derives not only from its
abstention from investment merit determination, but also from its
passive role in requiring disclosure by all companies and industries,
across the board and without selectivity, rather than in having to
deal with a narrow and captive economic sector. " ' The Commission
has not had a life-and-death power over all companies in a given
field. It has not had "the difficult and politically dangerous task of
choosing between competing applicants for a limited number of
franchises,"1 7 as does the Federal Communications Commission
and the Civil Aeronautics Board, or as a Federal Chartering Agency
in effect would have.4 The Commission need not "undertake the
444. The relative approach to judging the social responsibility of investments, notes
154-60 supra and accompanying text, also answer the question.
445. For example, the SEC requires prominently displayed chart and hydrograph dis-
closure to show prospective investors the percentage of ownership and control promoters will
receive, note 263 supra. Registration of the securities of newly founded companies or of
speculative enterprises of any type requires a blunt, no-nonsense listing of all the factors
which make the securities risky or speculative. Moreover, the registrant must insert the list
in a prominent place at the beginning of the prospectus. See, e.g., In re Woodland Oil & Gas
Co., 38 S.E.C. 485 (1958). On requirements for full, plain speaking disclosure generally, see
In re Universal Camera Corp. 19 S.E.C. 648 (1954); In re Franchard Corp., SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4710 (July 31, 1964).
446. By dealing with all industries rather than just one (railroads or airlines or the
broadcast media), there is less chance of being co-opted by a singularly organized coun-
terattack. To an extent this explains a difference between the SEC and the ICC.
Nader, supra note 388, at 87.
447. Ratner, supra note 442, at 583, explaining the Commission's success as a regulatory
agency.
448. Taking cognizance of the rising tide of opinion against creation of any more New
Deal type agencies, and the sentiment for deregulation of some industries, e.g., note 397
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imbroglios of rate determination," which result in heavy "industry
lobbying and a dependence on self-serving data," '449 together with
frequent ruination of the original intent to regulate in the public
interest.
In requiring corporate social accounting and disclosure, the
Commission would not take on such activist regulatory tasks. To be
sure, were the Commission to adopt disclosure requirements, some
executives would attempt to brand the Commission the activists'
sycophant. But closer analysis reveals that in requiring such disclo-
sure the Commission would not be changing one element in its
success formula. The Commission would still play the passive role
it has played in the past: requiring full and fair disclosure by every
publicly held company of a certain size or larger, to enable each
investor to make his or her own determination about the relative
worth of various enterprises.
VIII. A MODEST PROPOSAL-REQUIRED DISCLOSURE OF PROCESS
AUDIT RESULTS
By rule, the Commission should require a simple process audit
and disclosure of audit results. The required accounting and disclo-
sure should be kept simple, remembering that "the biggest mistake
of this juncture is to try to design," or to demand "techniques which
fully satisfy all dimensions.""4 ' Disclosure rules should require a
description of the social problem an issuer of securities believes it
is facing, with a statistical description when available. Following
the problem description would be a narrative describing the pro-
gram the company has designed to alleviate the conditions it be-
lieves to exist, together with a short narrative about the rationale
behind the program. Tabulation of the human and economic re-
supra, Ralph Nader and the Corporate Accountability Research Group have hinted at revi-
sion of their federal chartering proposal. Instead of a new Federal Chartering agency to
administer the proposed statute, they now propose that the regulatory functions the federal
chartering statute creates be parceled out to existing agencies, principally the SEC and the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITU-
TIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS
(1976); Jones, Nader Calls for Federal Charter of Business, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1976, at C-
10. This seems to be a singularly bad idea. By foisting upon the SEC the duty to pass upon
corporations' initial federal charter and upon charter renewals, the proposal would thrust
upon the SEC an active rather than passive role of the very type Nader, see supra note 446,
and others, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 397, have criticized. The further danger is that the
imbroglios and controversy so created might also infect the SEC in the other, more passive
missions it has carried out so well.
449. Nader, supra note 388, at 87.
450. Linowes, supra note 11, at 4.
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sources the company devotes to the program would be required. The
last item in the required process audit would be a list of the goals
the company hopes the program would achieve.
Monetization should not be required, much less any attempt to
demonstrate the programs' contributions to long-run profits. When
reasonably available and after a few years of beginning disclosures,
however, the SEC should begin requiring more quantification of
results, such as number of minority persons hired, number of em-
ployee accidents, number of product safety complaints, or effluent
level in parts per million. The SEC also should undertake a continu-
ing review of various quantification methods with a view towards
promulgating guidelines on how best to quantify a given item-for
example, excluding from a count of product safety complaints those
complaints not evidenced by a writing, or including work-related
injuries even though the particular employee has not lost work days.
The next question is what areas of social concern, or processes,
disclosure should treat. Again, the coverage should be modest. No
area should be included unless a near consensus exists that private
entities do have responsibilities in the area and that those responsi-
bilities lie in a certain direction and extend to certain lengths. Per-
haps a better standard would be that a formally stated executive or
legislative pronouncement must have imposed upon corporations a
duty in the area. Narrowing still further, required disclosure could
be limited to those areas in which a governmentally imposed duty
exists and a federal filing with some agency or arm of the federal
government is required. 5 '
The limitation to areas in which a federal filing is required
would not reduce SEC-required disclosure to a mere replication of
various federal filings. As has been pointed out, the disclosures
should place emphasis on the programs, strategies, and resources
companies have devoted to achieving the results that the filings
with other agencies are designed to monitor. Disclosure also could
go beyond other filings; filing with another agency would key SEC-
required disclosure over the entire spectrum of a company's activity
in the generic category involved. Hence, since indirectly the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (as to air pollution) and directly
the Clean Water Act (as to other effluents) require federal filings, a
451. See the discussion of the filings currently made, notes 217-31 supra and accompa-
nying text. The only filing not therein discussed is the corporate tax return. And, of course,
the Internal Revenue Code embodies both a policy in favor of corporate philanthropy and a
requirement of disclosure to the IRS. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 170(b)(2) & 545(b)(2).
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national policy exists in favor of some corporate abeyance of adverse
environmental effects. SEC-required disclosure, then, might per-
tain to the entire generic category-the environment. Thus, disclo-
sure also would briefly describe programs devoted to solid waste
reduction and recycling and noise level, reduction as well as to air
and water pollution. 52
Social responsibility disclosure should be required no more
often than annually. Whether this disclosure should be in the an-
nual 10K report companies file with the SEC or in the annual share-
holder report companies mail to stockholders, is becoming a moot
question. For years, beyond certain de minimus requirements, the
SEC had a hands-off policy with respect to the shareholder report,
preserving it as a vehicle for management to communicate with its
shareholders in the manner management deemed best.45 Thus, the
shareholder report tended to be a "discursive, chatty document,"
while the 10K the SEC received tended to be a thick and gray
liability-avoiding document. 54 The SEC, however, has modified, if
not discarded, that annual report philosophy and has moved much
more toward required disclosure in the glossy-paged shareholders'
report.455 That being so, corporate social responsibility information
might go in the shareholders' report, since that document is most
likely to receive wide circulation.
The last question is what companies should have to prepare a
process audit. The cutoff that first comes to mind is 12(g) status
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.456 Companies with a
class of equity securities held by 500 or more persons and having a
million dollars or more in assets must file periodic reports with the
SEC. Companies of 12(g) size, however, to the lay person's eye, can
be quite small. There is neither significant nor widespread investor
interest, let alone social responsibility interest, in many such com-
panies. Further, the limitation of resources under which many
smaller 12(g) companies operate may make fashioning a social audit
an undue burden on them. An already existing classification that
might limit social responsibility disclosures to larger companies,
452. The areas in which filings are now required and where disclosure would be required
are environment, corporate philanthropy, product safety, occupational health and safety,
minority hiring and promotion, and energy conservation and development. See notes 107, 134,
145 & 217-31 supra.
453. See Sommer, supra note 111, at 1100; supra note 214.
454. Sommer, supra note 111, at 1100.
455. See note 214 supra.
456. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
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able to carry the burden, would be having a class of securities listed
on a national stock exchange.4 57 Such a disclosure cutoff, however,
would exclude from social responsibility reporting some companies
that are quite large, but have chosen to have their securities traded
in the over-the-counter market.
A good "in-between" classification upon which to base corpo-
rate social responsibility disclosure might include all those compa-
nies that have securities traded on a national stock exchange plus
those larger companies whose securities are traded over-the-counter
and are on the margin list promulgated by the Federal Reserve. 58
Such a classification is not unknown to securities regulation or,
indeed, to disclosure requirements-the SEC has used that classifi-
cation to describe those companies to which expanded quarterly
reporting requirements will apply. The SEC has reasoned that such
a break-point includes within the reporting requirement companies
of sufficient size to be able to comply with expanded disclosure
requirements without undue hardship and in which investors have
sufficient interest to justify more quarterly disclosure.45 The same
seems true in the social responsibility area. Similarly, the Commis-
sion should require social accounting and disclosure of listed compa-
nies and those over-the-counter companies on the Federal Reserve
Board margin list.
The disclosure proposal then, is a modest and circumscribed
one: two pages or so of social responsibility disclosures in most very
large corporations' annual reports. The accounting results compa-
nies must report would be carefully limited to five or six areas in
which general agreement exists that corporations do have a duty,
including agreement of corporate executives themselves, and in a
particular direction and to a certain extent. Production of hard data
on results would be required only as the data becomes available to
reporting companies. Narrative descriptions, subject to limitations
on puffing and on the omission of material facts, would fill in the
interstices of the audit. Such a disclosure program seems eminently
reasonable. It can be required on the same bases upon which finan-
cial disclosure always has been required. Indeed, it seems the best
alternative available for gradually moving toward a new, modern
457. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
458. Such a classification would include 300 or so of the largest and best known of the
some 14,000 or more stocks traded in the over-the-counter market, Wall Street J., Sept. 12,
1975, at 5, col. 2.
459. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 177 (Sept. 10, 1975); Wall Street J., Sept. 12,
1975, at 5, col. 2. See also note 192 supra.
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model for the corporation without the severe dislocations, monu-
mental governmental intervention, or corporate resentment other
alternatives would produce.
IX. CONCLUSION
Adolf Berle once described what he called "inchoate" law:
[It] relates to the duties of corporations . . . arising from the impact on
social and economic situations forseeably resulting from a corporate course of
action. When the impact point is reached, it is predictable that hitherto unde-
termined . . . responsibility will suddenly emerge as explicit law. This result
might come about through sudden demand for and passage of legislation...
or through court decision . . . . It is the business [of corporations and their
counselors] to be aware of these fields of inchoate law and to guide corporate
policy so that results will accord, rather than conflict, with these inchoate
rules. In the truest sense this is corporate statesmenship .... 40
It is submitted that regulatory agencies, too, have a similar,
albeit muted, duty of statesmanship akin to that which Professor
Berle describes. At the SEC, for instance, commission statesman-
ship has manifested itself in anticipation of Congressional and bro-
kerage community reaction. The Commission has implemented
negotiated brokerage commission rates and a central market plan
before legislation has crystalized those reforms. In other areas, the
Commission in the exercise of statesmanship and enlightened self-
interest, regularly seeks congressional action before legislation in ill-
considered form is forced upon it.46 ' In this troublesome area of
corporate social responsibility, judging from the number, increasing
frequency, and intensity of reform proposals, Berle's impact point
seems to be approaching for both the regulators and the regulated.
Yet the SEC has done little. Instead of resisting, the Securities and
Exchange Commission should take cognizance of some "inchoate"
law's existence, and exercise some leadership.
Perhaps in conjunction with its recently announced and forth-
coming disclosure study,12 the Commission should seriously exam-
460. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. LAw. 149 (1968).
461. For example, recent SEC requests for legislation have included requests for ex-
panded authority to deal with so-called pyramid sales plans, expanded authority to deal with
securities issues by common carriers, and authority to regulate investment companies' sales
to foreign investors. In addition, the SEC has recently made a number of suggestions as to
what authority Congress should give the Commission to regulate banks in the automatic
investment plan and other areas. See generally BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 317, at A-9 to
A-10 (Aug. 27, 1975).
462. On Jan. 7, 1976, SEC Chairperson Roderick Hills told the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants that the SEC is soon to announce a 12-18 month study on "the
objectives of our disclosure policy and our means of implementing those objectives." In part,
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ine social accounting and disclosure. Perhaps, in the meanwhile, the
Commission could require some modest social accounting by corpo-
rations.463 If the Commission feels insecure in the area, perhaps it
should explore congressional feeling about disclosure and other re-
form proposals and consider the possibility of explicit legislative
disclosure requirements. Should the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission not begin a study of this area of "inchoate" law and should
it not exercise some statesmanship and leadership, the prospects are
that the Commission, publicly held corporations, and investors will
meet with an abrupt imposition of some heavy-handed, wasteful,
and theoretically unsound or uncertain corporate law reform and
new corporate law model. At a minimum, the Commission, corpora-
tions, and investors will continue to face uncertainty in this trouble-
some social responsibility area for a long, long time to come. Com-
panies, investors, and others need a Cheshire Cat to tell them
"where to go" and "how to get there." Some social accounting has
begun; let it proceed and progress, and let some disclosure of ac-
counting results begin under the considered mandate of the SEC.
though, the study will go off on a new track, attempting "to face up to the criticisms of
economists and accountants and lawyers that our disclosure policies overall are not as rele-
vant as they could be." The study will not confine itself to an investigation based on disclo-
sure's traditional premises, as the Wheat Report had done. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
335, E-1, at E-3 (Jan. 14, 1976). On Feb. 2, 1976, the SEC announced the appointment of
various experts to the new study group. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5673. Such a study
presents an opportunity for a thorough, open-minded consideration of social accounting and
disclosure matters, in contradistinction to the adversary setting. See, e.g., the discussion of
Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, notes 274-321 supra and accompanying text,
that heretofore has clouded the issues involved.
463. The Commission has not denied that it has the authority to require some social
responsibility disclosures. In the Natural Resources Defense Council proceeding the SEC
characterized its authority as enabling it to require disclosure on matters that are not only
primarily economic in nature but of matters "of economic significance" or having an impact
on economic matters. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,310, at 85,710. In fact, the Commission
noted that its "broad discretion to require disclosure provides necessary latitude to expand
or contract disclosure rules in light of changes in the relative context in which securities
issuers conduct their businesses." Id. at 85,712.
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